Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

44. Memorandum From William McAfee of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Bowdler)¹

Washington, July 31, 1980

SUBJECT

• Proceedings of the Special Coordinating Committee (Intelligence), July 28, 1980

At its meeting on July 28, the SCC(I)² discussed the following topics of concern to your Bureau, with the decisions indicated:

1. Influencing Guatemalan Government Policy. CIA declared that there was an inconsistency between overt policy, as defined in the preferred 4th option of State’s new policy paper on Guatemala, and the proposed covert actions, which could not be justified if the 4th option were chosen.³ CIA insisted that the 3rd option was the only proper framework for a covert program. Dr. Brzezinski indicated that he wanted to focus on the covert action plan, not on the overt policy, and that he did not favor proceeding to a PRC meeting on Guatemalan policy (though, of course, other agencies could press for it.) Regarding the three covert programs, he favored the first two, but not the third—in other words, he favored moves to build up a regional climate supporting opposition to Communism in Guatemala, as well as moves to strengthen moderate elements and institutions in Guatemala, but he opposed the third program of helping the security service to deal with Cuban backed terrorism and insurgency. State argued that moves to augment opposition to Communism were hardly needed in Guatemala, given the regime’s strong opposition already, but it was necessary to arouse opposition to rightist extremist killings. As for support to moderates, that might be all right if State and CIA could agree on a definition of who was moderate. CIA pleaded that its third program was essential to make the second work. Any moderates whom we might build up were in danger of being assassinated by the government unless we had first brought the army and security service to understand why anti-Communist centrism would be good for Guatemala.

The SCC’s decision was to adopt plan one, with the addition of a phrase to make clear that the program was to enhance opposition to right-wing extremism, as well as to Communism. Plan two was also accepted, though its implementation was to be subject to initial and, thereafter, periodic consultations between State and CIA to determine who fell into the moderate category. Plan three will be reformulated in greater detail by CIA and put on the agenda of the next SCC (I) meeting for consideration de novo.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Guatemala or Belize.]

1. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Files, vol. 12, Intelligence Committee Report, TIN 980643000013. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by MacDonald.
2. See Document 43.
3. For the Department of State policy paper on Guatemala, see Document 42.