270. Memorandum From the Director of National Intelligence Estimates (Kent) to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Helms)1
Washington,
December 29,
1965.
SUBJECT
- Three Memoranda Attached Re Vietnam
- 1.
- I have asked the boys, on the basis of the bombing pause and press
reports of some kind of US contact with the DRV, to think about a number of the possibilities
raised if these stories are true. The results, which I attach,
are:2
- (a)
- A paper outlining current Soviet tactics on Vietnam and how these relate to Moscow’s recent maneuvers against China; it concludes that Shelepin in Hanoi will push hard the case for more reliance on diplomacy and politics, less on military means. (Tab A)
- (b)
- A paper thinking about China’s attitude toward negotiations and concluding that Peiping will threaten big difficulties whenever it senses a weakening of Hanoi’s resolve to continue fighting. (Tab B)
- (c)
- A paper on South Vietnamese attitudes toward negotiations, which concludes that they are largely negative but not insurmountably so. This one was promised to the Director some time ago and has been approved by the Board of National Estimates. (Tab C)
- 2.
- None of these deal with the central question of how Hanoi itself now views its options. Some in this town may be better informed than we on this one; perhaps we’ll get some evidence soon.
- 3.
- I think you will find all of these papers interesting and hopefully a contribution to your thinking. At least the first two (A and B above) were written with this principally in mind and we do not recommend any further circulation. In a few days we may all know enough more to warrant review, revision, and circulation to a wider audience.
SK