40. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate in Belize City1
121020. Brussels for USEC. Subject: US/UK Consultations on Guatemala/Belize.
1. S-Entire text
2. Summary: This cable reports on the Belize-Guatemala portion of the discussions April 30 between UK FCO Minister of State Ridley and FCO Latin American Director Harding with Asst. Secy. Bowdler and DAS Bushnell. Separate cables report their discussion on the Caribbean, and Argentina and the Falkland Islands.2 Ridley and Harding were enroute to Belize to meet with Premier Price on May 1. Talks between the UK and Guatemala are scheduled for May 19–20 in Bermuda. Ridley said that the British Cabinet is in a “bullish” mood [Page 113] about the Belize issue and wants it settled. In his talks with Price and subsequently with the Guatemalans, Ridley will probe to determine their flexibility on the territorial issue and to ascertain whether other factors such as maritime rights and security assurances for the Guatemalans and development assistance and security assurances for Belize might persuade the two sides to be flexible. However, for the British, the bottom line would be to grant Belize independence with or without Guatemalan acceptance. End summary.
3. Ridley opened discussions on Belize by confirming that UK-Guatemalan talks are scheduled for May 19–20 in Bermuda. He was considering whether to have Premier Price on location in Bermuda for simultaneous consultation and participation in some sessions. The Belize issue had been discussed in the British Cabinet which Ridley described as in a “bullish” mood about ridding the UK of the problem.
4. Ridley said that the issue in the negotiations may boil down to the Guatemalans demanding a few square miles of swamp and Price refusing to give them up. He said the British could give the Guatemalans maritime rights that they want and try to provide something to satisfy their security concerns. He wondered if the United States could help with infrastructure and road improvement in the southern part of Belize. Ridley said that the UK would put maximum pressure on the parties to settle. He said Price has been adamant on not giving up land but otherwise appears to be ready to make accommodations. In response to a question, Ridley expressed the view that Belize, except for the practical reason of reaching a lasting settlement, had no reason for giving up territory. (For such a small country, cession of territory was “inflicting damage unnecessarily.”) Ridley said that he would listen to Guatemalans’ territorial demands, but in the end if an agreement is not reached the UK would tell the GOG that it would go ahead with Belizean independence without satisfying Guatemala.
5. Ambassador Bowdler cautioned that the Guatemalans are developing a siege mentality. They are alarmed over the situation in Central America, U.S. human rights policy and the presence of guerrillas in their territory. They treat the U.S. with increasing reserve. Bowdler urged caution in dealing with the Guatemalans. Ridley said the UK’s intention was to see how the May 19–20 talks go. At the conclusion of the talks, the UK will insist upon another meeting with the Guatemalans soon. He said there was a possibility of the British keeping a “sovereign” military base in Belize. Price, he thought, would welcome it and it might be reassuring to the Guatemalans. Ridley asked if the U.S. could get involved in pressing for a solution and Bowdler responded affirmatively, saying that the U.S. is prepared to send an emissary to talk with the parties if that were necessary.
6. Bushnell commented that the U.S. has the feeling that most Guatemalans want a settlement, but that they need some face-saving [Page 114] concession regarding territory. Ridley asked if there was any “carrot” we could offer them. He commented that obviously the Guatemalans want military equipment, development assistance and a “bit more loving attention.” Bowdler responded that the U.S. has problems in being responsive to the Guatemalans—there were killings, and repression of labor union leaders and university professors which made it difficult for the U.S. to be forthcoming on military matters. Bushnell pointed out that in some areas the Guatemalan Government was making reforms; they had passed out 13,000 land titles to peasants last year.
7. Bowdler commented that the U.S. would be approaching them soon with a new strategy intended to allay some of their fears. Bushnell remarked that a major problem was that the Guatemalans had no effective judicial system; when terrorists were caught they simply shot them.
8. Bushnell suggested that Guatemala’s isolation as evidenced in the United Nations might be important in persuading them to compromise. They cannot but be aware that they are totally isolated in the UN. Last year in abstaining on the UN vote on Belize, the U.S. put the Guatemalans on notice that the U.S. expected some movement toward a settlement.3 Ridley commented that the British probably would seek some publicity for the talks with the Guatemalans. In his talks with Price the following day he would probe to see how far he could be pushed. One problem was that Price had offers from other governments in the Caribbean area to provide assistance to keep the Guatemalans out. Ridley said it appears Torrijos may have offered 1,000 troops and has encouraged Price to unilaterally declare independence. Said UK not fully clear on what Torrijos doing in Belize.
9. Ridley recognized that the Guatemalans know that as the most wealthy and powerful country in Central America, they are a special target of the Cubans. Bowdler said it would be important to give the Guatemalans assurances that the Cubans could not act from an independent Belize to undermine Guatemala. Ridley agreed. However, he repeated that if the negotiations do not progress the British are prepared to play the card of letting the Guatemalans know they would have to fight the British if they invade Belize.4
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800227–0153. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to Guatemala City and London. Sent for information to Managua, Ottawa, Panama City, Paris, San José, San Salvador, Bridgetown, Port of Spain, Georgetown, Paramaribo, Willemstad (Curacao), Fort de France (Martinique), The Hague, Brussels, USNATO, and USUN. Drafted by Blacken; cleared by Bushnell, and in ARA/CAR, EUR/NE, and S/S–O; approved by Bowdler.↩
- In telegram 117143 to London and multiple posts, May 3, the Department outlined Bowdler and Bushnell’s April 30 discussions with Ridley and Harding regarding the Caribbean. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800220–0586) In telegram 120050 to Buenos Aires, May 7, the Department described Bowdler and Bushnell’s April 30 discussions with Ridley and Harding regarding Argentina and the Falkland Islands. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800225–0913)↩
- See footnote 2, Document 36.↩
- In telegram 11287 from London, May 27, the Embassy reported that Ridley considered the UK-Guatemala talks in Bermuda “as being highly successful from the British standpoint.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800260–0444) In telegram 3593 from Guatemala City, June 4, the Embassy reported that members of the Guatemalan delegation to the Bermuda talks returned pessimistic about the prospects for an acceptable settlement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800274–0232)↩