Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972

66. Memorandum of Conversation¹ ²

Washington, June 17, 1970, 7:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS:

• Agha Hilaly, Ambassador of Pakistan
• Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President
• Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff

Dr. Kissinger said: The President had asked him to see the Ambassador on a personal basis. We have been going on and on with the question of military supply to Pakistan. The Pakistani Government would receive official word of the President’s decision in a very few days. [In later conversation, it was clarified that Ambassador Farland would be receiving instructions to communicate this same message in Rawalpindi.] The President wanted President Yahya on a personal basis before he goes to Moscow [June 21] to have in mind President Nixon’s decision. At this point, there can be no publicity because we have to talk to the Congress, and delicate matters there will affect the timing of those consultations.

Dr. Kissinger described the President’s decision in the following terms:

1. Given Congressional opinion at this point, the present embargo as such can not be removed.

2. However, the President is prepared to make a significant one-time exception to this policy now in order to sell a substantial amount of equipment that Pakistan has requested:

A 12-aircraft squadron of tactical fighter aircraft (F–104G’s or F–5’s) or six replacement F–104A’s. [In conversation it was clarified that our intent was to enable Pakistan to reactivate its F–104A squadron, either by replacing planes lost and bringing it up to strength or by trading in the old planes and re-establishing the squadron with new aircraft.]

300 armored personnel carriers.

Four advanced design naval patrol anti-submarine aircraft.

Seven B–57 bombers (to replace B–57’s previously supplied by U.S. but lost through attrition).

Dr. Kissinger continued that the President wanted President Yahya to know that this has been done on the basis of his personal intervention and personal interest based on the President’s desire to help Pakistan meet its most acute equipment needs as economically as possible.

Dr. Kissinger said that, while this is a one-time exception, it does not preclude future discussion of other such one-time exceptions. Ambassador Hilaly asked when this might be possible. Dr. Kissinger replied he did not want to hold out specific hopes on when or whether this might be done. However, he did say that it could conceivably be possible when public and Senatorial pressures have lessened. He reiterated that, at this moment, all he can say is that we are making a one-time exception which does not preclude other one-time exceptions.

Dr. Kissinger said that the President has asked that this be kept quiet until we can inform Congress. This is extremely important. When Ambassador Hilaly asked when this might be done, Dr. Kissinger indicated that we had to get past the immediate debate over the Foreign Military Sales Act.

Ambassador Hilaly noted the word “sell.” He asked whether credit could be discussed. He was told that the U.S. had been working on the assumption of a cash sale and that contemplating credit would introduce an additional complication by getting us into the range of activity covered by the controversial Foreign Military Sales Act.

The Ambassador then noted that there were no tanks on the list. Dr. Kissinger said that he wanted to tell the Ambassador informally that we tried to introduce tanks into the package. The judgment was, however, that this could wreck the whole arrangement. The judgment was that the furor that would arise in the Congress might produce another amendment to the Foreign Military Sales Act or the later appropriations act that would make any kind of arrangement impossible. It was our judgment that the more important task for the moment was to get this principle established and then to work from there.

Ambassador Hilaly asked whether these were all items that the Pakistani military had asked for. He was told that these were the most significant of the requests that had been put to us over a period of time.

In conclusion, Dr. Kissinger said that he could assure the Ambassador that without the constant personal intervention of the President this could not have happened. Ambassador Hilaly asked what Dr. Kissinger meant, since he understood everybody was for doing something for Pakistan. Dr. Kissinger said that he was referring to the pressures from other governments and noted that it is the tendency of a bureaucracy not to create any disturbance when things are relatively quiet.

After leaving Dr. Kissinger, the Ambassador checked his list of equipment with Mr. Saunders. His notes were accurate. Mr. Saunders emphasized the great importance of keeping knowledge of this action restricted to the smallest circle possible since it put us in a very delicate position with the Congress. The Ambassador showed his understanding.

Harold H. Saunders

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1026, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Memcon–Ambassador Hilaly, 6/17/70. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office.
2. President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger informed Pakistani Ambassador Hilaly of President Nixon’s decision to make a one-time exception to the embargo on arms supplies for South Asia on Pakistan’s behalf.