Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

42. Strategy Paper on Guatemala Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, July 14, 1980

U.S. STRATEGY TOWARD GUATEMALA

I. THE ISSUE

Can we influence the current GOG to play a constructive regional role and to make the reforms necessary to reduce internal violence and prevent the growth of the extreme left? If so, how?

II. BACKGROUND

Guatemala is a unique and important country in its own right. As the region’s most substantial economic and military power, Guatemala is also critical to Central America’s future. An evolutionary course in Guatemala would enhance prospects for democratic reform in the entire region. Conversely, revolution in Guatemala would seriously endanger prospects for stability of the rest of Central America, and could ultimately affect Mexico.

Two problems are currently of major importance to U.S. interests: regional security and human rights.

Security. Guatemala is a key target of Cuban efforts in Central America. Encouraged by events in Nicaragua and El Salvador, and with Cuban advice, Guatemalan revolutionary groups have recently improved their coordination and stepped up terrorist actions. Guerrilla strength has increased from 600–700 in 1977 to an armed cadre variously estimated today to be between 1200–1400 and 3,000. There are indications of increased Cuban support—both through regional networks that supply weapons, safehouses and training, and through support for an international propaganda campaign against Guatemalan institutions and the United States.

Guatemala’s vulnerability to subversion is substantial, and due in large measure to a violent political tradition, gross socio-economic inequities, ideological polarization, and habitual repression (see next section on human rights). Reactions to these problems are sharply polarized between advocates of reform and of repression. Perceptions of an imminent communist threat are growing, both in Guatemala and to some extent in the United States.

In addition to Guatemala’s own security, two other major U.S. regional security goals—the success of the Salvadoran Junta and a peaceful resolution of the Belize dispute—will require substantial Guatemalan cooperation if they are to be attained:

—El Salvador. The governing Junta has faced two right-wing coup attempts. Guatemalan rightists have been involved. Direct Guatemalan military involvement would seriously threaten the Junta’s survival.

—Belize. The British are determined to grant independence to Belize within 12–18 months. Without a prior agreement that settles Guatemala-UK territorial differences, Guatemala might take military action against Belize, thus satisfying a point of national honor and providing an opportunity for harsh internal measures. Unless the British leave behind a garrison after independence, the Belizeans would seek security ties with other countries, probably including Cuba.

Human Rights. Guatemalan governments have traditionally relied heavily on intimidation and both official and private repression. Political pressures and violence from the extreme left have provoked increased violence by both the ultra-right and the security forces, who feel their survival requires an iron—and often indiscriminate—preventive fist.

The powerful Guatemalan ultra-right has a long tradition of employing force, including terrorism, against its opponents. Faced with what it sees as a war for survival, the ultra right—which includes substantial elements of the middle class as well as the wealthy, and has close ties to the military, police, and rural militias—has adopted a “survival” strategy based on annihilation of “the enemy” without regard for due process.

Guatemala’s already poor human rights record is thus worsening, and fueling intensified domestic and international criticism. Human rights violations in Guatemala are currently the subject of intense international scrutiny by Amnesty International, the ICJ, the OAS, UNHRC, trade unions, numerous non-government U.S. human rights organizations, and various members of the U.S. Congress. The Inter-American Human Rights Commission is scheduled to visit Guatemala in September.

III. ANALYSIS

The perception of growing danger from the far left has drawn together the narrow military/economic elite which brought President Lucas to power in 1978, giving him a good chance of completing his constitutional term in 1982. Although discontent is widespread, opposition groups are fragmented, and most of the power sectors—the military, the private sector, the church hierarchy—either actively support or tolerate the government.

The current conflict between “order” and “change” in Guatemala is thus not unlike the situations faced previously in the Southern Cone—with whose countries, particularly Argentina, Guatemala is developing close relations.

Two factors suggest that the forces of “order” could prevail as in the Southern Cone countries: the strength of established institutions, and the existence of some social policies.

—Though somewhat demoralized, the Guatemalan military remain powerful and united against the left. Guatemala’s developing middle class has a stake in stability. Though fragmented and weakened by the assassination of many key leaders, the nucleus of a modern party system still exists. Although voter turnout was low, seven of Guatemala’s eight legally registered political parties participated in municipal elections in April.

—Some of the socio-economic initiatives of the Lucas government are encouraging. Although promises have regularly outstripped implementation, the GOG National Planning Council has announced a 1980–82 Social Action Plan which contemplates expenditures of $566.7 million over the next two years concentrated in health, education, housing and child nutrition. Over 13,000 titles were distributed to landless peasants during 1979.

Unlike the Southern Cone, however, Guatemala faces two important problems that will be a continuing source of unrest: deep social inequities, and growing economic uncertainty.

—Guatemala’s large Indian population is the poorest sector of the society, and subject to harsh exploitation. Indian Communities are now increasingly caught up in a murderous crossfire of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary violence. Though still marginal to national politics, some Indians are for the first time beginning to be radicalized to the left.

—In addition, although agricultural export prices are good, and oil production is promising, the basically strong Guatemalan economy is showing signs of weakness due to declining investor confidence. This magnifies other problems of inflation, unemployment, an accelerating credit squeeze, and a shrinking market for Guatemalan industrial production caused by instability elsewhere in Central America.

In sum, to maintain long-term stability, political violence must be reduced, outlets provided for socio-economic discontent, an armed confrontation over Belize avoided, and honest presidential elections held in 1982.

Time to achieve these objectives is running out. To the extent that a viable “center” exists in Guatemala, and its strength is not great, this atmosphere contributes to a polarization which may lead to its complete disappearance—by imprisonment, by assassination from “left” or “right,” or by emigration.

IV. U.S. GUATEMALAN RELATIONS

Reluctant to acknowledge responsibility for their internal problems, most Guatemalan leaders blame foreign subversion, and appear to have concluded that U.S. policies will lead to the destabilization of the GOG and its replacement by a Sandinista-style regime. There is a growing climate of mistrust, resentment, and even paranoia toward the U.S.

The application of our human rights policies, particularly in the security area, has eroded U.S. influence with the Guatemalan armed forces, whose leaders remain key to the future of Guatemala. Exploiting fears of Nicaragua, misrepresenting our intentions in El Salvador, and employing a well financed, systematic campaign, the ultra-right has driven a wedge between us and the Guatemalan military that prevents an effective dialogue on behalf of our objectives.

There is a growing tendency, even among those officers who oppose repression, to write off the present U.S. Administration as hostile, or at best as an unreliable friend whose counsel is simply wrong.

These strains, and the resulting communications gap, are becoming increasingly serious. The GOG believes it is being damaged by what it considers our hostility and indifference. Specific areas of Guatemalan concern include our virtual embargo on military sales, critical comments on Guatemala by U.S. officials, and abstention on IFI loans for Guatemala—all of which have taken on a symbolic importance out of proportion to their intrinsic significance.

Despite these strains, the GOG may not respond to any U.S. overtures before November. Guatemalan perceptions of our internal political situation and foreign policy reverses, and their obsession with national security concerns bordering on a siege mentality, might lead the GOG to wait out the final months of the current U.S. Administration in the hope that it will be succeeded by one more sympathetic and less demanding of human rights improvements, and supportive of arguments that current Guatemalan policies are necessary to combat communism.

V. OPTIONS

OPTION I: Current Policy. To make clear our support for economic and political reforms, without which the society will remain vulnerable to revolutionary movements. To oppose violations of human rights and repression of dissent by the GOG and rightist paramilitary groups. To convey our desire to return to traditional good relations, including substantial security cooperation, when conditions permit.

Because of the growing violence, the implementation of this policy has led in practice to a virtual embargo on security ties, and support only for those IFI loans which clearly meet BHN criteria.

Pros

—Maintains U.S. pressure on a repressive regime which thus far has refused to alter its policies.

—Avoids appearing to change policies in mid stream and reinforcing beliefs regarding inconsistency in U.S. foreign policy at a time when the GOG is least apt to respond favorably to any new USG initiative toward it.

—Leaves open option to review further initiatives in 1981 after the U.S. election.

—Could be linked with limited elements of Option IV.

Cons

—Has led to sullen stand-off with the government and military and provides little leverage against Guatemalan actions on El Salvador and Belize contrary to our interests;

—Conveys mixed and confusing signals, thus sacrificing opportunity to encourage the moderate center at a time when both left and right extremes are growing in strength;

—Does not effectively dampen repressive policies which ultimately strengthen the violent opposition and weaken the “center”;

—Impacts adversely on the Guatemalan domestic and international investment climate.

OPTION II: Distancing. Reduce contact and cooperation with the GOG to a bare minimum. Would require that we eliminate our AID mission, reduce our embassy staff, and withdraw from any attempts to influence the course of action pursued by the GOG. A variation might allow us to maintain contact with opposition groups and leaders in the hope of establishing a good relationship with a successor regime considerably to the left of the current regime. Would not involve our active encouragement of the overthrow of the current regime.

Pros

—Lessens demands on scarce assistance resources.

Cons

—Would exacerbate “siege mentality” in Guatemalan ruling class, probably provoking increased nothing-to-lose human rights violations and greater involvement against the El Salvador junta;

—Would have a destabilizing effect on Guatemala’s economy by adversely affecting investment flows;

—Would stimulate the violent left and probably increase Cuban support for attacks against a government perceived as isolated.

OPTION III: Positive and Balanced Engagement. Put together a package of measures, including military spares, as an initial good faith gesture to reengage the power structure, particularly the military and key sectoral ministers. Our aim would be to shore up Guatemala’s security and to encourage regional cooperation against the extreme left and right to reduce levels of political violence as a prerequisite for a 1982 election with broad political participation. A practical program for tangible U.S. actions against the extreme right and left groups is an absolute necessity in order to provide democratic and moderate groups with the opportunity to participate in government. (Annex One spells out Option III in greater detail.)

Pros

—Would strengthen our access to security forces, and thus our ability to urge human rights improvements and reforms;

—If successful, would encourage the GOG to move more effectively against both left and right extremists;

—Would strengthen our ability to influence Guatemalan policies on Belize and El Salvador;

Cons

—The GOG may interpret our moves as endorsing their policies and reflecting a decision to give security concerns priority over human rights;

—Positive GOG progress in responding to our overtures would be difficult to measure;

—U.S. human rights organizations would vehemently oppose, charging a betrayal of human rights concerns;

—Military sales under present human rights conditions in Guatemala would require a determination that Guatemala is not a gross and consistent human rights violator under the terms of Section 502(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.²

OPTION IV: OPEN A FRESH DIALOGUE. Continuing to make clear our support for human rights and other reforms, and that repressive policies risk creating the very revolutionary conditions they and we both wish to prevent, we would attempt, over the next few months, to persuade the GOG that we are not hostile and lay the groundwork for improved cooperation in 1981 by adopting a nuanced, low-key political approach including selected military and civilian visits and exchanges. Concrete security and economic assistance measures are not part of this option, but could evolve once the GOG’s response and performance is evaluated at a policy level at year’s end. (Annex Two spells out Option IV in greater details).

Pros

—Balances security and human rights interests, and could therefore be presented publicly as a more active pursuit of current U.S. policy;

—Could be accomplished initially with a minimal expenditure of resources while we test the response to our initiatives;

—If successful, would give us an opening wedge toward having greater influence over Guatemalan security and human rights policies;

—Protects our short-term security interests while giving some prospect of avoiding the aggravated polarization and violence which could seriously injure our longer-term security interests in Guatemala and the region.

Cons

—Perceiving our initiatives to be minimal, the GOG may reject them or respond inadequately thereby embarrassing us somewhat;

—U.S. human rights organizations would protest any gesture to the GOG at this time;

—Diminishes U.S. ability to deal effectively with the Guatemalan opposition;

—May lead the GOG to conclude that the U.S. is preparing to accept the GOG on its own terms regardless of continued urging of reform, particularly if level of violence remains high.

1. Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I022, SSC–I Meetings, 1980. Confidential. According to a notation at the end of the paper, the paper was drafted by Einaudi who incorporated the substance of comments received from ARA–NSC/IG members. Tarnoff sent the paper with a covering memorandum dated July 24 to Brzezinski. In his covering memorandum, Tarnoff noted that he was forwarding the strategy paper to Brzezinski in response to a July 15 memorandum from Dodson concerning an SCC–I meeting scheduled for July 25. Tarnoff also noted that in a July 17 meeting the Inter-Agency Group for ARA, chaired by Bowdler, approved Option Four from the strategy paper, “beginning with step one as detailed in Annex Two.” (Ibid.) Annexes One and Two are attached but not printed.
2. See footnote 6, Document 28.