Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

49. Telegram From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State¹

Guatemala City, August 18, 1980, 1930Z

5263. From Dreyfuss and General Nutting. Subject: (S) Emissaries to President Lucas. Ref: State 207808.²

1. (S-Entire text)

2. We met at Presidential Finca with Lucas (who was accompanied only by Chief of Staff Mendoza) for over two hours of surprisingly, frank, animated, and non-acrimonious discussion. After usual pleasantries, reminiscences, etc., we opened with explanation that our mission was designed to open dialogue with him, attempt to clear up misunderstandings on either side and to provide a clear picture of policies and positions of USG, which we thought were misunderstood in Guatemala. We then made points outlined in para 8–B of reftel and gave him rundown of our view of the situation and problems in other Central American countries, and our efforts to favorably influence courses of events in them—efforts we thought would eventually be of benefit to US, Guatemala, and all of Central America.³ Lucas listened to these presentations in stony-faced silence.

3. However, when we asked him if he had any comments or questions at this point, he began a voluble discourse, saying that he was flabbergasted that we had come to talk to him as he had concluded that the USG had written him off. He said he believed that the US, particularly specific USG officials, had been trying to “strangle” Guatemala. He mentioned in this regard his belief that we were trying to block Guatemala’s export markets (he particularly noted DDT problems with meat, to which he ascribed political motives).⁴ He also stated his belief that USG officials had influenced private banks to deny Guatemala needed credits for development—which he wanted more than any government-to-government assistance. He also expressed great skepticism of possibilities of success of current US efforts to keep other Central American countries from falling into extreme leftist camp.

4. He went on to discuss his understanding of need for social and economic development as part of effort to reduce subversion and his efforts and plans to achieve such development, including an “agrarian reform” tailored for the Guatemalan situation that he felt would help meet social and economic needs of the campesinos without seriously harming the Guatemalan economy in general. In the course of this phase of the discussion, we made points detailed in para 8–D⁵ of reftel and launched into deeper and more specific discussion of how human rights situation in Guatemala affects Guatemala’s image with significant sectors, both private and official, in the US, runs head-on into our ingrained and durable policies and legal requirements with regard to extra-legal violence, and how this seriously hampers our ability to be of assistance to Guatemala in economic and security fields. We then offered for his consideration phase I of 3-step program which we hoped would enable us to improve our cooperation⁶ (reftel).

5. He obviously did not feel the need to consult with other members of his government on this idea, as after a moment’s thought he stated that he was sorry, but he could not do what we were asking him to do. He said to attempt to follow such a course would be suicidal—that he was engaged in a “war” with subversive leftist forces which would not follow the rules, and there was no possibility of defeating them in a “clean and legal manner.” He said he was feeling increasing pressure from various segments of Guatemalan society including the lower and middle classes to “do something” to put an end to leftist terrorism. He noted particularly his concern about the university which he believes to be a focal point of subversion dedicated to overthrowing the government and seizing the country, and said he would have to take “drastic action” to counter this threat. He said he understood what our position was on the human rights issue but strongly disagreed with our belief that he could successfully combat the extreme left with other than “radical” measures. During the course of this portion of the discussion which was in the form of animated give-and-take, we mustered all arguments we could to convince him he was wrong and that his methods would serve only to worsen the situation. However, he adamantly cast aside all such argumentation, countering with ingrained and durable GOG beliefs, such as the belief that the judicial system could not be used to punish terrorists and thus bring an end to their activities because of leftist infiltration of the courts and threats to non-leftist judges. He said that he felt that any tactic other than violent reaction to the violence against his government would merely permit leftist guerrillas and terrorists to strengthen themselves and consolidate their position, as had occured, he claimed, during Laugerud’s four years of “soft hand” tactics following Arana’s “success” in coping with the problem during the late 1960s. Lucas went on to say that the US seemed to be singling out Guatemala as a special target on the question of human rights and asked why we were not concerned about serious human rights violations in Mexico which were not given much publicity because of Mexico’s greater control of the press. He also noted somewhat bitterly that we giving assistance to Nicaragua when he was sure that the Nicaraguan Government was clandestinely wiping out large numbers of its opponents. In sum, Lucas’ position, from which he would not budge, was that while he needed and wanted official US economic and security assistance (particularly the latter) Guatemala could and would have to live without it if in order to obtain such assistance he had to follow a course that would deprive him of the ability to utilize measures that he believed were the only means to keep the extreme left from defeating him.

6. Despite the facts that he and we were in strong disagreement on this subject, Lucas said he felt the discussion had been useful, that he was disposed to continue such dialogue in the future, and suggested use of the Chief of Staff Mendoza as channel. In this regard we suggested that if we were to engage in effective continuing dialogue, it would be most helpful to have the proposed new US Ambassador in place in the near future. He did not react to this.

7. Request: Repeat to Panama for CINCSO.

Sinn

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870148–1884. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2. See footnote 3, Document 47.
3. Paragraph 8B of telegram 207808 to Guatemala City, August 6, included talking points favoring human rights and due process of the law, democratic constitutional order based on free elections with broad participation, economic development, and a democratic Central America. Alternatively, the talking points opposed human rights violations, terrorism, anarchy, and communism. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 27, Guatemala: 1/77–1/81)
4. In telegram 66875 to Guatemala City, March 13, the Department indicated that a laboratory test had identified unacceptable amounts of DDT in Guatemalan meat exported to the United States and noted that future meat shipments from Guatemala would be tested at U.S. ports prior to entry. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800130–0569)
5. Paragraph 8D of telegram 207808 to Guatemala City, August 6, emphasized Guatemala’s ability to “meet the challenges of change in an orderly manner” by ending illegal violence, expanding social and economic reform, and broadening political life in the country. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 27, Guatemala: 1/77–1/81) In telegram 5168 from Guatemala City, August 12, Sinn warned that the timing of the U.S. initiative to begin a “fresh dialogue” with the Guatemalan Government was poor due to the upcoming elections in both Guatemala and the United States. Sinn also warned that the term “human rights” was “simply a red flag, and often an unnecessary one which produces sub-rational and Pavlovian reactions” on the part of the Guatemalan Government. He suggested that “our emissaries should focus the dialogue on the killing, not emotionally charged abstractions.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870148–1898)
6. Paragraph 8E of telegram 207808 to Guatemala City, August 6, described three phases through which U.S.-Guatemalan cooperation could be improved. The first phase would involve a private pledge from Guatemala to reduce violence, resulting in increased high-level interaction between the two governments. The second phase would follow a public commitment from Guatemala to reduce violence, resulting in increased U.S. economic assistance and military consultations. The third phase involved a resumption of U.S. military aid following a demonstrable improvement in Guatemalan human rights practices. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 27, Guatemala: 1/77–1/81)