41. Memorandum From the Chief of the Latin American Division, Central Intelligence Agency ([name not declassified]) to the Acting Director of Central Intelligence (Carlucci)1
SUBJECT
- Points for Discussion on Guatemala
Covert Action Proposal
1. As you recall, on 7 April 1980 the SCC reviewed a Covert Action Proposal for Honduras and Guatemala which we had prepared.2 The SCC approved the Honduran portion and authorized $500,000 for the program. The Guatemalan section was briefly discussed but it was decided at that time that it would be held in abeyance until the State Department approved a new strategy paper for Guatemala which would provide the policy basis for our covert action program.
2. Luigi R. Einaudi prepared a strategy paper for Guatemala on 20 May 1980.3 Ambassador Bowdler chaired an inter-agency meeting to discuss the paper on 22 May 1980.4 The one option which offers some hope for realistically dealing with Guatemala via a combination of “carrot and stick” initiatives, is being significantly resisted by some sectors of the State Department, particularly the Office of Human [Page 116] Rights. It now appears that approval of a new strategy for Guatemala is questionable if not moribund. Without such a moderation in U.S. policy, a covert action program would be ineffective and in conflict with current policy toward Guatemala.
3. Steps to break this log jam or at least bring the matter to clear definition would be in all our interests. The level of Cuban assistance to insurgent movements in Guatemala and particularly El Salvador (witness recent intelligence reporting indicating Costa Rica will be used by the Cubans as a support base for activities against El Salvador) indicates that the clock may be ticking faster than policy-makers are aware of or wish to acknowledge at this time.5
[heading (one line) not declassified]
4. [1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]
5. [1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]
Possible Increase in Civic Action Programs by Pentagon6
6. It is my firm belief that the appeal of insurgency to the rural poor in Central America could be significantly lessened by an expansion of civic action contacts between local armed forces and the populace, particularly in Guatemala but also throughout Central America. The number of Mobile Training Team (MTT) visits, to provide civic action instruction to Central American armies or establish programs for civic action, should be augmented. I have discussed this with Southern Command Chief, General Nutting, during his recent visit to Headquarters and he supports the approach. It is a matter which I believe we should continue to support and encourage at the highest level.
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 13, Folder 4: SCC(I) Meeting June 1980 CA. Secret. Sent through the Deputy Director for Operations, John McMahon, who signed his concurrence on June 23.↩
- See Documents 489 and 490.↩
- Einaudi’s May 20 draft paper, entitled “U.S. Strategy Toward Guatemala,” posed the question: “Can we influence the current GOG to make the reforms necessary for Guatemala to evolve more democratically and play a constructive regional role? If so, how?” Einaudi proposed three options: 1) “Current Policy. Measured Pressure. Mixes human rights pressures, reassurances of anti-Communist resolve, and modest development assistance efforts, as dictated by the issue and circumstances of the moment;” 2) “Distancing. Make clear that no improvement in relations can be expected until the GOG moves decisively to end abuses and makes substantial progress on socio-economic reforms. No effort would be made to destabilize;” 3) “Gradual inducement: A positive USG stance to encourage regional cooperation and markedly reduced levels of political violence as a prerequisite for a 1982 election with broad political participation and the emergence of a constitutional successor to Lucas with enhanced legitimacy. We would undertake some modest initial good faith gestures to engage the power structure, particularly the military, in a broad-based dialogue. Our role on Belize would continue to be one of constructive neutrality.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 13, Folder 4: SCC(I) Meeting June 1980 CA) For the final version, see Document 42.↩
- No record of this May 22 meeting found.↩
- Intelligence reporting not further identified.↩
- Civic Action Programs involved military forces undertaking civilian development projects.↩