Attached is a revised version of the presentation I am suggesting
that:
—incorporates the points you wanted made on our direct
military-to-military links proposal;
—reflects the more forthcoming tone and specific requests the Soviets
have been making about our search operations near the crash site;
—puts U.S. markers on Central America and the Middle East on a
contingency basis only, since taking the initiative on regional issues
is too likely to invite a broad-ranging diatribe designed to divert
attention from the issues you wish to raise.
The presentation I am suggesting focusses on three set of issues: the
airliner (and the President’s proposal for military-to-military
communications links), arms control treaty compliance (missile testing
and especially the radar), and human rights (Shcharanskiy plus Jewish
emigration/anti-Semitism).
All three issues fall basically into the same category of Soviet behavior
that constitutes a threat to international order. On all three we are
justly accusing the Soviets of irresponsible conduct that makes it
difficult to move forward in any field, and demanding corrective action
at Gromyko’s level. All three fit
well within the conceptual framework suggested by Jack Matlock for the meeting as
originally planned: we cannot solve all problems, but we need to deal
seriously with the three interrelated problem areas of use of force to
settle disputes, the high and rising level of armaments, and the
shortage of trust and confidence in the relationship.
At the same time, there is a basic tension between the airliner tragedy,
arms control compliance and the Middle East/Central America—where we
wish basically to warn the Soviets at Gromyko’s level—and Shcharanskiy—where we want the Soviets to release him.
The tougher we are on the first three, the less forthcoming Gromyko is likely to be on Shcharanskiy.
There is no way to eliminate this tension, but we can perhaps reduce it
by shaping the tone, order and format of your presentation. Our
suggestions are embodied in the attached text. They are:
—Use Jack’s conceptual framework in setting the scene, and key each issue
you raise to it: the airliner illustrates use of force, but also the
Soviet arms buildup, and it damages trust and confidence; arms control
compliance is a trust and confidence issue first, then an arms buildup
issue; Shcharanskiy is
pre-eminently a matter of trust and confidence; we wish to move forward
if the Soviets are willing, but they are making things immensely
difficult by their actions and unwillingness to explain on all these
issues.
—Break the meeting into a session with advisors dealing with the airliner
and arms control compliance, and a more private session on Shcharanskiy and Jewish
emigration/anti-Semitism.
—Conclude the session with advisors by a summation that ticks off the
small steps we have managed to take in recent months, before asking for
the private meeting, and finish on a more-in-sorrow-than-in-anger note,
in order to set a more positive tone for an exchange on Shcharanskiy.
—The Foreign Ministry is not always informed about discussion of trades,
and if Gromyko weighs in in
Moscow following a heated conversation with you the option could be
eliminated.
Contingency responses in case he specifically raises the RC–135 and
intelligence charges are included in your book, and we will also have
for you specific material to counter a Gromyko diatribe on U.S. intelligence activities by
citing confirmed facts about the airliner shootdown.
The best antidote to a diversionary monologue is firmly but calmly to
seize and keep the initiative, and stick to your three topics. I have
revised my earlier view that you should raise Central America and the
Middle East in this meeting. To do so would be too much of an invita
[Page 332]
tion to Gromyko to declaim. But if he raises
regional issues (and only in that case), you should take the opportunity
to lay down the appropriate markers on both the Middle East and Central
America. Contingency talking points are at the end of the attached
presentation. Otherwise, I think you should tell him that the meeting is
short and that you would like to defer extended discussion of other
topics to New York.
Attachment
Paper Prepared in the Department of
State4
YOUR MEETING WITH GROMYKO AT MADRID
SUGGESTED OPENING REMARKS
I. INTRODUCTION
At the end of our meeting in New York last year, we agreed that it
would be a good thing for us to meet before another year had gone
by, if progress on the various issues in our relations justified
it.5
I wish I could say that was the reason we are meeting now. It would
be an encouraging sign not just in our relations but in
international relations generally if we were able to say that we had
gotten together in Madrid because we had succeeded in making enough
progress in resolving differences between our two countries to
warrant meeting earlier this year.
I regret that this is not the case. But we must frankly face the fact
that it is not the case. And I would be less than candid and less
than realistic if I told you that we think the progress that has
been made so far makes us optimistic about the larger prospect in
our relationship.
II. THE KAL SHOOTDOWN
Your brutal attack on an unarmed civilian airliner has shocked all
Americans profoundly. The explanation offered by TASS is preposterous. Your attempt to
turn a tragedy where very many lives from many nationalities were
lost into a problem in U.S.-Soviet relations is repugnant. The act
itself, and your reaction, point up for us the many and profound
differences between our two countries.
[Page 333]
I do not intend to discuss this aspect here. But I would like to
explain to you how this terrible event looks to us in the total
context of our relations, so that you will understand at the outset
how the United States is approaching this meeting and the meetings
we will have later in the month in New York.
This tragedy and your reaction to it have made us more aware than
ever that the central issue between our two countries is how to
improve world security and make our appropriate contribution to
establishing a basis for peaceful resolution of international
disputes. This is a grave responsibility. We take our portion of it
very seriously. It is impossible for us to have confidence that you
take your share of responsibility with equal seriousness. In
general, we face three interrelated types of problems, and last
week’s destruction of the Korean airliner by Soviet military forces
in the Far Eastern area brought these problems together for us with
almost overwhelming vividness.
The first problem is the high and increasing level of armaments. I
will not dwell on our concerns about the level of Soviet armaments
in this area: our negotiations in Geneva touch on certain aspects of
the problem, and our concerns and those of the East Asian countries
are well known to you. President Andropov’s statement to Pravda that the Soviet Union would be willing to destroy
missiles withdrawn from Europe under an agreement with us seemed to
us a step in the right direction.6
But it still did not address our underlying concern about unlimited
increases in Soviet military capacity in the area—a concern we share
with all your other neighbors and other countries in the region as
well.
The second problem is the shortage of trust and confidence in our
relationship. I do not know if the lack of confidence which your
pilot’s action showed was as shocking to you as it was to me and to
the President. I would be happy to hear from you that it was. What I
can tell you is that our confidence in the ability of our two
countries to conduct necessary business together has received
another blow. We know that our two countries are fated to live
together on a dangerous planet, and that we have a common
responsibility of historic magnitude to control the dangers we face
together, and to reduce them. But your unprovoked and unjustifiable
action has shown once again that we have a limited fund of trust and
confidence with which to work, and that the base for progress we
have managed to build is terribly narrow, and the road ahead
terribly hard.
The third problem is the use and encouragement of force to settle
international disputes. For us, your action last week was an
outrageous
[Page 334]
example of your
country’s willingness to use force in situations where my
country—and the rest of the world—believe and earnestly desire that
peaceful solutions can be found.
This is not a new concern of ours. It is one that President Reagan and I share with all our
predecessors since the war. Over the past two years, you have heard
Secretary Haig and me discuss it with respect to Afghanistan, with
respect to Kampuchea, with respect to the Middle East, with respect
to southern Africa, with respect to Central America and the
Caribbean. It lies at the heart of our approach to your military
buildup, to our discussions on arms control.
I know that you and your colleagues in the leadership do not accept
this analysis of the problems between us. That is part of the
problem too. But I must tell you that the airliner tragedy convinces
us more than ever that if we are to put our relations on a more
constructive course, you and your colleagues must recognize that the
United States and the rest of the world community are convinced that
you will use your vast military forces with restraint and with
responsibility. That is precisely what you did not do last week.
These are the fundamental questions that were raised by your action.
But they are not more fundamental than our anguish about the very
many American lives that have been lost. For these reasons I ask you
formally, once again, for a full and reasonable explanation of how
this tragedy took place; for all the information that is available
to you about the fate of the plane and its passengers; for
permission for our forces to participate with yours in the search
now going on off Sakhalin Island; and for prompt access if the plane
and any bodies are recovered. I would like to be encouraged by our
recent exchanges concerning coordinates and other data about our
search operations in the area.
III. ASSURING AIR
SAFETY: THE MILITARY LINKS PROPOSAL
In the wake of this tragedy, ensuring the safety of peaceful
international air travel is an issue on which the whole world must
cooperate. We must take every feasible step to make sure that this
sort of thing cannot happen again.
The Soviet Union must give the assurances the world needs and take
specific steps to ensure the safety of international civil
aviation.
But I would also like to remind you that even before this tragedy we
proposed to you a number of measures we could take to improve
communications between us.
Our discussions on adding a facsimile transmission capability to our
hotline communications have made the most progress, but we had also
proposed direct links between our military authorities. In fact, our
delegation to Moscow described our concept to you at some length
early last month.
[Page 335]
Had such links been in place last week, it is conceivable that this
tragedy could have been averted. They would have provided one way
for you to seek additional information and clarify the identity of
the plane your interceptors were pursuing.
I would urge you most seriously to consider our proposal for direct
communications links between our military authorities once again,
and I would appreciate a considered reply at the earliest possible
opportunity.
IV. ARMS CONTROL TREATY
COMPLIANCE
I wish I could tell you that the airliner tragedy is the only
instance that has reinforced these concerns in recent weeks and
months. Unfortunately, we also find ourselves with increasing
evidence of actions that raise questions about the Soviet Union’s
compliance with its obligations under existing arms control
agreements.
I cannot emphasize too much how such actions erode the trust and
confidence we must have that you will punctiliously carry out your
treaty commitments to us, and how important it is to any progress in
arms control that you address our concerns seriously and
specifically. If we cannot be sure that treaties signed in the past
are being carried out, then we will not be able to move forward with
you to sign new agreements.
These are not new concerns. Secretary Haig already raised with you
the troubling situation we see with regard to use of chemical and
biological weapons. Today, I would like to stress two areas of
concern that have arisen more recently.
For six months we have been discussing with you the questions we have
about the ICBM first flight-tested
on February 8, 1983. Despite the assertions your government has
made, we remain unconvinced that this missile qualifies as a
permitted modernization of an existing type of ICBM under the terms of SALT II. Moreover, the denial of
telemetric information vital to verifying compliance—also
inconsistent with the terms of SALT II—has simply reinforced our suspicions. We think
the importance of the problem warrants a more forthcoming response
in future discussions in the SCC
and through diplomatic channels.
Even more serious questions have arisen in connection with the new
large phased-array radar that you are constructing near Krasnoyarsk.
Your claim that this radar is for space-tracking purposes is
thoroughly implausible, since the radar is of the same type as ones
you have specifically identified as being for ballistic missile
early warning. Thus we demand a more convincing explanation for this
radar in view of its apparent inconsistency with the ABM Treaty.
[Page 336]
V. GENERAL MEETING
SUMMATION
It is precisely because fundamental problems in our relations are
involved that we seek adequate and responsible Soviet explanations
and actions on issues like these.
We are not seeking to destroy anything of what we have managed so
painfully to achieve in the way of trust, confidence and mutually
beneficial structure in our relations. It is your actions or refusal
to take actions that pose a threat to the narrow base we have
established. Our policy is unchanged. It will be based, as before,
on strength, on realism, and on willingness to explore with you
those areas where our two countries can work together to mutual
benefit.
We do not underestimate the significance of the small steps we have
managed to take together in recent weeks and months. The conclusion
of the CSCE review conference here
in Madrid is one of them: it is not a perfect outcome, and because
of Malta it has been a difficult outcome, but it is a beneficial
outcome.
The grains agreement we signed two weeks ago in Moscow was a similar
beneficial step. The President and I appreciate the release of the
Pentecostalists who were in our Embassy and their families. We have
agreed to renew the atomic energy agreement that expired in June.
Even in the difficult arms control area, we have had useful
discussions on confidence-building measures and on nuclear
non-proliferation. And, although we have not yet gotten to the
essential differences in our major negotiations, both sides have
shown encouraging flexibility in START, in INF and in
MBFR.
At the same time, it must be perfectly clear to you that such steps
cannot be taken in isolation from other elements in the
relationship. This last week has provided two fresh examples. As a
result of your action in the Pacific, it is not possible for us to
proceed with extension of the Transportation Agreement that expired
in June, and it is not possible at this time for us to follow up on
your agreement in principle to renew discussions on opening
consulates and on a new exchanges agreement.
Speaking for the United States, however, I can say that the President
and I intend to continue the effort to develop a more stable and
constructive relationship with the Soviet Union if the Soviet Union
is willing to work with us to do so. The steps our two countries
have taken perhaps show that we can do some serious business even in
difficult times. I will want in New York to go over the whole range
of issues between us.
For our part, we know we cannot hope to solve all problems at once.
But our two countries must face the fact that the larger problems
cannot be resolved in isolation from the others. And, in a spirit of
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realism and candor, I
must also say that the Soviet actions and inactions I have described
earlier make it immensely more difficult to move forward.
NOTE: We continue to believe that you should
discuss human rights issues one-on-one with Gromyko. After summing up,
therefore, we suggest that you ask for a private session
following the general meeting.
VI. PRIVATE SESSION ON
SHCHARANSKIY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
The airliner tragedy is a human rights issue for us too, but I wanted
to meet with you privately to discuss the more familiar problems of
human rights in our relationship.
I cannot exaggerate to you the importance of these issues for both
the present and the future. It remains true that no other area of
the relationship has such potential for improving or damaging
American trust and confidence in the possibility of our countries
doing serious business.
The President and I continue to believe that the best way to deal
with these issues in our relations is quietly and privately. That is
why I asked for this private session.
The case of Anatoliy
Shcharanskiy is of very great concern to us,
precisely because it so clearly involves the issue of trust and
confidence.
As I noted in the general meeting, the President and I appreciated
the way you dealt with the Pentecostalist matter after the
President’s meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin in February. We have been trying to deal
with the Shcharanskiy case in
the same quiet way.
That is why we were encouraged by President Andropov’s letter to Marchais, and
why we authorized Ambassador Kampelman to enter into confidential discussions
with Mr. Kondrashev.
I must say we were initially encouraged by those discussions. They
seemed to us to hold out some hope of progress without damage to the
positions of principle on either side.
In particular, we were encouraged by Mr. Kondrashev’s clear and
solemn statement on behalf of the highest authorities in his
government that Shcharanskiy
could be released by February 1984.
We therefore made clear both to Mr. Kondrashev and to other
authorized interlocutors that we on our side would be prepared to
take steps of interest to the Soviet side if this commitment were in
fact honored.
Our position remains the same, and we are interested in substance
rather than in form. However, it is our impression that the Soviet
side is no longer interested in moving forward to resolve the
Shcharanskiy case, and is
in fact departing from what we understood was a commitment.
[Page 338]
I would like to hear from you urgently on what the official Soviet
position on this matter is, and what the Soviet Union expects from
the United States if it is to be resolved.
We have other serious concerns in the human rights field, and I will
want to discuss some of them in New York. We are, for example,
worried not only about the radical decline in Jewish emigration from
the Soviet Union but also about what appears to us to be growing
official encouragement of anti-semitic activities in the Soviet
Union. In particular, the establishment of the so-called
“Anti-Zionist Committee” can only be called a step that confirms
this impression. You should be aware that we will have nothing to do
with it, and will encourage private citizens to treat it with the
contempt it deserves.
At the same time, the Shcharanskiy case is critical. Our relations will
benefit if it can be resolved soon: there is no better time for this
compassionate step. But our relations will inevitably be damaged
even further if Shcharanskiy
is made to serve his full term. We have conflicting reports on his
state of health, and I would not want to make a judgment. But if he
were to die in prison, it would be a catastrophe.
VII. CONTINGENCY POINTS
ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND CENTRAL AMERICA (IF GROMYKO
RAISES REGIONAL ISSUES)
We have a limited amount of time, and I would propose that we defer
extended discussion of these kinds of issues to New York. I have
only two points to make:
—We have had a number of exchanges on the Lebanon situation in recent
days, and I merely wish to reiterate a number of points to you.
The situation is dangerous for all the area parties and for both our
countries, and the root of that danger is the continued presence of
foreign troops in Lebanon. Our objective is the elimination of the
foreign troop presence in that country, so that the Lebanese
government can establish full sovereignty on its own territory. With
our encouragement, the Government of Israel has agreed to withdraw
its forces in a situation where Syria does the same, and in fact
took a first step in this direction last weekend even without Syrian
agreement to follow this course. The unwillingness of Syria to
remove its forces from Lebanon is an obstacle to progress with
consequences that are dangerously serious to all of us. I would urge
you once again to use your influence with Syria to encourage a more
constructive approach.
—With regard to Central America, I would like to reiterate with
utmost seriousness what I told you when we first met last year: that
your military shipments to Cuba far exceed what Cuba needs for
self-defense and are being used by Cuba to fuel dangerous tensions
in the region; that you cannot escape responsibility for this effect
of your
[Page 339]
actions; and that
the arrival of Cuban combat troops and jet combat aircraft in
Nicaragua would be unacceptable to the United States. We have no
motive to make Central America an issue in our relations, but you
may be sure that we will defend our interests.
