124. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Montgomery) to Secretary of State Shultz

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive, October 1–31 1983. Secret; Noforn; Nocontract; Orcon. Drafted by Wayne Limberg, INR/SEE; cleared by L. Carter, NESA/SOA. Hill’s handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on October 11.

125. Memorandum of Conversation

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron October 1983 [10/11/1983–10/24/1983]. Secret. According to a typed notation from Matlock, the meeting took place at “The Buck Stops Here” cafeteria. A covering memorandum from Matlock to Clark on October 14, is stamped “RCM has seen,” indicating that McFarlane saw the memorandum of conversation.

126. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan

Source: Reagan Library, Kenneth deGraffenreid Files, Subject File, [Active Measures: 1983–1985]. Confidential. Sent for action. Prepared by deGraffenreid. Reagan wrote in the upper right-hand corner: “Could I have the attached for possible use in Sat. Radio broadcasts? RR.” On an attached routing slip, Poindexter wrote to Linhard: “Bob, See President’s note. Judge would like to have a radio address prepared for Pres that talks about Soviet active measures in a general way. JP.”

127. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N830010–0138. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

128. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 10, Executive Secretariat Sensitive Chronology (10/22/1983–10/31/1983); NLR–775–10–25–5–8. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Dunkerley and Tefft; cleared by Pascoe and Niles. A stamped notation reading “GPS” appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. McKinley’s handwritten initials are in the upper-right corner, indicating he saw it on October 26. In the upper right-hand margin is a typed note to Burt from Shultz: “An excellent memo. Pls turn into a Sec-Pres, undated, to send over on Friday. G.” An undated, unsigned copy of a memorandum from Shultz to Reagan is ibid.

129. Note From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 1, Executive Secretariat Super Sensitive Chronology (10/28/1983–11/14/1983); NLR–775–1–58–3–4. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe on October 25. McKinley’s handwritten initials are in the upper-right corner, indicating he saw it on October 29.

130. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (10/26/83–10/31/83); NLR–748–24–38–10–9. Secret.

131. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (10/26/83–10/31/83). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Prepared by Matlock. A copy was sent to Bush. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. With the resignation of Clark, Reagan appointed his deputy, Robert “Bud” McFarlane to the position of the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs on October 17.

132. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1983 (10/20/1983–11/07–1983); NLR–362–3–14–1–0. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Although undated, the memorandum was likely sent on November 3 or 4.

133. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830658–0555. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to the Consulate in Leningrad, Beijing, Bonn, London, Paris, USNATO, USUN, Belgrade, Berlin, Bucharest, Budapest, Munich, Prague, Sofia, Warsaw, Tokyo, and the Mission in Geneva.

134. Article in the National Intelligence Daily

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 88T00528R: Policy Files (1982–1984), Box 1, Folder 1: VC/NIC Chron January–March 1984. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified].

135. Editorial Note

136. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan

Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Chronological File, Chron (Official) November 1983; NLR–362–6–10–5–7. Secret.

137. Memorandum of Conversation

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979–1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, November 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Eagleburger; approved by Shultz on December 6. Shultz’s approval is noted on another copy. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1983 Soviet Union Nov) A stamped notation reading “GPS” appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. The surnames for Kondrashev and Kvitsinskiy are misspelled throughout the document. On the cover note from Eagleburger, Shultz wrote: “LSE, excellent summary.”

138. Notes of a Meeting

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, [Saturday Group Notes] (November–December 1983). No classification marking. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s Dining Room at the Department of State. In his book, Matlock explained the origin of the small group meetings: “Despite his impatience to get relations with Moscow on a constructive track, Reagan did not seem to be focusing on the substantive issues. Decisions were stalled by squabbles among the various agencies. Shultz noticed this, of course, and tried to break the logjam within the administration by starting a series of Saturday breakfasts for senior officials. Shultz and McFarlane asked me to organize the meetings and act as executive secretary. They wanted to make sure that all the participants could be seated around a single table in a dining room on the eighth floor of the State Department. They also insisted that the fact of the meetings, as well as the content of the discussions, be kept confidential.” (Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, p. 75)

139. Action Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Bosworth) to Secretary of State Shultz

Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 11/16–30/83. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Sestanovich; cleared by Azrael and Kaplan. Forwarded through Eagleburger, who wrote in the margin: “G.S.: This is very much worth reading. LSE.” A stamped notation reading “GPS” appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. McKinley’s handwritten initials are at the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it on November 22, and Hill’s handwritten initials are in the upper-right corner, indicating he saw it on November 28.

140. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 1D, 1983—Soviet Union—November. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons and Palmer on November 16. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Simons initialed for Palmer. McKinley’s handwritten initials are at the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it on November 22.

141. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 1D, 1983—Soviet Union—November. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Dunkerley; cleared by Simons and Palmer. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Simons initialed for Palmer. A stamped notation reading “GPS” appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. Two handwritten notes in the upper right-hand corner read: “Given direct to McFarlane by GPS 12/3” and “done & given to Bud.” McKinley’s handwritten initials are at the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it, and Hill’s handwritten initials are in the upper-right corner, indicating he saw it on December 3.

142. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Stadis.

143. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830731–0263. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Bonn, London, Paris, USNATO, USUN, Brussels, Copenhagen, Ottawa, and Rome.

144. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (12/13/83); NLR–748–24–43–1–3. Confidential. Sent for information. A handwritten note at the top of the page by McFarlane reads: “This just doesn’t seem plausible to me (i.e. severe anxiety & fear of war). M.”

145. Memorandum From the Chief U.S. Arms Negotiator, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations (Nitze) and the Chief U.S. Arms Negotiator, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Rowny) to Secretary of State Shultz

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive December 1983. Secret. Forwarded through Adelman. Copies were sent to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs. A stamped notation reading “GPS” appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it.

146. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger)

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive December 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Dunkerley on December 9; cleared by Simons, Palmer, Haass in substance, Kelly, and Baraz for information. An unknown hand initialed for Dunkerley. Hill’s handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on December 16. A stamped notation indicates Eagleburger saw the memorandum on December 19. He wrote in the margin: “Very good piece! LSE.”

147. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Head of State Correspondence (US-USSR) December 1983. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for action. A handwritten notation in the upper right-hand corner, likely by McFarlane, reads: “Return by courier.”

148. Talking Points Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 88B00443R: Policy Files (1980–1986), Box 14, Folder: DCI Memo Chron (1–31 Dec ’83). Secret. The talking points were likely drafted by Gates for Casey’s discussion with Reagan on the “Spy War” and the general reporting on the increased Soviet intelligence activities related to the “war scare.” (See Document 135.) In his memoir, Gates recalled: “Casey met with Reagan on December 22 and advised him that we had learned that in November there had been a GRU (Soviet military intelligence) instruction to all posts to obtain early warning of enemy military preparations so that the Soviet Union would not be surprised by the actual threat of war. All posts were to try to determine ‘the enemy’s’ intentions and actions. Finally, the GRU elements were to create new agent groups abroad with the capability of communicating independently with GRU headquarters. The DCI told the President on that December day that the KGB and GRU information ‘seems to reflect a Soviet perception of an increased threat of war and a realization of the necessity to keep intelligence flowing to Moscow during wartime or after a rupture in diplomatic relations.’” (Gates, From the Shadows, pp. 271–272) No record of a meeting with Casey on December 22 appears in the President’s schedule. However, a telephone call from Reagan to Casey at 5:15 p.m. was noted. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary)

On December 23, Casey sent the President a memorandum dated December 22 on “the Spy War and Doomsday Talk,” which directly correlates to these talking points; however, the memorandum was a short summary and did not include as much detail on Soviet collection activities. In the covering memorandum to Reagan, Casey wrote: “In line with our telephone conversation, I am sending a little reading for your trip west: First, is a memo reporting on the latest development in the ongoing espionage war. Together with the report I sent to you a few weeks ago, it may say a lot about the Soviet state of mind today. There are other reports indicating a range of reaction from prevailing nervousness to fear and grudging respect for our policies in the Soviet view of the state of our relationship today. Whether this represents a threat or an opportunity is the continuing question.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 88B00443R: Policy Files (1980–1986), Box 1, Folder: Meeting w/the President (Backup) (10 Jan ’84))

149. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, E.4, President/Andropov Correspondence. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Hill; cleared in S/S-O and by McFarlane; approved by Dam. Sent for information Immediate to Shultz. A handwritten note reads: “Letter delivered to Gromyko on 12/24—no cable (reported by phone).”

150. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (12/20/83–12/28/83); NLR–748–24–46–6–5. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Reagan initialed this copy of the telegram, indicating that he saw it.

151. Report Prepared in the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (12/20/83–12/28/83); NLR–748–24–46–8–3. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared by [3 names not declassified]. Reagan initialed this copy of the report, indicating that he saw it.

152. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/03/84–01/04/84). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burt on January 3. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. A handwritten note on a Department of State copy of this memorandum reads: “Original Sec/Pres hand carried by GPS to WH.” A telegram was drafted for Hartman in Moscow on January 4 reporting on this meeting. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 2C, 1984—Soviet Union—January)

153. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Bosworth) to Secretary of State Shultz

Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 1/1–15/83. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Eagleburger’s Executive Assistant, William Montgomery, initialed for Eagleburger. A stamped notation reading “GPS” appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. McKinley’s handwritten initials are at the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it on January 5. In a covering memorandum to Shultz, Bosworth wrote: “The attached memorandum is an effort by Jeremy Azrael and Steve Sestanovich to identify some US initiatives that may deserve consideration as you prepare for your meeting with Gromyko. We are aware that each of these initiatives raises serious bureaucratic, political, and strategic problems. However, we are also conscious of the problems that could arise from a continued stalemate in US-Soviet relations and believe that this is the almost certain outcome of our standing pat on attempting to revive our former ‘small step’ gameplan.” See footnote 4, Document 31.