63. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1 2
SUBJECT :
- Arms Supply Policy for South Asia
When our Cambodian decision-making was at its height, you made a decision on the South Asian arms supply question but asked us to hold it. Then during your meeting with the CENTO foreign ministers you asked Assistant Secretary Sisco to take another look at what we might do for Pakistan. His memo is attached, and this will give you an opportunity for making a final decision. (Tab A)
To refresh your memory, the present policy bans the sale of lethal equipment but does allow sale of spare parts and non-lethal equipment as well as the sale of U.S.-made equipment now in the hands of third countries like Turkey. On this last point, you should be aware that one of the restrictions being proposed for inclusion in the Foreign Military Sales Act would prohibit third-country sales of this kind.
You will recall that the most realistic choice is between:
- —relaxing the ban to permit sale of equipment to replace worn out equipment formerly provided by the U.S. and
- —not changing policy, keeping it under review but making a one-time sale to provide Pakistan with some equipment it most urgently needs.
In your earlier consideration of this problem, you approved the second—the one-time exception—but asked that the decision be held.
The two sides of the case are well known to you:
- 1.
- Ambassador Farland—like Ambassador Hilaly at your meeting with the CENTO ministers—argues strongly that Pakistan is at a political crossroads, that President Yahya needs support in his effort to keep Pakistan from going radical [Page 2] and that re-opening of regular U.S. military supply can help him in his argument with his officers that Pakistan must keep its lines open to the U.S. He points out that Yahya is going on long-delayed trip to Moscow June 22 and that a U.S. answer before then is necessary so that Yahya will know what he can expect from the U.S. Farland concludes by describing the potential effects for U.S. interests if Yahya fails in his efforts to keep Pakistan out of radical hands—much greater Chinese influence in East Pakistan and even the commitment of Pakistani troops beside Arab forces against Israel.
- 2.
- Ambassador Keating argues the desirability of not reinserting ourselves in the middle of the India-Pakistan rivalry by going back into the regular military aid business. He also argues that the sharp Indian reaction is not worth what must be the marginal U.S. influence on the Pakistani political scene.
Secretary Rogers concurs in your earlier judgment not to remove the arms embargo altogether. That leaves us, he feels, with only the choice of making a one-time exception to that embargo to permit one direct sale to Pakistan. While this has the obvious advantages of doing something for Pakistan, he points out that it will not meet Pakistan’s desire for a basic change in policy. He feels that even a one-time sale would create “major” problems with those in the Congress who feel that we should not after almost five years re-involve ourselves in a dispute where we do not have direct security interests.
If you wish to go ahead, the Secretary recommends a package consisting of:
- —6 replacement F–104 fighter-interceptors or 12 F–5’s or F–104’s of a different model;
- —300 armored personnel carriers;
- —4 anti-submarine patrol aircraft.
Other possibilities for a package include:
- —7 B–57 bombers
- —100 M–48 tanks
The Secretary would exclude these because of adverse Congressional and Indian reaction. He feels that the controversy on the Hill over the Turkish tank deal alone could end the prospect of doing anything significant for Pakistan at this time. He rules out the B–57s because they are a more obviously offensive weapon.
If you decide to proceed with the arms offer to Pakistan as recommended by Secretary Rogers, he suggests the following scenario:
- 1.
- Early consultations with Congress.
- 2.
- A letter from you to President Yahya containing our arms offer.
- 3.
- Informing the Indian Government simultaneously through our embassy in New Delhi.
- 4.
- Asking both the Indians and the Pakistanis to treat our decision as confidential, but when leaks almost inevitably occur emphasize that the arms offer to Pakistan is a special exception.
Recommendation: That you approve Secretary Rogers’ recommendation for carrying out your decision to make a one-time exception for Pakistan and that you approve transmittal of the decision to President Yahya before he goes to Moscow June 22.
Approve
Add tanks
Add B–57’s
Add tanks and
B–57’s
Other
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 641, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. I, 1970. Secret. Sent for action. Attached but not published at Tab A was the June 4 Rogers memorandum. It can be found ibid. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendation, and with check marks on the two succeeding option lines indicated his intention to add tanks and B–57 bombers to the package of armaments recommended by Rogers.↩
- Nixon confirmed his decision to make a one-time exception for Pakistan to the arms embargo for South Asia, and he specified the inclusion of tanks and B–57 bombers.↩