45. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)1
SUBJECT
- US Policy to Guatemala (C)
At the SCC(I) there were a number of allusions to an interagency review of US policy to Guatemala. That review has produced a long policy paper with four options, and a long cable with detailed guidance for two emissaries which State wants to send to Guatemala to open up a new dialogue with President Lucas. (The proposed guidance is at Tab A; the policy paper is at Tab B but you do not need to read it.)2 (S)
The problem in Guatemala is that the current leadership is extraordinarily inept and reactionary; we have not been able to find a way of persuading President Lucas that an exclusively military strategy will not provide the solutions to his country’s problems. His people are [Page 128] not only fighting the left, but they are also killing the leaders in the middle, confusing the criticism from the middle with Communism. We had a similar problem—i.e., a difference on the definition of the problem—with former President Romero of El Salvador. (S)
I believe that there are two events which will be decisive in determining whether we will be able to communicate effectively with the Guatemalan government: El Salvador and the Presidential election in the US. If our strategy in El Salvador of helping the middle succeeds, the Guatemalans are likely to be more responsive. If our strategy fails, and the right attempts a final solution, we can expect the Guatemalans to imitate that regardless of what we do, and probably to the same result as in El Salvador, i.e., a full-scale civil war between the extremes; the middle will flee to Miami; the guerrillas in Guatemala, which are now extremely divided, would be emboldened and become a real threat. More importantly, the Guatemalan government is banking on a Reagan victory, since they view the world in exactly the same terms as Reagan does. I doubt that they will communicate with us in anything but a superficial way until “their man” either wins or loses. Indeed, they may “sit” on agreement for George Landau until then.3 (S)
For that reason, I do not think that the options which were developed in State’s paper provide us much reason to expect a more effective strategy to Guatemala. The options are: (1) current policy; (2) distancing (reduce contacts and cooperation to the bare minimum); (3) positive and balanced engagement (a package of carrots in the hope that it will induce better performance in human rights); and (4) a fresh dialogue. Option 3 might work after November, but before, it could only be [Page 129] interpreted as a complete abandonment of our human rights policy, and frankly, that would be the way the Guatemalans would see it: that we have finally “seen the light,” that we finally understand that a military solution is the only way. (S)
If Guatemala were approaching a state of crisis, I would insist on a high-level review, but that is just not the case. The Guatemalan economy is by far the strongest in Central America, as is their military. The guerrillas are increasing in strength, but are still quite weak. Guatemala is going down the road to disaster, but it is not a short road—certainly not before the situation clarifies in El Salvador. (S)
Therefore, Option #4—a dialogue—is the only viable option at this time, and the cable at Tab A is the guidance which our emissaries would use to implement that option. I think the guidance is much more extensive than necessary, and I would prefer to give our emissaries only two paragraphs instead, but State is adamant that such guidance is essential, and I will concede that point. (S)
I would recommend clearing the guidance with two amendments: (1) no non-paper should be left behind; and (2) the bottom line of the guidance should be that in order for us to begin taking steps toward improving our relationship through a fresh dialogue, we will need our Ambassador in place. In short, the purpose of the mission is to try to secure agreement for Landau. Bill Bowdler has just informed me that he accepts these two points. (S)
As far as the SCC(I) recommendations go, your instincts were exactly right.4 The security services are the problem; they are not the solution. The idea that we will buy anything from a financial relationship with them at this time other than a black eye for associating ourselves with them or that CIA could succeed in getting the Guatemalan security services to focus on right-wing as well as left-wing terrorism is wrong. The Guatemalan security services are following instructions from their President, not from us, and we will not turn him around by improving our relationship with his security services. (S)
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve the guidance at Tab A with the two amendments suggested.5 (U)
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 79, Sensitive X: 6–7/80. Secret. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Henze and Odom. A stamped notion on the memorandum reads: “ZB has seen.” Brzezinski wrote at the top of the page: “Good piece of work. ZB.” An unknown hand wrote “8/1/80” next to Brzezinski’s comment.↩
- An unknown hand underlined the word “not.” Tabs A and B are attached but not printed. Tab A is a draft of telegram 207808 to Guatemala City, August 6; see Document 49 and footnote 3 thereto. For Tab B, see Document 42. An unsigned NSC note, dated July 28, included Pastor’s comments on the Department of State’s strategy paper for Guatemala: “This paper represents the product of several months of interagency deliberations; it is not related to, nor does it discuss in any way the SCC(I) proposals. The bottom line recommendation of this inter-agency paper is to send a two-man team to Guatemala to try to urge the government to give agreement for George Landau. I assume State will proceed with that regardless of SCC(I) deliberations.” (National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I022, SSC–I Meetings, 1980)↩
- The New York Times reported on June 15 that “Ortiz, whom even moderate opposition groups find too close to the Lucas regime, is shortly to be replaced.” (Alan Riding, “In Guatemala, The Middle is No Sanctuary,” New York Times, June 15, 1980, p. E3) The New York Times on June 28 quoted from telegram 3936 from Guatemala City, June 20, in which Ortiz wrote to Muskie describing Guatemala as “a blood-bath waiting to happen” and noting that “the extremists here, particularly those of the right, are probably as extreme as any that can be found.” (Graham Hovey, “Envoy Losing Post After Policy Clash,” New York Times, June 28, 1980, p. 1; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800300–0012) Telegram Tosec 40275/170852 to the Secretary’s delegation, June 28, reproduced the New York Times June 28 report in full. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800312–0092) The Washington Post reported on June 28 that Landau, who had “become known as a strong advocate for protection of human rights” while Ambassador to Chile, would “be designated to replace” Ortiz as Ambassador to Guatemala. (“U.S. Planning to Appoint New Envoy to Guatemala,” Washington Post, June 28, 1980, p. A6) The Washington Post reported on July 18 that the “Guatemalan government has hinted that it may oppose the planned appointment” of Landau. “Because Ortiz, at least within U.S. human rights circles, is considered soft on the military, the Guatemalans believe Landau is being sent here as a human rights activist, although he has never been particularly known as such and is considered to be a middle-of-the-road professional.” (Christopher Dickey, “Violence Grows Greater in Guatemala,” Washington Post, July 18, 1980, p. A16)↩
- See Document 43.↩
- Brzezinski indicated his approval. Aaron wrote below the recommendation: “I agree.”↩