Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

50. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, August 20, 1980

SUBJECT

• US Policy to Guatemala—SCC (I) Recommendations and Next Steps (C)

We have just received a report of the Dreyfuss-Nutting mission to Guatemala (Tab A).² They explained fully our concerns and policies to Guatemalan President Lucas in order to try to generate a new dialogue in which we would be taking positive steps to Guatemala in response to a clear commitment by the Guatemalan government to end the repression. As I expected, the initiative was unsuccessful, although it was revealing in that Lucas was remarkably more candid than I had anticipated. He said, in effect, that we have different views of how to deal with the subversive problem in Guatemala, and that there was no way in his mind to bridge that difference. He said he is engaged in a “war” with subversive leftists who did not follow the rules, and “there was no possibility of defeating them in a clean and legal manner.” Lucas has clearly opted for the “Argentine strategy,” and the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Guatemala and Argentina this month is an indication of that. On the bottom-line point of encouraging Lucas to grant agreement for Landau, Lucas did not react. (S)

In my opinion, there is nothing more that we can do, or that we should do, until the election in November. A recent intelligence report (Tab B), provides additional detail on the repression he is planning. He believes that the assassination of “Marxist professors and students during the past several months has been effective in hampering the activities of the Guatemalan radical movement,” and he intends to extend this range of assassinations. We have heard through other channels that Lucas expects a Reagan victory, and believes that Reagan is not only sympathetic to Lucas’s strategy to stop subversion, but indeed would be supportive. It does not make any sense for him to modify that strategy as long as he thinks Reagan will be elected. Similarly, it makes less sense for us to abandon our human rights policy, because that is the way it would be interpreted, before the election when it is clear that there is no imminent Communist threat to the Lucas regime. The Army is still quite strong; the Communist groups very divided, despite Castro’s efforts to reunite them. Events in El Salvador will have a greater bearing on what happens in Guatemala than anything that the Guatemalans will be able to do in the near future. After Carter is elected, our leverage will naturally increase, and I think that a meeting of the minds at that point is possible. Not now. (S)

I therefore recommend that we maintain a steady course between now and the election. Hopefully, they will give agreement to Landau. If they do not, then we certainly cannot take any initiative without looking unbelievably weak and irresolute. If they do, then Landau can re-explore the possibility of improving our relationship; the guidance at Tab C does provide some possibilities for the future, if not for the next couple of months.³ To veer away from this course at this time would only embarrass the President and make him look inconsistent, and his policies politically motivated. It would not be any more effective in the Guatemalan context than in the US context. (S)

The only follow-up on U.S. policy to Guatemala relates to the three proposals before the SCC(I): (1) to develop a covert infrastructure in both the left and the right; (2) to assist moderate groups; and (3) to develop a [less than 1 line not declassified] relationship between the Guatemalan Security Service and the CIA. I think it makes sense to go ahead with No. 1 and No. 2—No. 1 because we may need that in six months or so, and No. 2 because the moderates need help from us desperately. I think it would be a terrible mistake, particularly in the light of the TD at Tab B to have anything to do with the Security Service in Guatemala at this time. The CIA admits the Security Service is not a “rogue elephant,” that it is executing (in the fullest sense of the word) the instructions of the President. Therefore, we cannot influence the Security Service if Lucas remains determined; all we can do is let ourselves be associated with their crimes. This is not what Jimmy Carter is about. I therefore strongly recommend that you oppose that proposal.⁴ (S)

Tab B

Central Intelligence Agency Information Report⁵

TDFIR DB–315/14753–80 Washington, July 29, 1980

SUBJECT

• Plans for Sharp Increase in Killings of Alleged Leftists by Guatemalan Government (DOI: late July 1980)

SOURCE

• [3 lines not declassified]

1. Beginning in August 1980, the Guatemalan Government (GOG) will sanction a sharp increase in the killing of leftists by its various security services operating under the guise of its national right-wing movement, the anti-communist secret army (ESA). This decision is based on the belief that the elimination of Marxist professors and students during the past several months has been effective in hampering the activities of the Guatemalan radical movements by striking fear into them and that further killings will bring their activities to a halt. An additional influencing factor considered by the GOG is the opening of the state university school year. The security services want to serve early notice to university students and faculty members that the war against Communism will continue to strike the state university campuses.

2. During the period 31 July–4 August 1980, new lists containing the names of “Communist” university students and professional persons will be prepared by the office of Colonel Hector Montalvan Batres, a key advisor to President Romeo Lucas Garcia. There will probably be three lists and each will contain different names. A list will be given to the Army G–2 (intelligence), to the National Police for subsequent action by “comando seis”, and to the National Intelligence Service. ([less than 1 line not declassified] comment: the National Intelligence Service has not been known to participate actively in the elimination of “Communists” in the past although information on targets has probably been extracted from their records.) It is widely believed among those involved that each list for August will include between eight and 15 professionals and as many as 50 students. (Source comment: While in round figures, the total number of persons targetted would be between 24–45 professional persons and as many as 150 students, it is doubtful that security forces will be able to carry out so many killings for a variety of reasons.)

3. The office of Montalvan serves as a clearing house in the compilation of the names. Involved Guatemalan security services provide names of troublesome Communists based on personal knowledge, informant reports, interrogation reports, and file checks. Based on the input from these services, a coordinated effort is made to assign priority targets which appear on the lists which are then fed back to the various services for their action. From time to time, on an after-the-fact-basis, ESA distributes flyers to the media claiming credit for only some of the actions. This ploy is designed to create fear among leftists. (Source comment: On some of the more delicate cases, referral is made to President Lucas for a determination prior to the inclusion of the target on an action list.)

4. ([less than 1 line not declassified] comment: The recent steady pace of killings of alleged leftist professors and students, mostly at the GOG-funded University of San Carlos, has created difficulties for the university, if no visible effect on the four major radical movements. Classes have been disrupted to varying degrees, and some of the faculty are less than enthusiastic about showing up for classes.)

5. ACQ: [2 lines not declassified]

6. Field dissem: [2 lines not declassified]

7. Washington dissem:

To State	Exclusive for the Director, INR
	Exclusive for the Office for Combatting Terrorism
To DIA	Exclusive for the Director, DIA

1. Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I026, Guatemala, 7 April 1980–10 September 1980. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. A copy was sent to Henze. Brzezinski wrote at the top of the page: “RP Is an SCC planned? We probably need one. ZB.” Odom wrote along the left-hand margin of the memorandum: “Many Reagan supporters have told me they believe the State Dept activism is the sole cause of trouble in Guatemala. WO.” Aaron drew an arrow pointing toward Odom’s note and wrote in the margin of the memorandum: “That is undoubtedly their view but it is B.S. What by the way does W.O. tell these many Reagan supporters? DA.”
2. See Document 49.
3. Reference is to telegram 207808 to Guatemala City, August 6. See footnote 3, Document 47 and footnotes 3, 5, and 6, Document 49.
4. Aaron, Odom, and one unidentified official initialed a concurrence.
5. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Copies were sent to the Department of State, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the White House Situation Room, National Security Council Staff, CIA Office of Current Operations, and USCINSCO Quarry Heights.