Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

255. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, December 28, 1965, 3:45 a.m.

1805. Eyes only for Ambassador and Porter from Secretary.

1. President has given most searching consideration to question of further delay in resumption of bombing of DRV, and has taken fully into account views expressed by you and Westmoreland on this subject.² He has decided that he wishes to defer resumption of bombing for several more days, possibly into middle of next week. No commitments would be made, publicly or privately, which would limit our freedom of action in the event of a major contingency or serious provocation. Air, ground, and sea operations in SVN would continue, including Arc Light, as well as air operations in Laos.

2. For your own personal guidance, a major factor in decision is the action which will have to be made public in January. The prospect of large scale reinforcement in men and defense budget increases of some twenty billions for next eighteen month period requires solid preparation of American public. A crucial element will be clear demonstration that we have explored fully every alternative but that aggressor has left us no choice.

3. We do not, quite frankly, anticipate that Hanoi will respond in any significant way. We have seen nothing in the mass of speculation or diplomatic gossip pointing to an interest in peace on Hanoi’s part and we have certainly had no such indication through any official channel. If, contrary to our expectations, there was some significant response, we would of course be in touch with you immediately. Thus, we do not want to commit ourselves irrevocably to a specific date for resumption.

4. While confidential until published this week, most recent Harris poll will show that 73% of American people would favor renewed effort for cease-fire (including 64% of Goldwater voters) and 59% would favor bombing pause (including 48% of Goldwater voters). Same poll will show 61% favoring increased bombing effort if cease-fire or pause fails to elicit interest of other side. Such polls do not make decisions, but they illustrate need to prepare our people for major sacrifices by making it crystal clear where responsibility lies. Same problem is reflected in Congress which will be reconvening on January 10 to face hard facts of required national effort. The simple fact is that we must sustain support for what has to be done in months ahead, if the other side is not interested in peace. Compared to this over-riding requirement, the destruction of the limited targets which would otherwise be struck during this period is a secondary matter.

5. Underlying above reasons is our genuine interest in securing SVN without major bloodshed if that can be accomplished. There is only the slimmest of chances that suspension of bombing will be occasion for basic change of objective by other side but communist propaganda on this point should be tested and exposed.

6. Another purpose of continuing suspension would be to drive rift between Communist powers and between Hanoi and NLF. We have considerable reason to believe differences exist that would come into play in a suspension, and tend to interpret Hanoi’s propaganda blast against pause on December 10 and 11 in sense that Hanoi itself is concerned about this.³ To this end we will be in touch with a few interested governments.

7. Accordingly, you should discuss this decision ASAP with GVN officials, in whatever way you think best, to obtain their private understanding and concurrence with this brief delay in resumption of bombing.⁴ Following are additional elements you should explain:

a. We plan no formal announcement other than responding to questions as to when bombing will resume by saying no decision taken.

b. All actions for further reinforcement in SVN will go forward without change, including specifically plans for two additional brigades and Marine Landing Team due to arrive in January. USG plans major further reinforcement in 1966 as required, and you may tell GVN this.

c. On side of countering possible GVN objections, you should note that Hanoi can hardly doubt our resolve in face of our present and planned effort. Suspension does not suggest, nor is there, slightest change in our negotiating position and objectives, which are familiar to GVN.

8. I know you will appreciate the importance of overwhelming support from the home front for the gallant job you and all hands are doing on the fighting front.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Pinta; Exdis. Drafted by Rusk; cleared by William Bundy, U. Alexis Johnson, Thompson, and in substance by McGeorge Bundy and Vance; and approved by Rusk. A copy of this telegram was sent to the President in Texas in White House telegram CAP 65927, December 28, 11:06 a.m. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLIV, Cables)
2. See Document 245.
3. Reference is to a Hanoi radio broadcast in English on December 10 and a commentary in Hanoi’s official paper, Nhan Dan, December 11, that the potential U.S. bombing pause was a trick to mask aggression, which deceived no one. (FBIS, North Vietnam, December 13, 1965)
4. In telegram 2306 from Saigon, December 28, Lodge reported that he called on General Ky and gave him the “pertinent and appropriate parts of Deptel 1805. When I had concluded he allowed a moment’s silence to go by and said: ‘I understand the problem and, of course, I have no objection.’” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)