India and Pakistan: Pre-Crisis, January 1969–February 1971
[Page 1]91. Telegram 13362 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State
The Embassy reported on the growing public alarm in India over the prospect of increased shipments of U.S. arms to Pakistan.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Confidential. Repeated to London, Rawalpindi, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, CINCSTRIKE, and CINCMEAFSA.
92. Telegram 176436 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India and the Mission to the United Nations
In the wake of his conversation with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi, Secretary of State Rogers had a conversation with Indian Foreign Minister Singh in which the irritants affecting relations between the U.S. and India were aired at greater length. Both agreed to try to approach future problems with a clean slate.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted on October 26 by Sisco and approved by Eliot. Sent to New Delhi eyes only for Keating and to USUN eyes only for Ambassador Charles W. Yost.
93. Telegram 8690 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State
In a conversation with Ambassador Farland, Pakistani President Yahya refined the list of weapons he asked to have included among those the U.S. was prepared to supply as part of the package President Nixon had authorized.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Exdis. Sent with a request to pass to the White House and Secretary of Defense.
94. Memorandum of Conversation
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Indian Ambassador Jha discussed what could be done to foster improved relations between the United States and India.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 546, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. III, Sept 70–30 June 71. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders. The conversation was held in Kissinger’s office in the White House.
95. Telegram 187199 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan
The telegram transmitted a message from President Nixon to Pakistani President Yahya expressing Nixon’s concern over the loss of life and property in East Pakistan as a result of a cyclone. Nixon offered U.S. assistance in responding to the disaster.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 PAK. Confidential; Immediate. Also repeated to the Consulate at Dacca. Drafted by Alexander Fuller and Spengler; cleared by Davies, John F. King, Deputy Director of the Office of Press Relations, David J. Waters, Assistant Chief of Protocol for Public Affairs, Saunders at the White House, and in AID by Curtis Farrar (AID/NESA), and Stephen R. Tripp (AID/PRI/DRD); and approved by Sisco. A major cyclone followed by a tidal wave struck East Pakistan on November 12. (Telegram 2116 from Dacca, November 16; ibid.) By November 25, 168,000 deaths had been recorded, and over 500,000 deaths were anticipated. (Intelligence note prepared in INR, November 25; ibid.)
96. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Kissinger outlined the initial steps taken and those under consideration to respond to the disaster in East Pakistan.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 334, Subject Files, Items to Discuss with the President, 9 Sept 70–Dec 70. Confidential. Sent for action. A copy of this memorandum in another file indicates that Saunders drafted it on November 16. (Ibid., Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71) Kissinger told Nixon in a telephone conversation on the evening of November 16 that he would give him the proposal for relief assistance to Pakistan “the first thing in the morning.” Nixon responded: “I don’t need to see it but I want them to know we care and we care fast.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 365, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)
97. Telegram 14451 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State
Ambassador Keating questioned Indian Foreign Minister Singh about Indian allegations of U.S. interference in Indian politics.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Secret; Nodis.
98. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Kissinger updated Nixon on the U.S. response to the disaster in East Pakistan.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Confidential. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.
99. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Kissinger summarized a “delicate” issue relating to U.S. efforts to respond to the disaster in East Pakistan. If the U.S acted on the Embassy’s assessment of the needs of the situation, it could contribute to the impression that the Government of Pakistan was not managing the situation effectively.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Confidential. Sent for information. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.
100. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the President’s Assistant (Haldeman)
Haldeman argued for immediate U.S. assistance to the victims in East Pakistan. He was not concerned about the political sensitivities of Pakistani President Yahya’s government: “We have to look humanitarian.”
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 365, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. A notation on the transcript indicates that the conversation took place in the early afternoon. The omissions are in the original transcription. A transcript of Kissinger’s conversation with Ambassador Hilaly earlier in the day is ibid.
101. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Kissinger provided a further update of the humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan that, he noted, was being described as “the greatest natural disaster in terms of destruction and danger to life of the century and perhaps of recorded history.”
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.
102. Telegram 2417 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State
Ambassador Farland reported from Dacca that relief efforts were proving to be effective in East Pakistan. He added that his information indicated that “few if any of the casualties died as a result of slowness of GOP expeditiously to move relief supplies to disaster victims.”
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 PAK. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated immediate to Islamabad.
103. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Acting Secretary of State Irwin
Sisco informed Irwin that the Indian Government had apparently decided to damp down its criticism of the U.S. decision to supply additional arms to Pakistan. He added that the Indians seemed inclined to try to repair the damage done to relations between the United States and India in recent months.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA/INS Files: Lot 74 D 17, India 1970, DEF 19, October Decision. Confidential. Drafted by Quainton and cleared by Schneider and Van Hollen. Attached but not published was telegram 14902 from New Delhi, November 27.
104. Intelligence Brief INRB–217 From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cline) to Secretary of State Rogers
Cline summarized the election results in Pakistan and pointed to potential problems growing out of the election.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 14 PAK. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the intelligence brief.
105. National Security Study Memorandum 109
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger tasked the Departments of State and Defense, the CIA, and AID to prepare a study of U.S. policy options in South Asia.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda, Nos. 104–206. Secret. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Director of the U.S. Information Agency.
106. Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Saunders and Hoskinson summarized discussions with Pakistan and India over the issue of arms supply to South Asia.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 641, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. I, 1970. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders. Sent for information. Published from an uninitialed copy.
107. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Nixon approved the provision of an additional 150,000 tons of food grains to East Pakistan for disaster relief.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Secret. Sent for action. Haig signed for Kissinger. A notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendation. Attached but not published at Tab A was a memorandum from Williams to Nixon sent through Kissinger for the President on December 23 under a covering memorandum from Eliot. Attached but not published at Tab B was the proposed press release. Not attached at Tab C was the draft letter. The Pakistan Relief Committee was established on November 26 and chaired by former Ambassador Robert Murphy.
108. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon
Rogers argued against extending credit to Pakistan for the purchase of arms.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Secret; Exdis.
109. Telegram 944 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State
Pakistani President Yahya addressed the developing movement for independence in East Pakistan and said that he did not intend to preside over the dissolution of Pakistan. Ambassador Farland assured him that it was U.S. policy to respect the unity and integrity of Pakistan.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL PAK. Secret; Exdis; Eyes Only for Assistant Secretary Sisco. In telegram 930 from Islamabad, February 1, Farland reported that he had met with President Yahya on January 29 in Yahya’s home to “talk about things in general.” (Ibid., POL 15–1 PAK)
110. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon
Rogers suggested that Nixon approve the AID program for India proposed for FY 1971 without waiting for the results of the NSSM exercise that was examining U.S. policy options in South Asia.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) INDIA. Secret. Drafted on January 26 by Quainton and revised on January 29 in S/S by James L. Carlson. The attached February 2, confidential memorandum from Rogers to Nixon was also dated February 2 and was classified confidential. There is no indication that Nixon approved or disapproved the options on the attached memorandum.
111. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers
Kissinger informed Rogers that President Nixon had approved the recommendation that the one-time exception military arms sale to Pakistan be conducted on a cash basis. He also instructed that Pakistan’s credit requirements for non-lethal arms sales be sympathetically considered.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Secret; Exdis. Farland was informed of the President’s decisions on February 5 and instructed to convey them to President Yahya. (Telegram 20428 to Islamabad; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK)
112. Telegram 21111 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India
The telegram conveyed a letter from Secretary of State Rogers to Indian Foreign Minister Singh in which Rogers took exception to an allegation by Singh that the United States was interfering in election campaigns taking place in India.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 14 INDIA. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Quainton on January 26; cleared by Schneider, Van Hollen, Sisco, Deputy Assistant Secretary Colgate Prentice, and Coerr; and approved by Rogers. Senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky visited New Delhi January 7–18.
113. Letter From the Pakistani Ambassador (Hilaly) to Secretary of State Rogers
Pakistani President Yahya requested the U.S. to use its good offices to mediate in a mounting dispute with India over an Indian airliner hijacked in Kashmir.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–PAK. No classification marking. The two men who hijacked the plane were members of the National Liberation Front for Jammu and Kashmir. They threatened to blow up the plane unless India released 30 political prisoners held in Kashmir. (Telegram 130 from Lahore, February 1; ibid., AV 12 INDIA) India subsequently demanded that Pakistan pay compensation for the loss of the plane, extradite the hijackers to India, and accept responsibility for the incident. (Aide-mémoire delivered to the Department of State by the Pakistani Embassy, February 12; ibid., POL INDIA–PAK) On February 24 the Embassy in New Delhi reported troop movements on both sides of the border between India and West Pakistan growing out of the hijacking incident. (Telegram 2759 from New Delhi; ibid., AV 12 INDIA) Additional documentation on the incident is ibid.
114. Telegram 1291 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State
Ambassador Farland argued strongly that unless Pakistan was afforded credit terms to help finance the weapons offered under the one-time excerption, the undertaking would prove to be “an exercise in futility.”
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Exdis.
115. National Security Study Memorandum 118
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, on behalf of the President, instructed the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA to prepare a contingency study examining the options open to the U.S. in the event of a movement toward secession in East Pakistan.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda, Nos. 104–206. Secret; Exdis. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
116. Letter From President Nixon to Pakistani President Yahya
Nixon responded to Yahya’s request for U.S. mediation in Pakistan’s dispute with India over a hijacking incident. He noted that the U.S. Government had discussed the incident with the Indian and Pakistani Governments but suggested that a multilateral approach to mediation through the International Civil Aviation Organization might prove more fruitful.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 759, Presidential Correspondence File, Pakistan (1971). No classification marking. On February 23 Yahya wrote to Nixonagain and, citing the effects of the prohibition of overflights of Indian territory on contacts between the two wings of Pakistan, reiterated his request that Nixon take a personal interest in the dispute. (Ibid.)
117. Telegram 29201 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan
The Department reiterated the reasoning behind the decision that all arms sales to Pakistan be made on a cash basis.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Exdis. Drafted on February 19 by Spengler; cleared by Van Hollen, Schneider, and Senior Regional Adviser James H. Boughton (NEA/RA), PM/MAS, and DOD/ISA; and approved by Sisco.
118. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Kissinger assessed the political tensions in Pakistan that were raising questions about the continued viability of the state, and which were compelling the U.S. to “walk a very narrow tightrope.”
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Nixon underlined the last sentence of the sixth paragraph from “Counsel General” to the end and added the following handwritten comment in the margin: “Good.” In the following paragraph, he underlined the part of the third sentence that reads: “more neutral stance toward Rahman, who is basically friendly toward the United States” and wrote in the margin: “not yet–correct–but not any position which encourages secession.”
119. Telegram 1660 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State
Ambassador Farland reported on Pakistani President Yahya’s concern and pessimism over the political crisis developing in the country. Farland repeated that the U.S. felt it was important to maintain the unity of Pakistan, and Yahya encouraged Farland to go to Dacca and make the same point to Awami leader Mujibur Rahman.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated priority to the Consulate at Dacca.
120. Telegram 1664 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State
Ambassador Farland explained to Pakistani President Yahya that the one-time-exception arms package could not be financed on a credit basis, and he reported that Yahya was “saddened and depressed.” Yahya noted that his Government was without the necessary funds to take full advantage of the offer, but he said that he would find the money to buy the armored personnel carriers.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis.