Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

269. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, December 29, 1965, 4:14 p.m.

1821. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. Many thanks for your helpful 2308.² My 1805³ was sent under some pressure of time and did not therefore go into certain details. Following are some additions.

1. No one is under any illusion here about our elementary choices if Hanoi and Peiping continue to push into Southeast Asia by force. We can either get out of their way and let them have it or we can meet them. We have decided to meet them. When I spoke of “securing South Viet-Nam without major bloodshed” I was referring to the contingency that the other side may look down the road ahead and decide that it is too costly or too dangerous for them to persist. This has happened with the Greek guerrillas, the Berlin blockade, Korea and the Cuban missile crisis. I realize important differences of attitude publicly expressed by Peiping but thus far (fingers crossed) Peiping has been much more cautious in its actions than it has been in its words. My remark was addressed to giving the other side every chance to pull back.

2. I personally do not see any “satisfactory outcome” which involves giving Hanoi and their Viet Cong puppets the fruits of their aggression by force in South Viet-Nam. A deal was made in 1954 and 1962. Once again the communist world is saying what is ours is ours and what is yours must be talked about and divided up further. I feel we should insist upon the 1954 and 1962 agreements. If the other side persists in attempting to destroy those agreements by force, then I fear there shall be bloodshed.

3. I agree with you fully that there is a fundamental difference between an honest and a dishonest cease-fire. From an operational point of view the most important point would be a pulling apart of North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam militarily. That would mean stopping infiltration, return of northern infiltrators and comparable actions on our side. This is feasible although verification would present some difficulties. We do not have in mind a cease-fire within South Viet-Nam itself which would deny the authority of the Government of South Viet-Nam in any part of the country. A long-term internal cease-fire could only be based upon a cessation of DRV aggression and acceptance by the Viet Cong of the idea that they must lay down arms and take their chances in peaceful political processes. It may be that public opinion needs more education on this subject. We have not undertaken it in any significant way because we have not even reached the point where Hanoi is willing to stop its aggression.

4. Your point that Hanoi and Peiping may interpret interest in peace as weakness is a good one and this has been much in our minds. We have talked about this frankly with Eastern European governments. If there is any such misunderstanding, it will be dramatically corrected when the President asks the Congress in January for $25 billion for Viet-Nam for the next eighteen months. You should know personally that we have made it very clear to those in touch with the other side that Hanoi is up against a moment of truth. If they do not now move towards peace, they must face the most disagreeable possible consequences.

5. As you may know, the Vatican is concerning itself very actively with Viet-Nam. They have not revealed to us fully what they are doing but our impression is that they are very busy. This makes it quite important that Archbishop Palmas fully understand that if there is any delay or reluctance in connection with his conversations with you, these are to be bound on the other side and not on our side. If you have not done so in the last ten days, I would suggest you merely inquire of him whether he has anything further pursuant to earlier conversations.

6. I am sending in a separate telegram a listing of points already made public by the United States on various occasions having to do with the basis for peace in Viet-Nam.⁴ I find that when these are drawn together most people, including foreign diplomats as well as newsmen, are surprised. Their surprise comes from their lack of diligence in doing their homework. But under Pinta restrictions, I should tell you that the Hungarian Foreign Minister asked me the other day whether the United States would be prepared to negotiate with the National Liberation Front on the basis of “this platform”. I replied that the Government of the United States cannot negotiate with the Liberation Front since they are only one element in a population of fourteen million and the views of Buddhists, Catholics and other sects and others must be taken into account. I told him I would be interested if he himself learned that the Liberation Front was interested in the points which we have made public.⁵ Thus far no reply. I cannot overemphasize the importance of any substantial defection from the Liberation Front away from Hanoi. If this momentum should begin to roll, the other side’s position would, in my judgment, deteriorate very fast.

7. I need not repeat to you how grateful the President and I are for the job you are doing. I am deeply convinced that the American people will do what has to be done in meeting their commitments if they can do so in good conscience and with a clear understanding that all honorable and peaceful avenues have been closed by the aggressor.

Warm regards.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Pinta. Drafted by Rusk. Repeated to the White House.
2. Document 264.
3. Document 255.
4. Reference is to circular telegram 1243, December 30, which repeated the text of Document 247, to all diplomatic posts and Hong Kong. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
5. See Document 258.