Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

110. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, November 8, 1967.

SOUTH ARABIAN PROSPECTS

(Paper prepared by State—NEA/ARP)

Introduction

Almost everything that could have happened in South Arabia to impede its orderly transmutation to independence has already occurred. By early November, 1967, the conservative regime on which Britain had earlier built its hopes had collapsed, feudal rulers in the Adeni hinterland had taken refuge in Saudi Arabia, a low-key civil war between local radicals (FLOSY and NLF) had put the NLF in control of most provincial centers, the collapse of sultanic rule in the Hadhramaut had made it likely that this vast area would join with the rest of South Arabia on independence, and “agreement on all issues so far discussed” was announced by NLF and FLOSY delegations in Cairo while their supporters were engaged in an armed struggle for the control of populous sections of Aden proper. Meanwhile, the UAR withdrawal from Yemen had reduced the external threat and the British had announced plans for an accelerated withdrawal, to be completed by December 1. London is holding in suspense plans to finance and train the South Arabian Army (SAA) and otherwise assist the new state pending the formation of a viable central government.

Periodic Department Assessments

IRG/NEA from time to time has reviewed developments in South Arabia. The Holmes Study² included the area in its purview. A year ago, October 1966, IRG/NEA reviewed the potential threat to US interests as the UK prepared to withdraw from South Arabia and agreed, among other things, at the time that it was in the US interest that the West retain a significant influence in South Arabia and that dominant communist influence in the area could be prevented.³

AID/NESA was asked by IRG/NEA to make an assessment of the potential requirements of an independent South Arabia for external assistance. This paper⁴ concluded that if the UK continues after independence to provide financial support to the South Arabian military and if Saudi Arabia performs on an earlier offer of economic assistance, the shortfall in a restricted South Arabian budget would be small. Prior to informal discussions with the British Foreign Office by the ARP Country Director in January, 1967, an inter-agency paper4 was prepared which assumed that an effective independent government in Aden would succeed the British in a year’s time. On that assumption, the paper concluded that: (a) prompt USG recognition should be forthcoming; (b) our Consulate General should be raised to Embassy status with an Ambassador, Defense Attache and small staff; (c) a one-man USIA operation should be set up; and (d) normal cultural and similar programs instituted. The paper pointed out that, since no AID or MAP help could be assumed, it would be important for us to establish a normal presence early as a means of maximizing our influence with the new state at an early stage.

In May 1967 IRG/NEA again reviewed the situation and agreed that “the outcome of the struggle for control of South Arabia following imminent withdrawal of the UK is of considerable importance for US interests.”⁵ A paper prepared by the Department for a scheduled NSC meeting of May 24, 1967⁶ conveyed the foregoing case and suggested several moves the US might make in consideration of the future of South Arabia. Among them were: a greater military presence in the Red Sea-Arabian Sea area and a willingness to undertake a full range of normal USG contacts with the new state.

A Joint Chiefs of Staff study prepared for the Secretary of Defense in May 1967⁷ regarded that if Aden were available to us it would be valuable, but not essential; that it was unlikely the Soviets would try to establish a military presence in the Arabian Peninsula or on the Horn of Africa; that the implications of US military or security assistance would be largely unfavorable to US interests. While a combination of UAR/USSR influence in the area would be contrary to US interests, South Arabia was adjudged not a critical area for our security interests.

On July 26, 1967 IRG/NEA agreed that policy and specific actions must depend on circumstances, that tentative planning should go forward for recognizing the new government, elevating the Consulate General to Embassy status, and appointing a resident Ambassador.⁸ Preliminary steps have been taken in implementation of these proposals. Further consideration was recommended for possible limited programs including Peace Corps volunteers, several MAP training spaces, and cultural exchanges should a new government voice an interest.

Following the November 2 UK announcement that withdrawal would be completed by the end of the month, the Department’s spokesman told the press:

“The British announcement that their withdrawal from South Arabia will be completed relatively soon is not unexpected, although the timing for independence is somewhat earlier than originally planned. With the day of independence approaching for South Arabia, we desire to extend the hand of friendship to all that country’s people, with every good wish for their future prosperity, stability and orderly development.”

On the recognition question, the spokesman noted that local groups had not yet agreed on a successor government and questions of the USG attitude towards it were premature. Congen Aden reports that the USG announcement received wide and favorable coverage in South Arabia.

Outlook

What is going from South Arabia is much clearer than what is coming. Both the Egyptians and the British are withdrawing militarily from the region. Far from driving the disparate nationalist groups in South Arabia together in some viable coalition, recent developments have only prompted further splits in their serried ranks. The key element is the unity of the SAA, which so far has fortunately withstood serious tendencies to split along tribal and faction lines. It is by no means certain that a coalition can be put together by November’s end to take over from the British. If no such government is formed, the SAA will be the only representative South Arabian body to which responsibility can be transferred. In talking with the British Ambassador on November 1, the Secretary said that we hoped HMG would continue to support the army until some local stability could be established.

What the independent regime may look like is still an enigma. NLF leader Qahtan al-Shaabi has stated that its orientation will be “progressive,” i.e. that the regime would take a radical view of regional and world events. On broad outlines, this may be true. But, in the inevitable sorting out process, much will depend on who actually emerges as head of NLF and whether the UK decides to continue subsidizing the SAA, since such help would make the army both a more united and a more moderate element of influence.

Saudi Arabia watches developments closely. King Faisal would prefer to see a conservative regime take over, preferably one headed by tribal leaders, whose desire to preserve their own status would provide some sort of guarantee to him that radically inclined groups would not be allowed to influence affairs. Faisal already recognizes, however, that NLF and FLOSY possess power which cannot be overlooked, and Saudi sources suggest that an army take-over by the SAA is the most acceptable, realistic alternative. If this does not happen, SAG may seek to undermine a government of “progressive” Adenese by assisting South Arabian tribal leaders.

The degree of interest the Soviets have in an independent South Arabia cannot be gauged, but they have been and continue to be active in Yemen, providing substantial economic and some military aid. It would appear reasonable for the USSR to extend its contact and influence in the Peninsula by recognizing the new South Arabian state and offering it assistance. Communist China probably has similar plans (there has been one report of Chicom arms arriving in the Hadhramaut, allegedly for the NLF).

There is no reason to think that the South Arabians would refuse communist offers. The British have asked NATO states to consider prompt Western recognition of the new state to get in ahead of communist countries. Influence of the latter is more likely to be curtailed, however, by a British decision to support the new state financially.

Pacification and consolidation of the country’s hinterland will be a long drawn out process. Indeed, the formula for the amalgamation of Aden city with its primitive neighbors was never found by the British, nor do their successors have any easier time ahead of them in their search for a mutually satisfactory arrangement. Whether or not the Saudis offer encouragement to unruly tribes, there is likely to be trouble upcountry for a government in Aden made up largely of non-tribal, or detribalized young men. Conversely, any attempt to establish a government solely made up of these provincials would be opposed by the Aden city-based organizations.

South Arabia, particularly in Aden, has the ingredients for a capable, if modest, government bureaucracy. The British have been there since 1839 and have created systems and routines as well as an experienced cadre of civil servants. There is a small army and a central police force, both of which, although made up of diverse city and tribal elements, have so far maintained their unity. South Arabia is better equipped now with trained human resources than is Yemen, a much older, independent state. Once the state is launched there is reason to believe that South Arabian nationalism may develop its own character, and its own loyalties, some of which may be uniquely local. Adenese and their back country cousins may well join wider Arab ranks, but perhaps on their own terms. With the UAR for the present curtailing its activities in the Peninsula, South Arabia will be spared at least some of the pressure, guidance, and manipulation associated with UAR interventionist tactics. It remains to be seen whether the Saudis will resist their own inclination to arrange matters as they would like them to be.

While the new state can be expected to find its place within the Arab world, joining its causes, Arabism may be less a concern than the immediate problem of the creation of a unified nation.

Assuming a viable government is formed, the USG ought not delay recognition for long lest we create an appearance of reluctance and indecision to do so because of the complexion of whatever government is established. Moreover, our failure to act would no doubt cause the regime to expel our consular staff, thus closing our remaining post in Southwest Arabia. Since the Soviets, Eastern Europeans and the Chinese will be in a position to be forthcoming with economic and military assistance, our prompt recognition could be a positive act of friendly intentions which might help offset our inability to do likewise.

If no government appears, but local security is adequately maintained by the SAA and police, both we and the British would expect to keep our diplomatic staffs in place. Should security break down, British warships will be available offshore for the prompt evacuation of our staffs.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Saunders Files, Aden & South Arabia, 4/1/66-1/20/69. Confidential. Drafted by Brewer. Prepared for a meeting of the Interdepartmental Regional Group for Near East and South Asia on November 16 at 3 p.m. Attached to a November 9 memorandum from Sober to IRG/NEA members (IRG/NEA 67-43) noting that the forthcoming meeting on November 16 would be devoted to a review of developments since the last meeting on the subject and further consideration of U.S. policy toward the emerging new state of South Arabia. He suggested that the attached paper might serve to focus the discussion.
2. See Document 22.
3. See Document 79.
4. Not found.
5. See Document 95.
6. Document 97.
7. Document 93.
8. See Document 100.