Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985

117. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, September 27, 1983

SUBJECT

• KAL: Managing the Next Phase

The month since the shootdown has shown the Soviets at their worst and the U.S. at its best. Our task has been twofold: first, to highlight the moral and political lessons—that the Soviets were acting like Soviets, and that we have the right policy for dealing with them over the long haul—and, second, to mobilize the international community to demand justice and restitution.

I think we have been successful on both counts. At home, there has been some criticism and some natural pressure for stronger unilateral acts, but by and large your message that this is an issue of the world against the Soviets has been persuasive, and your firm but moderate approach has carried public opinion with it and gained us new support. Internationally, the “automatic majorities” that have supported Soviet positions and refused honest criticism of the USSR in recent years have vanished, and governments and private groups have imposed an unprecedented series of concrete measures against the USSR.

We are now entering a new phase. Emotional reactions will level off, and political calculation will resurface. People in and out of government everywhere have learned what you and others knew all along about the Soviets, but this is not enough. We need to initiate a series of steps that keep the lesson of Soviet misconduct before the world, but without playing to the counter-strategy the Soviets have now put in place.

The Soviets have clearly begun to implement a program designed to eat away at the solid front of world outrage by playing on the ambiguities of the evidence; to divide the U.S. from the rest of the world by portraying KAL as a U.S.-Soviet issue; and to put the issue behind them by renewed concentration on carrots and sticks in the arms control field.

To manage the next phase, we will require a comprehensive program. Some of these steps are already underway; others need to be put in place soon; others are for further down the road.

First of all, we should keep the lesson of KAL before the public and the Congress in our public statements and in our continuing work on defense issues on the Hill.

Diplomatically, we should follow up strongly in Asia. Working closely with our Asian allies and friends on KAL has materially strengthened their confidence in the U.S. as a reliable ally. With regard to China, we should expect the Soviets to exploit any possibility of improving relations with the PRC to escape from the KAL box and regain some leverage on us, but Cap’s trip to Beijing should help keep the Chinese on an even keel. Further along, your Far Eastern trip in November will be an opportunity to consolidate area gains.²

In Europe, looking beyond the INF debate (where your decision to move forward on INF should help us materially), we should also engage the Allies in an intensified dialogue to draw the consequences of what KAL has shown about the Soviets for European defense spending, and for our part we should be making the same points in pressing our critical security assistance requests involving Europe in the Congress.

We should keep up the pressure in a number of fields. We have a running start: the widespread condemnations of the Soviets at the normally supine UNESCO Executive Board and General Conference September 22–23 and in the OAS are examples of what we should be seeking.³ Over the next weeks and months, we should proceed in the following areas:

1. The Search and Rescue Effort. The Soviet turnover of debris on Sakhalin Island on September 26 proceeded smoothly. By diplomatic note, however, we protested strongly the Soviet exclusion of Korean representatives and advised the Soviets that because Korea is the owner of the aircraft, and because Korea has authorized only the U.S. and Japan to conduct search and recovery operations, no other country including the USSR, is entitled to search for and recover such materials in international waters. The note also stated our expectation the USSR will not interfere with U.S. recovery operations.⁴ Meanwhile, the Navy will continue its intensive search efforts, in cooperation with Japan, expanding the search area as necessary, and we have put plans in place for handling the flight recorder should it be recovered, including inviting a ICAO observer aboard a U.S. search vessel.

2. The Public Boycott. A number of potential participants did not join the two-week suspension of air service to and from the USSR, and that suspension will end September 29. We have continued our efforts to bring other countries in, with stress on key Asian and Latin American countries that have regularly scheduled Aeroflot service. Meanwhile, we should consult closely with the participating NATO Allies, Japan and Switzerland about extending the boycott. We must be realistic, however, and as emotions cool, we must expect less extensive support than over the past three weeks. We should thus avoid any public confrontation with the Allies over extension, since this would play into Soviet hands and undo much of what we have accomplished to date.

3. The Private Boycott. Consistent with U.S. law and practice, we will continue to follow the independent efforts of pilots and other private sector groups to express their indignation in concrete work actions. In the long run these may prove the most effective concrete measures taken.

4. The Diplomatic Front. We will be keeping up international pressure in a number of fora:

—ICAO. Here we will need to work closely with Allies and concerned developing countries to prevent the Soviets from watering down the tough investigation mandated by the Extraordinary Council September 16,⁵ and to get a solid interim report from the SYG when the 110th Council organizational session meets October 14. The complete report should be ready for the Regular Council session scheduled for December 14–16.

—Aviation Safety Measures. We are now examining existing ICAO commitments to determine how they can be strengthened, and are supporting the French proposal that the Chicago Convention be amended to outlaw use of force against civilian aircraft, subject to the provisions of the UN Charter.

—UN General Assembly. We are studying effective ways to raise KAL in the General Assembly following your speech Monday.⁶ Friendly countries will be encouraged to raise this issue under every suitable agenda item.

—Fifth World Tourist Organization (WTO) Assembly in New Delhi, October 3–14. The USSR and Korea are members, and we are asking key WTO capitals to cosponsor or support a resolution condemning the Soviet action and endorsing the right of all people to travel for tourism in safety.⁷

—International Parliamentary Union (IPU) Conference in Seoul, October 3–10. Our delegation is exclusively Congressional, and we are consulting with the delegates on how best to proceed about raising the KAL issue in Seoul.

5. Claims. The Soviets have twice rejected notes demanding compensation on our behalf and Korea’s, and have done the same with similar notes from other countries.⁸ We have warned them that continued refusal to accept these notes is yet another act giving rise to right of redress under international law, and we are urgently pursuing the question of presenting our claims to the International Court of Justice in conjunction with other claimants, particularly the Canadians and British whose initial reactions have been tepid. We are also soliciting preliminary Japanese, Korean and Australian views. If these governments’ final responses are negative on simultaneously filing an application to the ICJ, we are considering seeking their support in making parallel demands on the Soviets to submit to the jurisdiction of the ICJ or another international tribunal.

6. Public Diplomacy and Congress. You have given the lead to the whole government in keeping the issue before the public, and this effort will continue. USIA will continue to give the tragedy priority attention, with major play in the immediate future to the ICAO Council Resolution and the ICAO investigation. On September 20 we forwarded the text of a special report on the incident to the White House,⁹ and publication of an appropriately updated document will be a strong public diplomacy initiative. With the Congress, we will be following up on the unanimous Joint Resolution condemning the Soviets. Here we must keep in mind that Congressional support is neither monolithic nor permanent, and that many members will continue to urge strong unilateral sanctions against the USSR. We will therefore need to keep key members fully briefed on developments, to demonstrate that international condemnation plus your measured response focussing on civil aviation is producing a far more effective and lasting reaction than a series of unilateral steps that simply feed Soviet efforts to “bilateralize” the issue.

If we can continue to manage the KAL issue successfully along these lines, we will not only keep pressure on the Soviets to provide the restitution the world demands, but we will improve the prospects for forward movement on our larger foreign policy goals as well.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, KAL (3/3). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons on September 21; cleared by Burt and Eagleburger. Drafting information is from another copy. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, 1983 Sept 1–8)
2. See footnote 3, Document 83.
3. During the September 26 Executive Board Plenary Session of UNESCO, the KAL incident was discussed at length, with presentations from Ukraine and the Korean Ambassador and then a retort by the Soviets. (Telegram 35850 from Paris, September 27; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830559–0749) The OAS Permanent Council met on September 21. In a statement on September 22, Speakes expressed Reagan’s thanks for the OAS member nations’ expressions of condolence. (Public Papers: Reagan, 1983, Book II, p. 1327)
4. In telegram 274915 to Moscow, September 27, the Department reported that “Acting EUR Assistant Secretary Kelly presented diplomatic note to Soviet DCM Sokolov at 1600 hours Monday, September 26.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830557–1018)
5. See footnote 2, Document 112.
6. Reagan addressed the 38th Session of the UN General Assembly on the morning of September 26. While the main focus of his speech was peace and cooperation in arms control, he made two references to the KAL tragedy, connecting Soviet actions in this incident with broader complexities in U.S.-Soviet relations. “Reactions to the Korean airliner tragedy are a timely reminder of just how different the Soviets’ concept of truth and international cooperation is from that of the rest of the world. Evidence abounds that we cannot simply assume that agreements negotiated with the Soviet Union will be fulfilled.” Later in the speech, he stated: “In recent weeks, the moral outrage of the world seems to have reawakened. Out of the billions of people who inhabit this planet, why, some might ask, should the death of several hundred shake the world so profoundly? Why should the death of a mother flying toward a reunion with her family or the death of a scholar heading toward new pursuits of knowledge matter so deeply? Why are nations who lost no citizens in the tragedy so angry? The reason rests on our assumptions about civilized life and the search for peace. The confidence that allows a mother or a scholar to travel to Asia or Africa or Europe or anywhere else on this planet may be only a small victory in humanity’s struggle for peace. Yet what is peace if not the sum of such small victories?” The full text of the speech is printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 169.
7. In telegram 21034 from New Delhi, October 15, the Embassy reported that the WTO “meetings were largely successful and all US principal objectives were achieved.” The United States “succeeded in gaining sufficient votes to pass a resolution ‘deeply deploring’ USSR action in downing KAL 007, a civilian aircraft. Resolution cites negative impact on tourism of actions of this type.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830600–0243)
8. A September 16 Department statement noted: “Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Richard Burt called in Soviet Minister Sokolov and presented him with a second diplomatic note demanding that the Soviet Union accept diplomatic notes which the United States had attempted to present the Soviet Union on its behalf and on behalf of the Republic of Korea. These notes demand compensation from the Soviet Union for the lives and property of U.S. and Korean nationals lost as a result of the wrongful shootdown of Korean Air Lines #007 on September 1.” The full text of the September 16 diplomatic note follows this statement. (Department of State Bulletin, October 1983, p. 21)
9. This draft paper was sent to the White House on September 19. See footnote 2, Document 113.