Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

93. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara¹

JCSM-281-67

Washington, May 18, 1967.

SUBJECT

• Military Importance of South Arabia (C)

1. (C) Reference is made to a memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I-22913/67, dated 10 May 1967,² subject as above, which requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide an analysis of the military importance of South Arabia.

2. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that:

a. The anticipated UK withdrawal from Aden in early 1968 could make Khormaksar Airfield and Aden port facilities unavailable for US contingency operations. Execution of CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA’s contingency plans for Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Sudan, and French Somaliland will be hampered by the loss of this staging base. Execution of these contingency plans would be simplified if en route staging bases and overflight rights were granted and if alternate staging facilities such as Dhahran, Addis Ababa, and Aldabra Island were available. A long-term implication of UK withdrawal from Aden could be the creation of a power vacuum which, if filled by forces hostile to the West, would increase the threat to nations oriented toward the West.

b. Aden, if available, would be valuable, but not essential, for various contingency operations. Its military value to the United States stems from its port, airbase, and troop facilities which provide a staging base for US contingency operations in northeast Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Persian Gulf. Aden also provides an en route and refueling base for contingency operations in South Asia. Elimination of UK bases in the Persian Gulf would not alter the value of Aden as a potential base for US operations. The military significance of the elimination of British bases in the Persian Gulf is that British forces would not be readily available for contingency operations and, therefore, instability would be aggravated. A US/UK base on Aldabra Island would assist in the conduct of contingency operations into Kenya or east Africa but could require en route stops and/or overflight of various countries. Development of a base complex at Diego Garcia could also support contingency operations by providing facilities in the Indian Ocean.

c. The availability of bases in Aden to the United Arab Republic (UAR) or the USSR would provide additional means for projecting UAR/USSR-sponsored subversion or military assistance into Africa and the remainder of the Arabian Peninsula. The use of Aden would also provide opportunities for extension of Soviet electronic intelligence and electronic warfare capabilities, support for Soviet ships, a means of establishing greater influence through an increased Soviet presence, and a contingency staging and logistics base.

d. It is not likely that the Soviets would make an effort to establish a direct military presence in the Arabian Peninsula or the Horn of Africa through the establishment of overt Soviet bases or the development of Soviet military forces. However, the long-term Soviet goal in this area is to supplant Western influence with communist influence, leading in time to a Moscow-oriented communist political, economic, and social system. However, for the near term, provision of military advisors, as in Somalia, or economic advisors, as in Yemen, will remain the probable Soviet tactic.

e. UAR or Soviet control of the southern entrance to the Red Sea would have an important military significance if the UAR or USSR attempted to exercise this control to prevent passage by tankers or other ships in conjunction with closure of the Suez Canal. If this action were taken, it would have a serious impact on shipping to the Red Sea ports of Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, Israel, and Jordan. Such an eventuality is unlikely in view of the resultant adverse international reactions and the effect on UAR finances through loss of Suez tolls. While control of Aden might make a blockade easier, a more feasible method would be to close the Suez Canal.

f. The military implications of US military assistance or security assurances to South Arabia are:

(1) Drain on already taxed US military capabilities and the possible generation of additional US force requirements.

(2) Possible commitment of sizable US forces in order to preserve an unstable government of questionable alignment.

(3) Involvement of US military forces (possibly with the UAR/USSR) in an area of limited strategic interest.

(4) Potential requirement for semipermanent US military presence.

(5) Further reductions in current military assistance programs in other countries where the United States has interests.

(6) Acceleration of British troop withdrawal from the Persian Gulf.

(7) Reliance by the United Kingdom on US military involvement rather than on the use of British forces.

g. Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iran, and Ethiopia would view additional UAR or USSR military influence in South Arabia as an increased threat. These countries probably would request increased US or other Western military aid or security commitments. Failing to receive US assistance, they would probably then turn to neutral or communist nations not involved. Iran and Saudi Arabia may provide support to opposing factions in an attempt to contain further UAR/USSR expansion.

h. It is considered unlikely that UAR/USSR control of Aden’s airfield or port facilities would cause a peacetime stoppage or reduction of Persian Gulf oil to Europe. Currently, very few oil-carrying tankers stop at Aden. In any case, Free World tankerage could transport, though at a greater cost, oil to Western Europe via the Cape of Good Hope or, when completed, through an Israeli-owned pipeline.

3. (S) From the above and the additional rationale in the Appendix³ hereto, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that:

a. UK withdrawal from Aden could hamper but not prevent execution of certain CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA contingency plans. UK follow-on withdrawal from the Persian Gulf would not alter this assessment.

b. Use of Aden air base and port facilities by UAR and USSR military units would improve UAR/USSR abilities to project forces into South Arabia and the Indian Ocean area and provide facilities for other military or subversive activities.

c. Soviet effort to establish a direct military presence in the area of the Arabian Peninsula or the Horn of Africa is unlikely.

d. The military significance of UAR or Soviet control of the Southern entrance to the Red Sea lies in their capability to attempt a physical blockade; however, this eventuality is considered unlikely.

e. Considering the worldwide military assistance commitments of the United States, a program which would involve additional commitments of US resources to South Arabia is not recommended at this time. Continuous efforts should be exerted to enlist the United Kingdom, United Nations, or other Western-oriented governments in preserving the internal and external security of South Arabia. It is not advisable to offer assurances of US military support to any government of South Arabia.

4. (S) In summary, the further extension of UAR/USSR influence in the Near East area would be contrary to US interests. In this connection, while South Arabia (particularly Aden) is of some military significance, it is not critical to the security interests of the United States.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2468, Saudi Arabia 1967, South Arabia 092, 9 May 67. Secret.
2. Not printed. (Ibid.)
3. Attached but not printed.