Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985

118. Memorandum From Donald Fortier of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, September 28, 1983

SUBJECT

• KAL: The Forgotten Elements

Tocqueville once observed that under despotisms people are told nothing, while in free societies they are told everything. In the latter case, fundamental questions are sometimes obscured by a forest of detail. The validity of this observation has been driven home anew in the KAL incident. There, both the press and the bureaucracy have focused on a disparate array of issues: the retrieval of debris, the duration of the boycott, the pursuit of claims, the functioning of Soviet air defenses, airline safety measures, and so forth. These are all laudable objects of attention—and indeed the President’s public posture has been just right. The Secretary’s memo to the President continues to focus on these matters, and the follow-up actions he recommends are essentially correct.² I do believe, however, that his memo overstates the actual punitive effect of what our allies have done to date. Indeed, there is evidence that the pilots’ association—demoralized by the limited duration of official boycotts—may be on the verge of relaxing its measures as well.

Are there, however, important—if subterranean—fundamentals that are now being lost sight of as we grind away on operational matters? I think so. To me the neglected questions are as follows: What does the incident and its handling tell us about relations between Andropov and the Soviet military? Second, leaving aside the precise motivation for the attack, what impact is the incident likely to have on the security attitudes of our Asian partners (and others). And, if the most likely long-term reaction from them is greater fear rather than responsiveness, what can we do to offset this tendency? Third, apart from our statesmanlike public posture, are we adequately communicating—through quiet measures in Afghanistan and elsewhere—the kind of firmness that can signal the Soviets that we can impose real costs, as well as symbolically effective ones.

Regarding the first question, much confusion exists. For example, in discussing the unusual prominence of the Soviet military in “explaining” the incident, some columnists have suggested the military is now in a more dominant position than ever. Another possibility, however, is that Andropov has pushed the military onto center stage to distance himself from world opprobrium and to protect his own position in the succession crisis. Some speculate that the Soviet general staff—miffed at certain decisions that have not gone their way—deliberately failed to notify the political authorities as a show of independence. If so, then similar such displays may occur in the future. We may not be able to precisely answer any of these questions, but we need to put our best minds to the task. These are not just theoretical questions, inasmuch as the answers hold vital implications for U.S. foreign policy over the next year and beyond.

Second, how is the incident likely to affect our security partners, and what does it suggest in terms of an increasing Soviet tendency to use force for intimidation? You correctly advised State not to put out the line that recent Soviet toughness in the Middle East and elsewhere is a consequence of the KAL. Indeed, if anything, the KAL shootdown is but part of a pattern of toughness worldwide. That pattern is longstanding, and comes as no surprise, but we still need to ask ourselves whether that pattern has not recently taken a noticeable turn toward the worse. The answer would appear to be yes. In addition to the obvious examples: ever more aggressive support for client states and an unwillingness to try to shape a face-saving retreat in Afghanistan (indeed, the Soviets have suddenly begun to increase their Afghan infrastructure on the Iranian border), we have less obvious indicators, such as provocative submarine intrusions in the northern flank that have caused some Norwegians and Swedes to believe the Soviets are self-consciously accelerating their war planning. And we have seen Soviet nuclear threats to Japan and Korea that are so blunt as to be reminiscent of the Khrushchev era.

I believe that consciously—or subconsciously—this pattern of more overt intimidation is having some effect. If so, we may find the short-term outrage and cooperation (in Europe and Asia) giving way to greater implicit fear of the Soviet Union—and hence greater accommodation. If we are to offset this we must do more than consult. We need to concentrate on measures—described in the original decision memo but ignored in the current State plan—such as deployments of F–16s to Japan, AWACs, and so on. These measures do not need to be advertised publicly; indeed, they shouldn’t. But we have to be clear enough about their importance internally that the bureaucracy does not lose sight of them.

Finally, there is the question of the signals we privately send to the Soviets. I am myself confused by the Secretary’s recent reassurance to the allies that we do not intend to allow the incident “to throw our policy toward the Soviet Union off course.” If he means we won’t sidetrack arms control, that is one thing. But I assume our policy toward the Soviets continues to be a mix of incentives and disincentives, of dialogue and firmness. If so, then, if anything, the Korean incident suggests we need to more comprehensively enrich our package of available disincentives. That to me is the importance of the Afghan measures I recommended to you at the time of the shootdown—measures which Diane Dornan has now fleshed out.

Moreover, if the trend of Soviet intimidation by force continues, and indeed if dramatic new incidents arise, then we will also need other tools with which we can work. The New Republic wrote that the Korean incident demonstrated that—given the futility of sanctions—the West has no effective response to Soviet brutality.³ We cannot allow this perception to take root. The most effective long-term response is the one we have emphasized—rebuilding our strength. The problem is this may not deter the Soviets over the near term where they will enjoy the fruits of their own extended buildup and years of Western disinvestment in defense. We need to then concentrate on political-military measures we can take to increase costs over the near term. At our earlier direction, the CIA has been working on a series of papers on the vulnerabilities of key Soviet proxy states. The problem is that these studies are not due to be completed until late next year, [1½ lines not declassified]. These studies need to be accelerated and a parallel and highly restricted policy group established to develop contingent responses based on this work.

One final note. One of the signal achievements of this Administration has been to elevate the importance of public diplomacy. The danger in this is that sometimes public diplomacy serves as a tempting substitute for real policy. We cannot allow that to happen here.

How then to translate all this porridge into action? I recommend the following:

First, we should concur generally in the work program outlined by the Shultz memo, though we will want to follow the International Court of Justice option closely to ensure we do not have to pay a heavy price for the involvement of others. Roger Robinson will monitor this package.

Second, Jack Matlock, Ken deGraffenreid and I should convene a small group of Soviet experts—both inside the government and out—to review the data and explore the implications of the incident for Soviet internal politics and future decision making. We will submit a short report directly to you.⁴

Third, the Korean incident has made the political-military dimension of the President’s Asian trip more important than before.⁵ I recommend that you send a directive to Shultz and Weinberger making this point and directing that Gaston and I jointly chair a small panel—comprised of Howe, Wolfowitz, Armitage, and General Thompson—to explore trip-related political-military proposals that help to build upon existing regional concern in light of the shootdown.

Fourth, we need quick follow-through by CIA on the Afghanistan options. Moreover, we need to ask Casey to accelerate and restructure the proxy vulnerability work. (We will prepare a separate memo on this should you concur.)⁶

Fifth, in order to be better prepared to have quiet but effective responses to future Soviet intimidation, Jack and I should take the lead in transforming the CIA studies into action proposals. This should be a highly restricted effort.

Roger Robinson, David Laux and Jack Matlock concur.

Recommendation

That you sign your memo at Tab I to the President forwarding Secretary Shultz’s memo.⁷

1. Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, KAL (3/3). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. This memorandum is unsigned.
2. Attached at Tab A is the September 27 memorandum from Shultz to Reagan; see Document 117.
3. See Joseph Finder, “Reagan’s Big Schtick,” New Republic, vol. 189, Issue 14, pp. 13–15.
4. Reagan traveled to Tokyo from November 8 to 12 and Seoul from November 12 to 14.
5. Not found.
6. Not found.
7. Tab I, the undated memorandum from Clark to Reagan transmitting the copy of Shultz’s September 27 memorandum (see footnote 2, above), is attached but not printed. Clark did not check his approval or disapproval of the recommendation.