This memorandum assesses the Soviet Union’s growing involvement in the
Western Hemisphere. The Executive Summary, Tab 1, includes suggested
talking points for your meeting with Gromyko at the UN. Tab 2
provides additional background information on: the Soviet Union’s
evolving attitude toward the Americas, possible future Soviet actions,
the U.S. response, and how to discuss this problem with the
Soviets.2
Tab 1
Executive Summary of a Paper Prepared in the
Policy Planning Council3
THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
(Executive Summary)
The Soviet Union’s growing assertiveness in the Western Hemisphere
poses new challenges for the U.S. Until the mid-1970’s the Soviets
placed the region at or near the bottom of their foreign policy
agenda. But during the 1970’s the Soviets had reason to reevaluate
their assumptions about Latin America. The Soviets apparently have
now accepted the validity of the Cuban “armed struggle” thesis, at
least for Central America.
Elements of the trend toward greater Soviet involvement include the
use of Cuba as a political-military proxy, increased weapons
deliveries to Cuba, intensified use of Cuba as a Soviet military
platform, military assistance for Nicaragua and Grenada, and
expanded trade with South America.
The cumulative effect of Moscow’s actions in the Western Hemisphere
is to undermine the two-ocean security buffer that the U.S.
traditionally has relied upon for protection of the Americas from
its major adversaries. There is also a growing danger that Soviet
miscalculation of how important the region is to the U.S. could lead
to a superpower military confrontation.
Soviet deployment of nuclear weapons in the Western Hemisphere seems
unlikely, even in response to INF
deployments in Western Europe. There are, however, a number of steps
Soviets might take over the next few years that would cause the U.S.
serious problems. Of most immediate concern is the possibility
of:
—expansion of direct Soviet military involvement in
Nicaragua,
—support for Cuban combat troops in Nicaragua,
—delivery through intermediaries of sophisticated weapons to the
Salvadoran guerrillas.
There are no magic “linkage” or “talking tough” strategies that will
make the Soviet threat in this hemisphere disappear. The core of our
response must remain the set of concrete actions we take in this
[Page 322]
hemisphere to demonstrate our resolve and to make the
region a less favorable environment for the Soviets.
But our concrete actions can be reinforced by a policy of
communicating our concerns clearly and forthrightly to the Soviets
so that they can avoid a miscalculation that could be disastrous for
both sides. Our recent actions—the President’s strong public
commitment to protecting U.S. interests in Central America, the contra program, the training facility in
Honduras, and large-scale military maneuvers—provide a window in
which we can now convey a somewhat sterner message to the
Soviets.
Our most serious and immediate concern is the Soviet/Cuban role in
Central America. We want the Soviets to 1) pressure Cuba and
Nicaragua to end their support for Salvadoran and other Central
American revolutionaries, and 2) sever Soviet/Cuban military ties
with the Sandinistas. By setting forth these long-range objectives
to the Soviets at this point, we can help them avoid miscalculation
and condition them to their ultimate acceptance. We should place our
Central America concerns within the broad trend of increased Soviet
involvement in the Western Hemisphere, however, lest the Soviets be
encouraged to move in areas where we have neglected to raise
objections.
We suggest that you make your UN
meeting with Gromyko the
primary vehicle for a broad discussion on Latin America. Following
are points that might be included in the discussion:
—Soviet and Cuban actions in the hemisphere have grown
increasingly bold and provocative over the last few years.
—These actions include support for Central American subversives,
the military buildup in Nicaragua, the modernization of the
Cuban armed forces, growing Cuban/Soviet security ties with
Grenada and Suriname, and more intensive Soviet use of Cuba as a
military platform (mention as an illustration the recent TU–142
Bear F ASW aircraft flights out
of Cuba, since we have not raised this with the Soviets yet; we
should not, however, label the flights “unacceptable.”)
—We do not view these as isolated actions, but as part of a
pattern of increased Soviet interference in the Americas. We
note with particular concern that the Soviet Union now seems to
support fully the Cuban doctrine of “armed struggle” as the best
path to revolution in Central America.
—The U.S. has important interests in Central America; the Soviet
Union does not. The Soviet Union and Cuba should have no
illusions about our determination to uphold our interests. Such
illusions will only increase the chance of dangerous
confrontation, which neither side seeks.
—You should also know that we will hold the Soviet Union
responsible for the activities of its clients that directly or
indirectly affect U.S. interests in the Americas. This includes
the sending of jet fighters or armed Cuban forces to Nicaragua,
or any similar escalation, which would be simply
unacceptable.
[Page 323]
—We are pursuing a policy that we hope will lead to a peaceful
solution to the Central America crisis.
—U.S. policy is working. We intend to provide the Salvadoran
government with enough military assistance to turn the tide
against the FMLN-FDR, and we will continue to press for reforms
to broaden that government’s popular appeal. In contrast, there
is every indication that the Sandinista government in Nicaragua
is losing popular support and that the contras are growing, and will continue to grow, in
strength.
—In sum, it is clear that events in Central America are running
in our favor.
—We intend to press our advantages until Nicaragua and Cuba
terminate their support for Central American revolutionaries and
Nicaragua severs its military ties with the Soviet bloc. We also
support the Contadora process, and hope that it can reach a
solution consistent with these goals, as well as the other goals
of the Act of San Jose.
—But if the negotiations process fails, you should know we are
prepared to employ the other means at our disposal to uphold our
interests.
