Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985

119. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

New York, September 29, 1983

SUBJECT

• KAL: My Talks in New York

My discussions of the KAL incident thus far in New York have confirmed the correctness of the basic approach contained in my memorandum to you of September 27.² Specifically, I have found broad support here for the way in which you have handled the KAL tragedy and an encouraging understanding among a wide range of countries, by no means restricted to the NATO Allies, of what this incident tells us about the Soviet Union.

My discussions in New York have also made clear that our efforts following the September 29 end of the two-week boycott of service to and from Moscow by most of our key Allies should concentrate on two key areas, namely,

(1) efforts in ICAO to obtain a clear and conclusive report on the shootdown, with recommendations for follow-up action in that organization to prevent future occurrences of this type; and

(2) continued pressure on the Soviet Union, together with the other countries whose nationals perished in this tragedy, to provide compensation.

We should also press forward with the search effort. If we can recover either or both of the flight recorders, we will be in a better position to put to rest once and for all any Soviet allegations that the KAL aircraft was engaged in a spy mission on behalf of the United States. Our handling of the search effort, in particular the inclusion of ICAO representatives as well as officials from several other of the countries involved, and our readiness to allow the ICAO to analyze the recorders if they are found, puts us on the high ground as far as this important aspect is concerned.

In my talks here with Allied and other friendly Foreign Ministers, I have explored with them the possibility of extending the boycott beyond September 29. Not unexpectedly, I have detected that we should avoid high-level pressure on our friends and Allies to extend the boycott so as not to place in jeopardy what we have accomplished to date. Rather, I believe we should declare victory in view of the impressive line-up of countries which joined the boycott, while privately encouraging key countries to continue this effort. We should also continue to work quietly with the pilot groups and other unions which might be prepared to continue their boycott of service to and from the Soviet Union.

The KAL tragedy will doubtless figure importantly in my press backgrounder in New York on Friday afternoon.³ On this occasion and elsewhere, the press will seek to draw us into a dispute with our Allies regarding the extension of the boycott. Given the success which you have achieved thus far in establishing a common, consistent and coherent international reaction to the KAL tragedy, I believe that we should refrain from any public criticism of our Allies for not extending the boycott and, as I suggested above, call attention to the impressive participation in this manifestation of revulsion at the Soviet action. This is the line which I propose to take at my Friday press backgrounder.

1. Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive Chronology (09/29/1983–09/30/1983); NLR–775–10–11–3–5. Secret; Sensitive. In an attached covering memorandum to Shultz, Burt wrote: “The boycott of flights in and out of the Soviet Union will come to an end on Thursday, September 29th. In anticipation of this, you will want to keep the President informed of our efforts here in New York to shape the continuing international response to the KAL incident.”
2. See Document 117. Shultz was in New York for the UN General Assembly session.
3. Not found.