79. Record of Meetings1
INTERDEPARTMENTAL REGIONAL GROUP FOR NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
Record of IRG/NEA Meetings—October 5 and October 12, 1966
In considering the prospects for, and our interests in, South Arabia, the Group:
Noted the general assessment contained in National Intelligence Estimate 30-1-66,2 and the Joint Staff evaluation of our military interests in the area3 circulated with IRG/NEA 66-34.
Expressed its general agreement, subject to certain modifications, with the analysis contained in the State (Country Director) paper on the “Future of South Arabia” circulated with IRG/NEA 66-34, a revised copy of which is attached.4
Reviewed the potential threat to US interests as the UK prepares to withdraw from South Arabia in 1968, as the UAR seeks the establishment of a local government responsive to its wishes and as the USSR—working to a large degree through the Egyptians—aims at achieving significant influence (although probably not military bases) in the area.
Noted the statement by the UK Foreign Minister at the UNGA on October 11, 1966 reiterating British intent to withdraw and further welcoming UN participation in effecting the transition to an independent South Arabia.
[Page 182]Agreed that it is in the US interest that the West retain a significant influence in South Arabia; also that dominant Communist influence in the area be prevented, and that major regional disputes (such as a Saudi-UAR confrontation) over the area be avoided.
Recognized, however, that any attempt to pre-empt the area for the West and to ensure its political and economic stability would require a major commitment of resources, the justification for which has not been established.
Agreed that we should support British efforts to bring the conflicting local factions to an agreement on the future government of South Arabia; and that particularly the conditions for establishing an expanded—and perhaps continuing—UN presence in the area should be explored.
Agreed that we should encourage continued British support of the South Arabian security forces; in this connection, we should consider the advantages and disadvantages of extending explicitly to South Arabia our general security assurances against the use of force or the threat of force in the Near East.
Agreed that we should, in early discussions with the UK, seek to obtain a detailed British assessment of the future viability of South Arabia, determine current British intentions concerning economic aid to the area, and explore the conditions under which the British might increase their security and economic commitments to South Arabia.
Agreed that we should keep under review and consult from time to time with the Saudis and the Iranians, as well as other nations friendly to us, on the extended security threat which they claim to see in UAR/USSR encroachment into South Arabia.
Agreed that it would also be desirable to consult with the UAR, on appropriate occasions, on the desirability of a peaceful transition in South Arabia; and to explore the scope for useful exchanges on this subject with the USSR, perhaps in the context of our other security concerns in the Near East.
Agreed that we should be prepared to elevate our present Consulate General in Aden to an Embassy, when South Arabia becomes independent.
Agreed that AID should make an assessment of the potential requirements of an independent South Arabia for external economic assistance, and of the conditions under which such assistance might be obtained and administered. While the study should not preclude an official US aid effort, it should also examine the feasibility of developing an assistance effort limited to non-USG sources such as the UN or other international agencies, oil-producing countries of the Middle East, and private Foundations, as well as the UK and other third countries.
Agreed that potential requirements for expanded US cultural exchange and information programs in South Arabia should also be explored.
Noted, finally, the desirability of proceeding with such steps as are now appropriate, but that our general course of action can be only tentative at this stage and must be kept under review in the light of future developments as South Arabia moves toward independence.
[Page 183]MEMBERS PRESENT
- Executive Chairman: Ambassador Hare
- AID: Mr. Farr (10/5); Mr. Macomber (10/12)
- CIA: Mr. Critchfield
- DOD: Col. Jordan
- JCS: Brig. Gen. Sibley
- NSC: Mr. Wriggins, Mr. Saunders
- USIA: Mr. Austin
- State (NEA): Mr. Davies; Mr. Moore; (S/P): Mr. Brewer
- JCS: Capt. Zimmerman (10/5)
- Staff Director: Mr. Sober
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Saunders Files, Saudi Arabia, 4/1/66-2/31/67. Secret.↩
- Document 77.↩
- Document 76.↩
- Not attached.↩