51. Telegram From the Consulate in Belize City to the Department of State1
975. Subject: Belize Dispute. Ref: (A) State 221147;2 (B) Belize 955.3
1. (C-Entire text)
2. Belizeans do not see our policy of qte facilitative neutrality qte as being neutral at all. They regard it as supportive of the Guatemalan position. I have discussed this in the past with Premier Price, Harry Courtenay, and Assad Shoman. They appear to believe that at one time, this policy may have had some efficacy and merit but that now, due to Guatemalan intransigence, it has no value and in fact gives confidence to GOG. They say that supporting the status quo is not being neutral at all.
3. The degree of progress made by the British and Guatemalans is the big unknown in this equation. I cannot help but wonder if perhaps some progress was made in New York in July;4 if for no other reason than because of the secrecy which surrounds the discussions. The fact that UK Delegation at Bermuda were prepared to tell the GOG that a British military presence would remain here is, in my opinion, a very significant step, and it seems it was so regarded by the Guatemalan delegation.5
4. Price’s search for support of a military nature following independence is, as Dept. aware, an old one; he has been casting about for help since early 1978. It is said that he has approached, during these years Canada, India, Nigeria—all of whom have said qte no qte in [Page 144] varying degrees of firmness, and Panama, Guyana, Jamaica, Grenada, and Venezuela, all of whom have indicated, so I understand, some sort of willingness except perhaps Venezuela who fudged. No state in the affirmative line seems to be in a position to send more than the smallest of token forces. Panama might be an exception, but one wonders how Panamanian soldiers might get here, especially if in response to an overt Guatemalan military move. The idea is frightening to many Belizeans and, one must admit, unpleasant to consider from post point of view. Jamaican military have a bad reputation here, as do Jamaicans in general, based on local unhappy memories of Jamaican regiments here many years ago and Jamaican police in less distant past. The fighting capability of such a force we reckon to be close to nil, and the potential for incidents and unhappy relations with the locals very high indeed.
5. In principle, Belize would feel that a change in our vote would be a recognition of the legitimacy of their claim to independence, and that we had given up a position which they feel is not an expression of neutrality. I do not believe it would influence the Belizean position of no land cession; rather, I feel it would reinforce it. As for an exhortation to reach an agreement, that seems hardly necessary here; there is nothing most Belizeans would rather have than such an agreement.
6. As a post script, I might add that last night, I spoke at the monthly social meeting of the Belizian Lions Club where I gave what I call speech B, qte The U.S. Consulate: Who we are. What we do. qte the Q&A following was given over largely to a series of criticisms of our policy of abstention; the audience was largely younger civil servants and a few businessmen and the questions uniformally ran along the lines that we abstain because we do not wish to offend Guatemala, that our economic investments there are huge and we are afraid of losing them and that we support a conservative, military regime because of our fear of spreading Communism in Central America.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800399–0680. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information Priority to Guatemala City, London, and USUN.↩
- In telegram 221147 to Guatemala City and Belize City, August 20, the Department noted that officials had begun a process to review the United States’ position on “yet another resolution on Belize certain to be introduced in the UN Fourth Committee this fall.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800397–0077)↩
- In telegram 955 from Belize City, August 20, the Consulate recommended that the United States vote in favor of the upcoming UNGA resolution on independence for Belize because both HMG and the GOB were pressing for independence. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800398–1127)↩
- According to telegram 4167 from Guatemala City, July 2, and telegram 2749 from USUN, July 10, Guatemalan and British officials met in New York July 7–8 to review legal issues related to the 1859 treaty and to continue talks about Belize. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800322–1063; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800331–0244) For more information about the treaty, see footnote 4, Document 16.↩
- See footnote 4, Document 40.↩