India and Pakistan: Pre-Crisis, January 1969–February 1971

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61. Letter From the Country Director for India, Ceylon, Nepal, and the Maldives Islands (Schneider) to the Chargé d’ Affaires in India (Stone)

Schneider informed Stone of the decision made by Nixon to provide military assistance to Pakistan.

Source: Department of State, NEA/INC Files: Lot 77 D 51, Eyes Only Correspondence, 1969/1970. Secret; Eyes Only; Official-Informal. Published from a copy that bears Schneider’s typed signature.


62. Memorandum of Conversation

Ambassador Keating warned Secretary of Defense Laird that a decision to provide military assistance to Pakistan would have a “devastating” effect on U.S. relations with India.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files, FRC 73 A 1975, Box 19, India 1970, 000.1–334. Secret. Drafted by Kravitz, and approved on June 1 by Nutter and on June 5 in Laird’s office. The conversation was held in Laird’s office.


63. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Nixon confirmed his decision to make a one-time exception for Pakistan to the arms embargo for South Asia, and he specified the inclusion of tanks and B–57 bombers.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 641, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. I, 1970. Secret. Sent for action. Attached but not published at Tab A was the June 4 Rogers memorandum. It can be found ibid. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendation, and with check marks on the two succeeding option lines indicated his intention to add tanks and B–57 bombers to the package of armaments recommended by Rogers.


64. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)

Kissinger and Sisco discussed the President’s decision to include tanks and B–57 bombers in the one-time exception package for Pakistan. Sisco warned that to do so would increase opposition in the Congress and cause a greater reaction in India.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 363, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.


65. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)

Sisco and Kissinger discussed the contemplated one-time exception again, and Sisco revised the proposal to eliminate the tanks and change the 6 bombers to 12 interceptor fighters.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 363, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. The omissions are in the original transcript.


66. Memorandum of Conversation

President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger informed Pakistani Ambassador Hilaly of President Nixon’s decision to make a one-time exception to the embargo on arms supplies for South Asia on Pakistan’s behalf.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1026, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Memcon–Ambassador Hilaly, 6/17/70. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office.


67. Telegram 96236 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan

The Department instructed Ambassador Farland to inform Pakistani President Yahya about President Nixon’s decision on arms supplies for Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Van Hollen on June 17; cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Plans and National Security Affairs Robert J. Pranger (DOD/ISA), Director of the Office of Military Assistance and Sales Christian Chapman (PM/MAS), William F. Spengler (NEA/PAF), Sisco, David Abshire (H), and Saunders; and approved by Rogers. Saunders sent a draft of the telegram to Kissinger on June 18 under a covering memorandum. A handwritten notation by Saunders on the memorandum indicates that Kissinger revised and cleared the telegram. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. II, 1 Dec 69–Sept 70) Telegram 96481 to Rawalpindi, June 18, cited at the conclusion of the telegram, provided Farland with the rationale underlying the policy decision. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK)


68. Telegram 5012 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State

Ambassador Farland reported that Pakistani President Yahya was “deeply pleased and appreciative of President’s action.”

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. II, 1 Dec 69–Sept 70. Secret; Priority; Nodis.


69. Telegram 8424 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State

Ambassador Keating reported on a conversation with Swaran Singh, the new Minister of External Affairs, in which Singh said that a U.S. decision to resume military supplies to Pakistan would “greatly impair” his efforts to improve relations between India and the United States.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 ASIA SE. Secret; Exdis.


70. Letter From President Nixon to the Ambassador to India (Keating)

Nixon wrote to Keating to explain the rationale behind his decision to provide “at least one package of equipment” to Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 725, Country Files, Europe, USSRFiryubinKeating, Jul 70. Secret; Eyes Only.


71. Backchannel Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Ambassador to India (Keating)

Kissinger confirmed the information concerning arms for Pakistan that was sent to Keating in a letter from President Nixon on July 17. He added that India’s pending decision on recognition of North Vietnam would “be considered in assessing the timing on Pakistan arms package.”

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 725, Country Files, Europe, USSRFiryubinKeating, Jul 70. Top Secret; Sensitive. Initialed by Haig for Kissinger. The message is undated, but an attached note indicates that it was sent on the date and at the time given. Telegram 112500 to New Delhi is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK.


72. Memorandum of Conversation

President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Ambassador Jha discussed prospects for improving relations between the United States and India.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Secret. A copy was sent to David Young. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office. The time of meeting is not indicated on the memorandum.


73. Telegram 122180 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India

The Department transmitted the text of a letter from Indian Foreign Minister Singh to Secretary of State Rogers in which Singh expressed his interest in improving Indo-U.S. relations but warned that a U.S. decision to resume arms sales to Pakistan would have “serious repercussions.”

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 INDIA. Limited Official Use; Limdis. Drafted on July 28 by R. Grant Smith (NEA/INC), cleared by M. Gordon Tiger (NEA/INC) and by Craig Baxter (NEA/PAF), and approved by Van Hollen. Repeated to Rawalpindi.


74. Telegram 1569 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State

Ambassador Farland reported from Dacca on severe flooding in East Pakistan that had led Pakistani President Yahya to postpone national elections from October to December.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 PAK. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Rawalpindi. The telegram, signed by Consul General Blood, was sent by Farland. Nixon followed Farland’s advice. On August 18 Farland was authorized to deliver a letter from Nixon to Yahya that was virtually identical to the letter proposed by Farland. (Telegram 134524 to Rawalpindi; ibid.)


75. Telegram 7184 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State

President Yahya told Chargé Sober that his decision to postpone national elections until December should not be taken to mean that he was wavering in his determination to restore civilian government.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–PAK. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Dacca, Karachi, and Lahore.


76. Memorandum for the Record

Ambassador Farland summarized his conversation with President Nixon during which he reported on Pakistani President Yahya’s enthusiastic reaction to Nixon’s offer of a one-time exception to the embargo on military sales to Pakistan.

Source: Department of State, NEA/PAB Files: Lot 78 D 98, Military Supply–PAK Requests. Secret; Nodis. Prepared by Farland. For the message delivered by Farland to Yahya on June 20, see Document 67


77. Telegram 160165 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India

The Embassy was instructed to inform the Indian Government that the U.S. intended to make a limited sale of arms to Pakistan as a one-time exception to the arms supply policy established in 1965.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Quainton and Schneider on September 28; revised and cleared by Van Hollen; cleared by Spengler, Chapman, Deputy Assistant Secretary Colgate Prentice (H), Saunders, Colonel Gross (OSD/ISA), and Rear Admiral St. George (DOD/Joint Staff); and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Repeated to Rawalpindi. The Embassy in Rawalpindi was instructed on September 29 to inform Pakistan about the details of the decision to offer a one-time exception to the existing restrictions on military supply. (Telegram 160449 to Rawalpindi; ibid.)


78. Telegram 12174 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State

Ambassador Keating conveyed the decision to allow limited arms sales to Pakistan in a conversation with Acting Foreign Secretary S.K. Banerji. Banerji described the issue as “extremely explosive” and expressed regret at the decision.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Under Secretary Johnson called in Ambassador Jha on September 30 and informed him about the decision to offer limited arms sales to Pakistan. Jha protested the decision and anticipated that it would produce a “great deal of unhappiness” in India. (Telegram 161070 to New Delhi, September 30; ibid.)


79. Telegram 7754 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State

Deputy Chief of Mission Sidney Sober reported on his meeting with Foreign Secretary Alvie and Defense Secretary Ahmed to discuss the U.S. offer to sell military equipment to Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. The reference to Conte–Long provisions in the telegram is a reference to the Conte–Long amendment to the Foreign Assistance and Related Appropriations Act of 1968. The amendment, adopted as section 119 of the appropriations act on January 2, 1968, directed the President to withhold economic assistance in an amount equivalent to the amount spent by any underdeveloped country other than Greece, Turkey, Iran, Israel, the Republic of China, the Philippines, and Korea for the purchase of sophisticated weapons systems. (PL–90–249; 81 Stat. 936)


80. Telegram 7805 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State

Pakistani President Yahya indicated that Pakistan would have difficulty financing the military sales being authorized and asked for alternative purchase plans.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis.


81. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers

Sisco summarized the Indian and Pakistani reactions to the decision to authorize limited arms sales to Pakistan.

Source: Department of State, NEA/INC Files: Lot 77 D 51, DTS–Chrons, Oct–Dec 1970. Secret. Drafted by Schneider and cleared by Spengler and Van Hollen.


82. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Nixon approved a $72 million proposed program of PL–480 commodities for Pakistan for fiscal year 1971.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. No classification marking. The memorandum is undated. Transmitted under an October 9 covering memorandum from C. Fred Bergsten of the NSC staff to Kissinger for submission to the President. Kissinger initialed the approval line of the memorandum for Nixon. Attached at Tab A but not published is a September 3 memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Johnson to the President, in which he recommended the proposed PL–480 program on behalf of the Departments of State, Agriculture, and the Treasury. Caspar Weinberger, Acting Director of the Office of Management and Budget, concurred with Johnson’s recommendation in a September 26 memorandum to the President, attached at Tab B but not published. Also attached was an October 20 memorandum from NSC Staff Secretary Jeanne Davis to Eliot informing the Department of State of the President’s decision and instructing the Department not to inform Pakistan until after Nixon had met with Yahya in Washington on October 25.


83. Letter From President Nixon to Pakistani President Yahya

Nixon’s letter conveyed to Yahya the terms of the offer of an arms sale to Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 755, Presidential Correspondence File, Pakistan, 1969–1970. No classification marking. The text of the letter was transmitted to Rawalpindi on October 16 to be conveyed to Yahya prior to his trip to New York for the fall session of the UN General Assembly. (Telegram 170588 to Rawalpindi; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK)


84. Telegram 8141 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State

The initial status report from the Embassy indicated that the “major problem” affecting the U.S. offer to sell arms to Pakistan was the question of whether Pakistan could afford to finance the package of arms being offered.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Exdis.


85. National Intelligence Estimate 31/32–70

NIE 31/32–70 provided a summary of long-term political and economic prospects for India and Pakistan.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R 01012A, NIC Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. Submitted by Deputy Director of Central Intelligence R. E. Cushman, Jr. According to a note on the cover sheet, “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on October 20, except for the Assistant to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside of his jurisdiction.”


86. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Nixon approved a recommended $100 million AID program loan to Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Confidential. An October 22 covering memorandum from Bergsten transmitted the memorandum and attachments to Kissinger for submission to the President. Kissinger wrote on Bergsten’s memorandum that the proposed program loan to Pakistan was “approved on basis of oral instruction by President.” Accordingly, Kissinger initialed the approval line for Nixon on October 28. Attached but not published at Tab A was an undated memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Irwin to Nixon recommending authorization for a $100 million program loan to Pakistan. Attached but not published at Tab B was an undated memorandum from Shultz to Nixon, in which Shultz concurred with Irwin’s recommendation.


87. Telegram Secto 52 From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State

Secretary of State Rogers and Pakistani President Yahya met in New York during the meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. Yahya anticipated that it would take 6 months following the establishment of a constituent assembly based on the general election scheduled for December before a constitution could be drafted and martial law replaced with civilian government.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 S. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Also designated USUN 2646. Sent with a request to repeat to Rawalpindi, Cairo, and Amman.


88. Telegram Secto 70 From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State

Secretary of State Rogers and Indian Prime Minister Gandhi had a sharp exchange in New York growing out of the Indian reaction to the U.S. decision to supply additional arms to Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. III, Sept 70–30 June 71. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Also designated USUN 2711. Sent with a request to repeat to New Delhi and Rawalpindi. In an October 26 letter to Keating, Schneider described the conversation between Gandhi and Rogers as “a very difficult one,” but he felt that the exchange was colored by the fact that both were tired at the end of a stressful day of meetings and speeches. (Department of State, NEA/INC Files: Lot 77 D 51, Eyes Only Correspondence, 1969/1970) Gandhi set the tone for the meeting by declining an invitation from Nixon to attend a dinner the President was hosting in Washington for heads of state attending the General Assembly. (Telegrams 173630 and 176269 to New Delhi, October 21 and 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 INDIA, and ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. III, Sept 70–30 Jun 71) Jha explained that Gandhi’s decision related to scheduling commitments on her return trip to India, but Keating saw it as a “studied affront related in large part to our decision to sell arms to Pakistan.” (Telegram 12939 from New Delhi, October 19; ibid., RG 59, Conference Files, Box 519, 1966–1972: Lot 71 D 227, CF 469)


89. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Rogers summarized his conversations with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi and Indian Foreign Minister Singh for Kissinger.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 365, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. The omissions are as transcribed. For Rogers’ conversation with Singh on the morning of October 24, see Document 92.


90. Memorandum of Conversation

Presidents Nixon and Yahya discussed relations between the United States and Pakistan and the possibility of Pakistan facilitating secret contacts between the U.S. and China.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 63, Presidential File, Memoranda of Conversation, 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. The conversation was held in the Oval Office of the White House. A copy of this memorandum of conversation, edited in the NSC for distribution to the Department of State, indicates that Kissinger was present and took the notes on which the memorandum was based. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71) The time of the meeting is from the President’s Daily Diary. (Ibid., White House Central Files)