489. Memorandum From Paul Henze
of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
Washington, April 3, 1980
SUBJECT
- CIA PAPER “COVERT ACTION OPTIONS
FOR CENTRAL AMERICA”
This CIA paper bears the marks of having
been rather hastily put together. On the theory that doing something in
this volatile area is better than doing nothing, its proposals
nevertheless need to be seriously considered.2
[Page 1288]
The paper includes status reports on what has been
accomplished to date in previously approved programs for Nicaragua and El
Salvador—TABS A and B.
New proposals in this paper relate to Honduras and Guatemala—TABS C and D.
Considering the magnitude of what is aimed at—insulation of these
societies from susceptibility to Cuban manipulation and reorientation of
them along pro-American, democratic lines—the proposals are modest.
Media and agents-of-influence operations are proposed but are not thought
likely, by themselves, to have significant impact (Option #1).
Option #2 proposes provision of assistance to the intelligence services
of Honduras and Guatemala to help them combat terrorism and insurgency.
Option #3 proposes support for moderate, reform-minded leaders and
organizations. It also envisions enlisting the help of like-minded
individuals in neighboring Latin American countries and selected
Europeans to further the same purposes.
Options #2 and #3 are judged to require a new Presidential Finding. A
draft text is provided at TAB E.3
RECOMMENDATION: The proposals are actually much
less specific than they first seem. What CIA is asking for is a general “hunting license”4 to become active in the covert action area in
Honduras and Guatemala. This is desirable. A beginning must be made
somewhere. Recommend endorsement.
Attachment
Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence
Agency for the Special Coordination Committee5
Washington, April 3, 1980
SUBJECT
- Covert Action Options for Central America
1. INITIATIVE: This proposal originated within
CIA, but reflects the shared
concern of senior CIA, DOD and other USG officials about increasing Cuban involvement in
Central America. Liaison services
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throughout the hemisphere believe that Cuba
is replacing the United States as the dominant influence in Central
America and fear that the USG is
either unwilling or unable to react. None of these services (or the
governments that they represent) is prepared to take on the Cubans;
but several might be willing to cooperate with a U.S.-sponsored regional program. This
possibility has not been discussed with any of them, however,
pending the approval which is being requested in this
memorandum.
2. ISSUES FOR DECISION: The basic issue is
whether the level of the threat to Central America posed by
Cuban-supported terrorism and insurgency is great enough to warrant
a decision to take overt and covert actions which would encourage
the countries of the region to resist Cuban-supported terrorism and
insurgency concurrently with overt and covert actions which would
prompt Honduras and Guatemala to institute needed social and
political reforms.
3. ACTION OPTIONS:
Option No. 1: Develop a covert action
infrastructure (media and agent of influence operations) within the
region and in appropriate third countries to encourage Central
American countries to resist Cuban-supported terrorism and
insurgency. This option by itself is unlikely to have a significant
impact.
RISK: LowCOST:
Absorbable within current funding levels
Option No. 2: Provide assistance to the
liaison services of Honduras and Guatemala to enable them to deal
with Cuban-supported terrorism and insurgency; such assistance would
take the form of training, materiel and on-the-scene counsel and
would have to form part of a large USG overt assistance package. As a quid pro quo and enducement for that assistance, support
USG efforts to end human rights
abuses in Guatemala and to promote needed social and political
reforms in Honduras.6
RISK: ModerateCOST:
[dollar amount not declassified]
Option No. 3: Identify, support and encourage
moderate and reform-minded leaders and organizations in Guatemala
and Honduras. Use them as well as selected individuals,
institutions, and third countries [2 lines not
declassified] to encourage significant political, social
and economic reforms.
RISK: ModerateCOST:
[dollar amount not declassified]
4. COMMENTS: It is generally accepted that
Nicaragua is presently very heavily Cuban-influenced (if not
controlled). El Salvador is tottering. Guatemala is believed to be
“next” on the Cuban priority list
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and it is anticipated that within another six
months to a year Guatemala will be in a situation roughly similar to
present-day Nicaragua or El Salvador. Honduran Communist party
members are currently being trained in assassination and terrorism
techniques and are presently engaged in providing logistical support
to the transshipment of arms through Honduras to Guatemala and El
Salvador. It is anticipated that an active level of
terrorism/insurgency could break out in Honduras within the next
year to year and one half, particularly if the new Honduran
Government does not initiate some needed social reforms and
significantly curtail government corruption. Both Costa Rica and
Panama have been extensively “used” by the Cubans as channels for
support to terrorism/insurgency within the four Central American
countries of concern. Both Panama and Costa Rica have potentially
positive roles to play in the region and both should be encouraged
to participate in a regional effort to encourage peaceful reform and
the exercise of self-determination.
Enclosed as TABS A and B are updates on activities carried out in
support of the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran Findings. Enclosed as TABS
C and D are details on the programs being proposed for Honduras and
Guatemala.
A regional overt and covert policy for the Central American region is
sorely needed. The absence of such a policy will almost certainly be
viewed by other countries in the hemisphere, and perhaps elsewhere,
as an abrogation of the USG’s
responsibility within an area which has traditionally been regarded
as a zone of USG influence.
Non-action will be tantamount to declaring disinterest in the area
and will imply a willingness to allow other (non-regional) countries
to call the shots. On the positive side, U.S. influence in the region is still potentially high
and much can be accomplished if the USG is willing to make a public commitment to oppose
Cuban-supported terrorism and insurgency and to promote needed
reforms.
While USG overt commitment to the
continuing stability of the region is an imperative, overt policy
can be supplemented by the covert actions proposed in this
paper.
5. FINDING: Options 2 and 3 outlined in
paragraph three require a specific Finding and reporting to the
Congressional Oversight Committees in accordance with Section 662 of
the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended. Enclosed as TAB E is the
proposed text of a specific Presidential Finding.
6. SOURCE OF FUNDS: [1 line
not declassified]
