September 1983–October 1983
“Controlled Fury”: Shootdown of KAL 007
85. Telegram From the National Security Agency
Source: Reagan Library, Intelligence Directorate, NSC Records, 1981–1989, Series I: Subject File, Korean Airlines Disaster 09/01/1983: (09/01/1983–09/15/1983); NLR–262–1–17–4–7. Secret; Spoke; Flash. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.
86. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz
Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, September 1–8 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Drafted by Simons and John Hawes (EUR/RPM); cleared by Hartman and Palmer. Simons initialed for Hartman and Palmer.
87. Memorandum From Donald Fortier of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)
Source: Reagan Library, Donald Fortier Files, Subject File, KAL Shoot Down 09/01/1983; NLR–195–6–57–1–6. Secret. Sent for information. Clark’s stamp appears on the memorandum, indicating he saw it.
88. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan
Source: National Security Council, Institutional Files, NSPG Meetings, Box SR 108, NSPG 0068, 2 Sep 83 Soviet Downing of Korean Airliner. Secret; Sensitive.
89. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz
Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, September 1–8 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons; cleared by Hartman and Palmer. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Simons initialed for Burt, Hartman, and Palmer. Hill’s handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on September 2.
90. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan
Source: National Security Council, Institutional Files, NSPG Meetings, Box SR 108, NSPG 0068, 2 Sep 83 Soviet Downing of Korean Airliner. Secret. Printed from an uninitialed copy. On September 2, Reagan returned to Washington from his ranch in California, arriving at the White House at 5:43 p.m. The NSPG meeting Clark discussed in this memorandum began in the Situation Room at 6 p.m. From a comment in Shultz’s memoir (see Document 84), it is clear that Clark was with Reagan in California, and likely returned with him to Washington on Air Force One. See also footnote 3, Document 88.
91. Notes by Secretary of Defense Weinberger of a National Security Planning Group Meeting
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Appointment and Diary File, Box 9, Notes Set B, 1983 #25–41. No classification marking. The editor transcribed this text from Weinberger’s handwritten notes of the NSPG meeting. An image of the notes is Appendix D. The NSPG meeting to “discuss the Soviet attack on the Korean civil airliner” was held in the Situation Room from 6 p.m. to 7:57 p.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) No formal record of the meeting was found.
92. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N830008–0162. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Stadis. Drafted by Simons; cleared by Palmer, Burt, McKinley, and in S/S–O; approved by Eagleburger.
93. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Bosworth) to Secretary of State Shultz
Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 9/1–15/83. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by R. Braibanti on September 2; cleared by M. Wiznitzer (PM/RSA), L. Einaudi (ARA/PPC), and for information by M. Minton (EUR/SOV). Braibanti initialed for all clearing officials. A stamped notation reading “GPS” appears on the covering memorandum of this packet, indicating Shultz saw it.
95. National Security Decision Directive 102
Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 102, U.S. Response to Soviet Destruction of KAL Airliner. Secret. On September 6, Clark sent the signed NSDD to Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, Kirkpatrick, Vessey, Secretary of Transportation Elizabeth Dole, Wick, and Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration J. Lynn Helms. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron November 1983 (2/4))
96. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz
Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, September 1–8 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons; cleared by J.H. Smith (L/LEI) and Palmer. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Simons initialed for all clearing officials.
98. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State and the Embassy in Spain
Source: Reagan Library, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, NSC USSR File, USSR-KAL Incident (09/01/83) (3); NLR–170–17–40–1–9. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Sent for information to Leningrad, Bonn, London, Paris, USNATO, USUN, Seoul, and Tokyo. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.
99. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger to President Reagan
Source: Reagan Library, John Lenczowski Files, NSC Files, Chron File September 1983; NLR–324–11–25–2–0. Confidential. A note on the routing slip indicates that Poindexter presented this information to Reagan during his daily briefing on September 7.
100. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Hill) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)
Source: Reagan Library, Robert Lilac Files, Arms Transfer, Subject File/1981–84, AT (Arms Transfers): [Korean Airlines] KAL [09/10/1983]; NLR–332–14–35–1–4. Secret. A covering memorandum dated September 10 to Clark from Lilac and Robinson indicates the NSC received this set of papers.
101. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Shultz in Madrid
Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830516–1096. Confidential; Flash; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Moscow, Seoul, Tokyo, the White House, and USUN. Drafted and approved by Kelly. Cleared in S/S–O and the KAL Working Group.
102. Memorandum From John Lenczowski and Kenneth deGraffenreid of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)
Source: Reagan Library, Robert Lilac Files, Arms Transfer, Subject File/1981–84, AT (Arms Transfers): [Korean Airlines] KAL [09/07/1983]; NLR–332–14–32–1–7. Secret. Sent for action. Lenczowski initialed for deGraffenreid.
103. Memorandum From John Lenczowski and Kenneth deGraffenreid of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)
Source: Reagan Library, John Lenczowski Files, NSC Files, Chron File September 1983; NLR–324–11–25–6–6. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Lenczowski initialed for deGraffenreid.
104. Memorandum of Conversation
Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to the United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz/Gromyko in Madrid September 8, 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Krimer; approved by Shultz. The meeting took place in the U.S. Ambassador’s Residence in Madrid. In his memoir, Shultz recalled: “I went over to our ambassador’s residence after lunch to prepare for Gromyko’s arrival. I planned to take him into a small room with only our interpreters and try to talk to him directly, first about human rights and then about the KAL downing. When he arrived, we went into the study for half an hour. The atmosphere was tense. He was totally unresponsive.” Shultz continued: “I then turned to the Soviets’ attack on KAL 007. Once again, Gromyko was totally intransigent. I regarded this meeting as a last effort to come to grips with this crisis with him on a human level, but it was fruitless.” (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, pp. 369–370)
105. Memorandum of Conversation
Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to the United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz/Gromyko in Madrid September 8, 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Krimer; cleared by Matlock, Hartman, Burt, and Palmer; approved by Shultz. Brackets are in the original. The meeting took place in the U.S. Ambassador’s Residence in Madrid.
107. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Bosworth) to Secretary of State Shultz
Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, September 1–8 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Hill’s handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on September 8.
108. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State and the White House
Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Flash; Nodis.
109. Memorandum From Richard Levine and Peter Sommer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)
Source: Reagan Library, Robert Lilac Files, Arms Transfer, Subject File/1981–84, AT (Arms Transfers): [Korean Airlines] KAL [09/09/1983]; NLR–332–14–33–4–3. Confidential. Sent for action. Cleared by Lilac and Robinson. Sommer initialed for Levine, Lilac, and Robinson.
110. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (Gates) to Director of Central Intelligence Casey and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (McMahon)
Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1983, 400641. Secret. Casey forwarded the memorandum to Clark on September 12. In an attached covering memorandum to Clark, September 12, deGraffenreid noted: “The DCI marked this IMMEDIATE, so I am sending it to you directly without complete staffing. However, Gates’ points seem well taken, and I recommend that it be circulated widely on our staff and Gates’ points fully considered.” Clark wrote “NO” to the side of this recommendation and noted at the bottom: “Let’s hold up for now.” In a follow-up note to Poindexter, deGraffenreid reported: “Bob Gates called to say he had just learned that the DCI sent his memo here. He is a bit worried that because his criticism of State could be misinterpreted that we limit distribution of his memo. I agree. We can just pull out the thoughts.”
111. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Foreign Intelligence Council (Casey) to the National Foreign Intelligence Board and the National Foreign Intelligence Council
Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1983, 400683. No classification marking. Although an unidentified “Attachment 1” is noted at the bottom of the memorandum, no attachment was found.
112. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz
Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, September 1–8 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe and Simons; cleared by Niles. Simons initialed for Pascoe. Kelly initialed the memorandum for Burt. Hill’s handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on September 16. An administrative action changed the title of the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs on September 15.
113. Memorandum From Robert Lilac of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)
Source: Reagan Library, Robert Lilac Files, Arms Transfer, Subject File/1981–84, AT: [Korean Airlines KAL 007: Intelligence] (Binder); NLR–332–14–55–2–1. Secret. Sent for action. Lenczowski, Sommer, deGraffenreid, Raymond, and Robinson concurred. Lilac initialed for Lenczowski, and a note indicates that Raymond’s concurrence was verbal. Clark’s stamp appears on the memorandum, indicating he saw it.