120. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1
12430. Geneva for USINF. Subject: Andropov Blasts U.S., Addresses KAL.
1. (C—Entire text).
2. Summary: Andropov’s September 28 statement raises to the most authoritative level long-standing Soviet criticism of the Reagan [Page 413] administration and of the President personally.2 It is pessimistic about future dealings with the administration, asserting that there can no longer be any illusions on this score, but balances this pessimism with sober assurances that “Soviet policy is not based on emotion.” The General Secretary’s response to the President’s INF initiatives was negative,3 but essentially nonsubstantive, and does not rule out further Soviet examination of our proposals. In endorsing in toto the Soviet version of the KAL affair, Andropov was bowing to the inevitable. The fact that it has taken him nearly a month to do so is as significant as the fact that he has now associated himself with the coverup.
3. We read this highly defensive statement as an attempt to recapture the arms control high ground Andropov staked out in his August 29 Pravda interview,4 only to lose it three days later with the KAL shootdown. Andropov’s tough language on the United States probably reflects accurately high-level Soviet resentment over what they regard as U.S. exploitation of the KAL affair. Aside from simple spleen-venting, the statement’s objective is to focus foreign attention away from KAL and back on the coming battle over INF deployments. End summary.
Harsh Words for the U.S.
4. Andropov’s September 28 statement is the strongest and most comprehensive attack on the United States by a Soviet leader in years. The substance of most of his allegations (U.S. efforts to attain world dominance; administration “slander” of the Soviet Union; Washington’s having undertaken a “crusade” to rid the world of the USSR) have appeared regularly in Soviet press criticism of the administration over the past three years. Andropov has raised them to the most authoritative level and has catalogued them in unprecedented detail. He has [Page 414] also used his strongest language to date in describing President Reagan personally. Andropov characterizes the President’s UNGA performance as “convincing no one” and accuses him of setting the tone of anti-Soviet rhetoric for the administration. He complains that unidentified leaders of the U.S. have resorted to “foul-mouthed abuse mingled with hypocritical sermons on morality and humanity” in their attacks on the Soviet Union and its people.
5. The most disturbing element of Andropov’s remarks on the U.S. is his assertion that “recent events”—presumably KAL—have “dispelled any illusions about the possibility of a change for the better” by the administration. This language recalls articles by lower-level Soviet spokesmen (e.g. Arbatov and Bovin) last year suggesting that it would prove impossible to conduct serious business with the administration. While he makes no bones about his view of the administration and its approach, however, Andropov stops short of burning any bridges and stresses the basic continuity of Soviet policy in arms control and other areas. While expressing Moscow’s indignation over its handling by the U.S., he concludes that Soviet nerves are “strong,” and that Soviet policies are not “built on emotions.”
INF—U.S. Proposals Not Rejected
6. The continuity of Moscow’s approach in the wake of KAL comes through strongly in Andropov’s handling of INF and security issues in the second half of his speech. This part of his statement could have been written before August 31. Its appeal to the European peace movement and suggestion that Europeans are “hostages” to U.S. INF policy are standard Soviet themes, as is Andropov’s suggestion that European leaders are inadequately protecting their peoples’ interests in supporting the two-track NATO decision. His statement that deployment would be a step of major proportions by the U.S. against the cause of peace seems designed, like the first part of his statement, to keep the focus on the United States as the “problem” in arms control.
7. Andropov’s response to the President’s most recent INF initiative failed to address the substance of the new U.S. proposals. Instead, Andropov complained that the “so called new move” was simply a rehash of past U.S. proposals which would bless U.S. deployments while requiring unilateral Soviet reductions. Like Gromyko in his September 26 toast to visiting Czech Foreign Minister Chnoupek, however, Andropov did not reject the detailed elements of the U.S. proposals, or even divulge their contents.
First Statement on KAL
8. Andropov’s statement marks his first public mention of, or association with, the KAL tragedy. Using the incident as an illustration of U.S. willingness to stop at nothing to advance its militaristic designs, [Page 415] Andropov endorsed in toto Moscow’s version of the event as articulated in the September 6 Soviet Government statement.5 There is no way, in our view, that he could have avoided this. The fact that he waited almost a month to do so is probably as significant as the fact that he has finally associated himself with the shootdown.
Defensive Tone
9. Nonetheless, the KAL incident largely set the stage for Andropov’s statement, and is no doubt responsible for the defensive tone which runs throughout it. Like Marshal Ogarkov’s article a week before,6 Andropov convey’s an impression of the Soviet Union’s being pressed hard by United States military and ideological initiatives. He digs deep—to Vietnam, to distortions of the U.S. role in Lebanon—to portray the U.S. as the real locus of evil in the world. He takes pains to emphasize that the Soviet Union threatens no one, has no aggressive designs on any other country, does not intend to change other nations’ social order. But he is concerned to reassure the Soviet people that Soviet defense capabilities are capable of discouraging any attacks.
Comment
10. Andropov’s statement simply makes clearer what was already obvious—the period ahead will be a frigid one in U.S.-Soviet relations, and Moscow will do nothing to make our life easier. His tough treatment of the U.S. probably reflects accurately high-level Soviet perceptions that the U.S. exploited Moscow’s mishandling of the KAL episode, and will not miss future chances to gouge the Kremlin. At the same time there is clearly an operational side to the Soviets’ rhetoric. Andropov, like Ogarkov and the Soviet media in general, is seeking to make the U.S. “the problem”, and to get out of the glare of KAL. The Soviets no doubt see some advantage to making the Europeans and others believe the bear has been backed into a corner and could lash out. They hope that this will translate into pressure on Washington in Geneva.
11. At the same time Andropov’s speech, as he stated explicitly, was an appeal to the Soviet man in the street. His message was twofold. On the one hand his appeal was a patriotic one. While less blatant than Ogarkov’s the week before, Andropov’s was a call to rally round the leadership at a time of national danger. At the same time, he sought to reassure the populace lest their fear of war lead to despair. Most [Page 416] importantly, he sought to make clear that Andropov was personally in control and able to deal with the threat from without.
- Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830565–0577. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Leningrad, Beijing, Bonn, London, Paris, USNATO, USUN, USIA, and for information to Stockholm, Belgrade, Berlin, Bucharest, Budapest, Prague, Munich, Sofia, Warsaw, Department of Defense, USCINCEUR, USDelMBFR Vienna, and the Mission in Geneva.↩
- In telegram 12421 from Moscow, September 29, the Embassy reported that Andropov’s statement was read on the Vremya news program on September 28. A printed version appeared in Soviet papers on September 29, which differed slightly from the other text. The Embassy commented: “A passage on the value of joint Warsaw Pact military exercises replaced three paragraphs on ideological competition which appeared in the press. The change had no apparent substantive significance, and we are unable to explain why it occurred.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830566–0109) For the text of the statement, see Documents on Disarmament, 1983, pp. 881–816.↩
- In his address to the 38th Session of the UNGA in New York on September 26, Reagan proposed several new arms control initiatives. (Public Papers: Reagan, 1983, Book II, pp. 1350–1354) See also footnote 6, Document 117. In his memoir, Shultz wrote that Reagan “called for global limits on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and without giving up on our ultimate goal of the complete elimination of these weapons, asserted that the United States was open to negotiation over the number of Pershings and GLCMs to be deployed in Europe. He also proposed discussions on verifiable limits on some Soviet and American land-based aircraft.” (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 371)↩
- See footnote 2, Document 82.↩
- See Document 98.↩
- Ogarkov’s September 22 TASS article was discussed in telegram 12073 from Moscow, September 22, and telegram 12158 from Moscow, September 23. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830549–0006 and D830562–0007 respectively)↩