Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

46. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency for the Special Coordination Committee¹

Washington, August 4, 1980

SUBJECT

• Guatemala—Additional Information Requested by the SCC

1. This memorandum contains additional material relating to the third option of the CIA Covert Action Proposal on Guatemala submitted to the Special Coordination Committee (SCC) on 28 July 1980.² The SCC requested that CIA provide additional information on Option 3, which recommends providing assistance to the civilian and Guatemalan military intelligence services as well as supporting moderate civilian leaders and organizations. This memorandum should be circulated to the SCC members.

2. Our proposed assistance to the intelligence services has several purposes. We would seek to make the military (G–2) and civilian intelligence services more professional and less dependent on the repressive measures presently used by the police to deal with subversion and terrorism. The Guatemalan Government would then have alternatives to the use of the notoriously brutal special unit of the police. These alternatives hopefully should reduce the Government’s tendency to counter violence with violence and may serve to demonstrate that the careful collection and judicious use of intelligence is a better tactic against the extreme left than mindless violence. We plan no assistance to the police at this time due to their presently repressive practices.

3. Training would be provided to the G–2 and civilian intelligence service in non-lethal defensive techniques including VIP protection, incident management (including suggestions for the formation of a national policy to deal with terrorism), bomb disposal, airport controls, and processing and analysis of intelligence. Training and assistance would also be provided to enhance intelligence collection capabilities against terrorists. Every effort would be made to influence the G–2 and civilian intelligence service to avoid counterproductive tactics. Such enhanced capabilities should reduce the Government’s tendency to view counterviolence as the sole means of dealing with terrorism.

4. As outlined in our proposal, we also intend to seek out and assist political moderates and to develop other means of moderating the policies of the current Government. We are attempting to deal with the issue as a whole: the need for rapid and significant change in Guatemala at a time when extremist forces are actively promoting insurgency with Cuban assistance. To implement the proposal, it is necessary to find ways to induce the Government, especially G–2 and the civilian intelligence service, to cooperate with us. The training and other assistance described [1 line not declassified] providing us the opportunity of influencing policies. [less than 1 line not declassified] should also provide an element of even-handedness so that our efforts to assist moderate elements are not viewed as an attack on the Government itself.

5. Lastly, CIA wishes to emphasize its view that:

—The CIA Covert Action proposal for Guatemala is not consistent with Option 4 of the State Department Strategy Paper and cannot be realistically implemented if State’s Strategy Option 4 is approved.³ CIA’s proposal is consistent with State’s Strategy Option 3.

—It is doubtful that we could provide effective assistance to moderate elements with it not coming to the attention of the Guatemalan Government. If this happens, the Guatemalan Government will certainly interpret this action as detrimental to its position and generate a reaction which could negate our efforts and worsen relations between the U.S. and Guatemala. [1 line not declassified] we will be in a position to monitor this and possibly soften the reaction of the Guatemalan Government. In addition, [1 line not declassified] will provide us additional opportunities to identify possible moderates within the military and security apparatus.⁴

1. Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I022, SSC–I Meetings, 6 August 1980. Secret; Sensitive.
2. See Document 43.
3. See Document 42.
4. See Document 48.