Office of the Historian

67. Telegram 96236 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan1 2

Washington, June 18, 1970, 2220Z

SUBJECT:

  • Military Supply: Arms for Pakistan
[Page 1]

For Ambassador Farland

1.

You should seek appointment ASAP with President Yahya (or with Foreign Secretary if Yahya unavailable) and deliver following oral message:

QUOTE: President Nixon has very much appreciated patience President Yahya has shown in connection with protracted review our military supply policy. Our deliberations have taken longer than anticipated and have involved number of difficult considerations, including current situation within US Congress. Despite these problems, President has tried to be as responsive as possible to Pakistan’s needs in keeping with his assurance to President Yahya in Lahore that he would see what [Page 2] could be done to be helpful.

We are now pleased to be able to inform GOP that, within framework of our existing policy but on special exception basis, US will be prepared to sell Pakistan certain military items which Pakistani military authorities have requested from us.

Before conveying this information formally by letter to President Yahya, we consider it necessary to consult with the Congress. However, because of very difficult situation in Congress at present, we believe it prudent defer formal consultation until after conclusion of current debate on Cooper-Church amendment and Foreign Military Sales Bill.

In addition to offer of sale of items in US “lethal weapons” category, US military authorities have been asked to act promptly on Pakistan’s recent requests to purchase variety of non-lethal items such as helicopters, light aircraft, transport aircraft, jeeps and trucks. We [Page 3] believe we will be able to move quickly on these items. END QUOTE.

2.
You should then say that USG prepared sell following military equipment which Pakistani military authorities have requested from us: (a) six F–104A replacement fighter interceptor aircraft or, as alternative, 12 interceptor aircraft of different model (e.g., F–104G’s or F–5’s) on understanding Pakistan will transfer its present six F–104A’s; (b) three hundred armored personnel carriers; (c) four maritime patrol aircraft; (d) seven B–57 replacement bombers.
3.
After conveying arms package offer, you should avoid getting into detailed discussion of military equipment and instead say that, following Congressional consultation, further details can be worked out between Pakistani and US military representatives. However, during conversation you should explicitly convey following points:
A.
US offer represents one-time exception to present [Page 4] policy. This point could be made by calling attention to portion of oral message stating that current sales offer is “within framework of our existing policy but on a special exception basis”.
B.
We would anticipate that items offered for sale would be paid for on usual cash basis.
C.
It is essential that GOP treat information re US arms offer with utmost secrecy. Any premature leaks could seriously jeopardize our Congressional consultations, and ability to proceed.
D.
At later date, we will wish to inform Indian Government in general terms of our decision offer to sell [Page 5] certain arms to Pakistan on special exception basis, asking GOI not to divulge information publicly.
4.
If asked about Pakistani tank request, you should say that tanks were carefully considered. However, proposed Turkey-Pakistan transaction has stirred up considerable controversy in Congress leading to recent introduction of Mansfield amendment which would prevent third country sales. Because of adverse Congressional sentiment on general issue of tanks, it was not considered feasible to offer Pakistan direct sale of tanks.
5.
We cannot emphasize too strongly importance of urging Yahya to hold this information with utmost secrecy within GOP and avoid any leaks which might endanger project. For this reason, we would prefer you try to see Yahya alone.
6.
Immediately following message contains background information FYI.

END

Rogers
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Van Hollen on June 17; cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Plans and National Security Affairs Robert J. Pranger (DOD/ISA), Director of the Office of Military Assistance and Sales Christian Chapman (PM/MAS), William F. Spengler (NEA/PAF), Sisco, David Abshire (H), and Saunders; and approved by Rogers. Saunders sent a draft of the telegram to Kissinger on June 18 under a covering memorandum. A handwritten notation by Saunders on the memorandum indicates that Kissinger revised and cleared the telegram. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. II, 1 Dec 69–Sept 70) Telegram 96481 to Rawalpindi, June 18, cited at the conclusion of the telegram, provided Farland with the rationale underlying the policy decision. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK)↩
  2. The Department instructed Ambassador Farland to inform Pakistani President Yahya about President Nixon’s decision on arms supplies for Pakistan.↩