Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

47. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, August 5, 1980

SUBJECT

• SCC(I)—Guatemala (S)

The CIA has provided some more information to try to justify its Option 3, which recommends providing assistance to the Guatemalan Civilian and Military Intelligence Services.² The CIA paper also says that this option cannot be “realistically implemented if State’s strategy Option 4 is approved,” which is what happened. Guidance implementing Option 4—sending emissaries for a new dialogue with the Guatemalans—has been transmitted.³ Moreover, the CIA says that it cannot help moderates in Guatemala unless its Option 3 is approved. In short, the CIA is trying to set up the SCC(I) for a catch-22, but in fact, it has been caught.⁴ You may want to ask Turner whether they continue to support their Option 3 in light of the fact that you, State and Defense have approved State’s strategy for Option 4 and it’s being implemented. (S)

Assuming that they will still try to get their Option 3 accepted by the SCC(I), I think your initial reservations about allowing the US to be associated with the Guatemalan Security Service is correct. Indeed, I think the initial decisions by the SCC(I) were on the mark: to assist moderates, and State and CIA would first agree on who these moderates are; and to develop further the covert action infrastructure to encourage resistance to left wing and right wing terrorism. I believe that the SCC(I) was correct in its reluctance to enter into a relationship with the Liaison Service in Guatemala. (S)

I recommend that you oppose CIA’s Option 3. To establish such a relationship as the CIA is recommending at this time would be to identify us with the repression without enhancing our ability to reduce it.⁵ [3 lines not declassified] (S)

1. Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I022, SSC–I Meetings, 6 August 1980. Secret. Sent for information. A copy was sent to Henze. Attached as Tab D to an undated paper prepared in the National Security Council entitled “Guatemala: Chto Delat’? Ničevo Delat’?” For additional information about the substance of this paper, see footnote 5 below.
2. See Document 46.
3. In telegram 207808 to Guatemala City, August 6, the Department noted Muskie’s selection of two emissaries to begin a fresh dialogue with Guatemala: John Dreyfuss, as Special Emissary and team leader, and Lieutenant General Wallace Nutting, in a supporting role. The telegram also instructed Sinn and Landau to make arrangements for the emissaries to meet with Lucas and included talking points. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 27, Guatemala: 1/77–1/81) For more on the Dreyfuss-Nutting Mission, see Document 49.
4. See Document 48.
5. In an undated paper prepared in the National Security Council entitled “Guatemala: Chto Delat’? Ničevo Delat’?” Henze recommended to Brzezinski, in advance of the August 6 SCC–I meeting, that “CIA should not be put in a straddling position—either it should be given a serious role in accordance with its proposals or left out of the picture. If State is assigned the action, it must be in the framework of arrangements that ensure that State perform—otherwise State will accept Option 4 but do little or nothing and will then come back in a few weeks arguing for CIA to go in and rescue the situation—when it may well be too late.” (National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I022, SSC–I Meetings, 6 August 1980)