Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972

78. Telegram 12174 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹ ²

New Delhi, September 30, 1970, 1537Z

Subject:

• Military Supply: Arms for Pakistan

Refs:

• A. State 159970 and B. State 160165

1. In accordance reftel A I called on acting Foreign Secretary S.K. Banerji at 5:00 p.m. Sept 30 to carry out instructions contained reftel B. Banerji was alone.

2. I adhered closely to the script contained in para 6 reftel B. I subsequently emphasized fact we were now making a one-time exception to policy but that 1967 military supply policy had been retained as India desired. I added that in my judgment our decision to retain 1967 policy reflected importance U.S. attaches to good relations with India and our desire to avoid an arms race, at least to the extent that we are able to effect such a development.

3. I then again mentioned our desire to maintain good relations with Pakistan and our wish to avoid a situation where Pakistan would feel excessively dependent on the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists. I noted that the Government of India had accepted Soviet assurances that they would not do anything to injure Indian interests and I expressed the hope that the GOI would accept similar assurances on our part.

4. Finally I said that my government fully accepted the desire expressed by the Foreign Minister for a steady improvement in our relations and expressed the opinion that the limited sale to Pakistan should not reasonably detract from such an improvement.

5. After initially expressing appreciation at being informed regarding our policy, Banerji asked what effect this “one-time sale” would have on future third country sales. It was pointed out that part of our 1967 policy which we were continuing provided that we would give consideration on a case-by-case basis to the sale by third countries of U.S. controlled or licensed lethal end items and that we would presumably continue to be prepared to consider such sales.

6. Banerji then asked me if what was involved were complete military items or only parts. I replied that they are complete items. Banerji then said that he felt he must express “our regret” at decision. He said he need hardly reiterate that it was under 1954 agreement with Pakistan that arms race had begun. This was not something of Indian choosing. At that time India had expressed very grave doubts as to where U.S. decision would lead, doubts that had unfortunately been realized. Any supply of military equipment to Pakistan was bound to reraise the same doubts.

7. At this point I said that I presumed he did not regret the omission of tanks from the list of items included in the one-time exception. Banerji replied that his regret would be much greater in that case. He then again referred to the possibility of a third country sale of tanks to Pakistan and said such a development would move the clock back to the same upsetting situation that had existed before. He then said GOI was prepared accept policy of non-supply to either country. The possibility of third country supply was a matter of grave concern to India. At the moment, he said he would not like to express any other reactions.

8. I told him that I hoped it would be the conclusion of his government that this development would not interfere with good relations between our two countries any more than India’s relations with the USSR and France had been affected by the delivery of the far more substantial amounts of equipment obtained by Pakistan from those two countries. At this point Banerji said he wanted to talk quite personally and frankly and off the record. He emphasized that this was an “extremely explosive issue. It is one that has bedeviled our relations.” He mentioned how he had enjoyed his earlier tour of duty in the United States and admired the American people, but the Indian people felt that the 1954 agreement had endangered the security of their country.

9. He said he had personally regretted this development because Indo-U.S. relations had gotten off to such a fine start due to the contribution the United States had made to the achievement of Indian independence. The first major shock to these good relations was the U.S. decision to provide arms to Pakistan, a decision allegedly to permit Pakistan to defend itself against the communist powers but “we knew it was directed against us”.

10. Banerji then said to me that I must know, having lived in his country, that under the Indian political system it was just not possible “for us to be on the agressive”. Therefore, it was just not possible to equate India and Pakistan “in this regard. Some could say that this was an inherent weakness of the democratic system. India could not use its arms to attack any country. They could only use them for defensive purposes”.

11. Again mentioning that his remarks were personal and off the record, he said that China was playing a game with Pakistan and any accretion to Pakistani military strength meant an accretion to Sino-Pak military strength. He added that it was sad for him to see the relations between our two countries which had started in such a promising way had gone down to what they now were.

12. I told him I had difficulty in understanding why he should feel so strongly, given the fact that Russia was supplying so much more to Pakistan. Banerji replied that American arms had actually been used against India in 1965. “It was because the F–86’s and tanks were used against us that there is so much more emotion involved in the Indian reaction.”

13. I mentioned the resurgence of friendship that had occurred between our two countries following our prompt response to India’s request for assistance at the time of the Chinese attack in 1962 and again in 1965–66 when hundreds of thousands of Indian lives had been saved. Banerji nodded assent but said we must positively work to improve relations. He said it was no part of India’s policy to be unfriendly to such a great country as the United States which had done so much to help India in the past.

14. Before leaving I told the acting Foreign Secretary that Ambassador Jha would be informed about our policy by Under Secretary Johnson and asked to convey the substance to Foreign Minister Swaran Singh in New York.

15. Comment: I regret that the Department was unable to comply with my recommendations contained in New Delhi 9936, para. 4A and authorize me to provide in greater detail the equipment comprising the one-time exception. I had been encouraged by State 135650 to believe my recommendations in this regard would be largely accepted.

16. Banerji is obviously concerned that we have only lifted some but not all of the veils surrounding our policy. I presume we have concluded as part of our review that we do not intend to approve any third country sale of tanks to Pakistan. If i am correct in this assumption I most strongly recommend that I be authorized to so inform the Indians.

Keating

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Under Secretary Johnson called in Ambassador Jha on September 30 and informed him about the decision to offer limited arms sales to Pakistan. Jha protested the decision and anticipated that it would produce a “great deal of unhappiness” in India. (Telegram 161070 to New Delhi, September 30; ibid.)
2. Ambassador Keating conveyed the decision to allow limited arms sales to Pakistan in a conversation with Acting Foreign Secretary S.K. Banerji. Banerji described the issue as “extremely explosive” and expressed regret at the decision.