Office of the Historian

245. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson, in Texas1

Washington, December 27, 1965, 11:05 a.m.

CAP 65917. Following is the text of a message from Westmoreland2 regarding the resumption of bombing in North Vietnam.

1.
Although I am not aware of all the considerations leading to the continuation of the standdown in Rolling Thunder air operations over North Vietnam, I consider that their immediate resumption is essential.
2.
Strictly from the standpoint of the war in South Vietnam it is difficult to understand why the pressure has been taken off the nerve center of direction, supply and manpower located in North Vietnam.
3.

Air attack against lines of communication is extremely difficult in this part of the world. It is clear that air interdiction at any one point can be circumvented by the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese forces and all local obstacles can be overcome by ingenuity and hard work, both of which they display in ample quantities. Therefore, our only hope of a major impact on the ability of the North Vietnamese to support the war in Vietnam is continuous air attack over the entire length of their lines of communication from the Chinese border to South Vietnam, and within South Vietnam. Although at any one point the impact may not be great, the cumulative effect of armed reconnaissance, bridge busting, rail cutting and barge sinking and forcing them to operate almost exclusively at night, must be great.

Notwithstanding the heavy pressure on their transportation system over the past 9 months, they have demonstrated an ability to deploy forces into South Vietnam at a greater rate than we are now deploying US forces.

4.
I notice that since the 3d of September, there has been a steady decrease in ordnance delivering sorties over North Vietnam. During the period 3 to 16 September, 982 such sorties were flown. By 15 to 28 October, this had been reduced to 700, and in the period 10 to 23 December, it had further diminished to 662. I recognize that part of this can be explained in increased activity in Laos, but this does not change the basic fact that our pressure against North Vietnam is decreasing.
5.
Considering the course of the war in South Vietnam and the capability which has been built up here by the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese forces—the full impact of which we have not yet felt—the curtailment of operations in North Vietnam is unsound from a military standpoint. Indeed, we should now step up our effort to higher levels.3
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLIV, Cables. Top Secret; Exdis. The President was at the LBJ Ranch in Texas, December 21-January 2, 1966.↩
  2. COMUSMACV telegram 45265 to CINCPAC, December 27. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)↩

  3. Admiral Sharp in Honolulu sent comments that were relayed to the LBJ Ranch in White House telegram CAP 65918, December 27, 10:51 p.m.:

    • “1. I have already indicated some of the disadvantages in a continued stand down of Rolling Thunder and recommended immediate resumption.
    • “2. Westmoreland has made a plea for resumption of Rolling Thunder and notes the decrease in Rolling Thunder strike sorties in the last three months. He requests that pressure on North Vietnam be increased.
    • “3. I have recommended programs for Rolling Thunder designed steadily to increase the pressure on North Vietnam. These programs will drastically reduce the flow of military supplies reaching North Vietnam and hence the Viet Cong.
    • “4. The armed forces of the United States should not be required to fight this war with one arm tied behind their backs. I urgently recommend that Rolling Thunder commence immediately and that the target programs I have recommended be approved.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Reprisal Program, Vol. IV)

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