Office of the Historian

43. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee (Intelligence) Meeting1

Washington, July 28, 1980, 3:30–5:50 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Intelligence Operations

PARTICIPANTS

  • State

    • Amb. David Newsom
    • Amb. David Mark

  • OSD

    • Adm. Daniel Murphy
    • Amb. Robert Komer

  • JCS

    • Gen. John Pustay

  • White House

    • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski*
    • David Aaron**

  • NSC

    • Paul Henze (Notetaker)
    • Robert Pastor***

  • Justice

    • Atty. General Benjamin Civiletti
    • Kenneth Bass III

  • OMB

    • Edward Sanders

  • CIA

    • Adm. Stansfield Turner
    • Amb. Frank Carlucci
    • John McMahon
    • [name not declassified]
    • [name not declassified]
    • [name not declassified]

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Guatemala or Belize.]

Guatemala:

CIA’s proposals for developmental covert action in Guatemala, originally presented on 7 April 1980, were reexamined along with a policy [Page 125] review paper prepared by State.2 CIA representatives argued strongly that if the Agency were to be asked to play a covert action role in the worsening situation in Guatemala, it was imperative that it begin now to build capabilities. The group endorsed a proposal for directing the covert action infrastructure at Guatemala and a proposal, totalling [dollar amount declassified], for encouraging moderate and reform-minded leaders and organizations. There was no agreement, however, on CIA’s proposal for providing modest training and advisory assistance to the Guatemalan security service to assist in combatting terrorism and insurgency, though the Agency insisted that without a program for the security service, support of moderates and reformists would be unlikely to be effective.3 The chairman directed CIA to submit for review at a subsequent meeting a more comprehensive explanation of the relationship of the security-service support program to the rest of the developmental covert action effort. The Chairman also asked State to assist the Agency in relating covert action planning to overt action plans and to work out a consensus on who the moderates and reformists are who will benefit from our support.4

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Guatemala or Belize.]

  1. Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I022, SCC–I on Covert Action, 6 August 1980. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Henze. Brzezinski was present only for, and chaired, the second part of the meeting. Aaron chaired the first part of the meeting. Pastor was present only during the Latin American discussion. [names not declassified] were present only during the Latin American and Near Eastern discussion, respectively. Dodson sent this copy of the summary, as well as the summary of conclusions from the August 6 SCC meeting (see Document 48) to Turner under a September 12 covering memorandum. McAffee provided additional information about the July 28 SCC–I meeting in his July 31 memorandum to Bowdler; see Document 44.↩
  2. For the Department of State paper, see Document 42. An undated memorandum prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency for members of the Special Coordination Committee posed the issue for decision: “whether the level of the threat to Guatemala posed by Cuban-supported subversion and insurgency is great enough to warrant a decision to take overt and covert measures to prevent a victory by the Left while attempting simultaneously to influence the Government of Guatemala to accept needed social and political reforms.” The memorandum presented three covert action options for Guatemala: 1) “Use and develop further the covert action infrastructure (media, agent of influence and liaison operations) within the region and in appropriate third countries to encourage resistance to Cuban-supported terrorism and insurgency in Guatemala;” 2) “Advise, support and encourage moderate and reform-minded leaders and organizations in Guatemala. Use them, as well as selected individuals, institutions and third countries to encourage significant political, social and economic reforms;” and 3) “Provide assistance to the liaison service of Guatemala to influence it to deal with Cuban-supported terrorism and insurgency.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Congressional Affairs, Job 82B00035R: Committee Files, Box 2, Folder 15: Covert Action—Guatemala 25 July 80)↩
  3. Pastor’s June 23 memorandum to Henze, sent in advance of the July 28 SCC–I meeting, commented on the three covert action items proposed by the CIA: “The Guatemalan government is one of the most brutal regimes in the world. The CIA has provided us reliable reports that the President or officials close to him directly ordered the assassination of some moderate Christian Democratic politicians. Their policy is to eliminate all Communists, and their definition is so broad, it would probably include Zbig. Moreover, it is probably working to undermine the Salvadorean junta. In this light, Option #1 (to encourage resistance to Cuban terrorism) is ludicrous, comparable to bringing coals to Newcastle; Option #2 (to help moderate groups) is essential; and Option #3 (assist liaison service) is premature at best, and at worst, criminal—it would give C.I.A. a bad name. We need to learn more about what the Guatemalan Security Service is doing to resist U.S. objectives in Guatemala and in El Salvador, but I wonder whether that’s the objective of Option #3.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 24, Guatemala: 2/77–12/78)↩
  4. See Document 48.↩