244. Memorandum From the Legal Adviser (Meeker) to Secretary of State Rusk1
SUBJECT
- Viet Nam Initiatives
Background
To summarize quickly, the United States in ten years has moved from the provision of military assistance to Viet Nam, through the furnishing of military advisers, the increase of their numbers and giving them an active role in combat, to infusing ever larger contingents of American fighting men in organized units to wage the war against the Communists. At the end of 1965’s long monsoon season, we are evidently not poised for dramatic gains and military victory.
We confront a limited number of choices: (1) to seek negotiations now; (2) to continue military operations at recent levels, with the aim of inducing a greater disposition on the part of the Communists to negotiate; (3) to increase three-fold or more our already heavy military investment in Viet Nam in order to crush North Viet Nam and wipe out the Viet Cong.
Experience to date negatives any likelihood that carrying on the war will improve the prospects of negotiation. Stepping up the US military commitment to somewhere between 500,000 and one million American troops—in order to eliminate the Communist opposition in Viet Nam—threatens the following consequences: greatly increased US casualties, on a scale not known since World War II; substantially increased taxes at home, probably accompanied by inflation and increasing economic and social dislocations; an end, for practical purposes, to the struggle against poverty at home and the building of the Great Society; escalation of the Viet Nam conflict that could put the US in a war with Communist China, whose magnitude and course are withheld from our view today.
The net of this paper is that we will do better to accept the fact of conflict in Viet Nam and seek to transfer it to the political plane; to wait out with patience and intelligent action the long period while Vietnamese nationalism gradually asserts itself against China, and while China goes through the process of development enabling it to function—in the way the Soviet Union has come to function—as a member of the community of nations.
[Page 700]For the United States—with the aims and purposes we hold—the path is narrow between prevention or frustration of forcible aggression, on the one hand, and being drawn into actions that lead progressively to larger—and perhaps nuclear—conflict, on the other. There have been signs, coming out of Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow that we may be better able to pursue our aims at this stage through shifting to a political and diplomatic offensive. We are at a point where it may be possible to strengthen significantly the hand of the peace party throughout the Communist camp.
Suggestions
An armistice. The basic idea advanced here is that we want a cessation of fighting in Viet Nam followed by negotiations. It should be a total cessation, of ground action in the South, of air strikes against the North, of terrorism in the cities and in the countryside. The cessation could be initiated in connection with the observance of Tet in Viet Nam. It could be related to a public appeal that selected governments or Pope Paul VI might address to all the authorities concerned. The cessation could be proclaimed for a fixed time period (such as 30 days) and could be extended without limit of time if satisfactory steps were being taken with a view to negotiated settlement; this feature should probably be made clear from the outset.
Whether such an armistice could last would, of course, depend on the willingness of the two sides. We should test the Communist side to see whether it would keep a cease-fire. An armistice seriously intended by both sides could survive incidents of violation through mistake or misunderstanding. If the Communist side breached the armistice, this would quickly be apparent. The US and GVN would be free to resume military operations. The responsibility would be clear, and this should have a good effect in furthering greater understanding and increased support for US policy toward Viet Nam.
Upon the taking effect of an armistice, neither side would stand down its preparations, reinforcement, etc. If fighting had to be resumed, relative military advantage would be essentially unchanged. But this is not a state of affairs we should wish to see indefinitely continued. We should want to see the process of armament and military preparation put in reverse. This can only be done as the result of negotiated agreements.
Negotiation. At the earliest possible time the United States should make a formal and comprehensive statement of our aims in Viet Nam. You summed them up very cogently at the end of the large staff meeting this last Thursday morning. A statement like this should be made to press, radio and TV. The text should be formally communicated to governments around the world. We should take pains to see that it is delivered to Hanoi—through the French, the Canadians, India, the USSR, [Page 701] other Eastern European countries, etc. This could be a factor in deciding the debates that must now be going on in Hanoi.
Once an armistice is begun, a peace conference should follow whatever reasonable time is required to prepare it. There are many ways of organizing a conference. The Geneva Co-Chairmen could take the initiative. A meeting of 14 nations could be convened, or it could be limited to some of them. Perhaps the meeting should involve directly only Hanoi, the NLF, Saigon and the United States. The UK and USSR could stay in the background and seek to act as catalysts in the negotiating process. We should not exclude from consideration the idea of Communist China being absent from the international meetings, except to attend a formal conference of larger size which would confirm the understandings reached by a smaller group. We should look forward to protracted discussions. So long as the armistice were kept, we should be prepared to engage in a very long negotiation.
It is impossible at this stage to block out the contents of a settlement. Terms can emerge only from prolonged and close bargaining and the inter-action of negotiating efforts. Negotiation might run through a series of phases, just as a settlement itself would have multiple phases.
An early subject of discussion should probably be observation and policing of the armistice. International teams of military observers—perhaps made up of Commonwealth and Bloc personnel—might be employed. Withdrawal of military forces should be a focus of attention. International observation could identify what forces are present in Viet Nam, and could later verify and supervise an agreed withdrawal—perhaps first to staging areas, some for North Vietnamese units and others for US forces. Ultimately, all foreign forces would be withdrawn from South Viet Nam.
One of the most difficult of all questions is what to do about the Viet Cong and their weapons. It is not likely to be practicable to segregate them in any supervised garrison areas. Experience with the disarming of insurgents and the central collection of their weapons gives no ground for believing this would be feasible in South Viet Nam. The Viet Cong would have to be left alone during the armistice, as would the GVN’s military units. The military problem is likely to be solved only after a new political structure has been created in the South, following on internationally supervised elections, the establishment of a representative assembly, and the effective functioning of institutions of local government.
International assistance. During the long period of negotiation as well as afterward there would be great value in a wide program of international assistance for the reconstruction of South Viet Nam. Organizations such as the United Nations, the FAO, and voluntary agencies could perform great humanitarian service and also contribute significantly to [Page 702] political settlement through the provision of needed food and medical relief, technical assistance in agriculture and building, war-scarce materials for civilian use, and personnel to help with community services. It might be possible for a large and imaginative program of this sort to supply the needs of local government for a substantial period of time—obviating the assertion of authority and the exercise of control by the GVN or Viet Cong in disputed areas. The US should be prepared to contribute largely to the financing of such a program, which would have to be under neutral direction. We should seek also at an early date to give practical effect to President Johnson’s long-standing offer to arrange for the participation of North Viet Nam in an internationally aided program of economic development for Southeast Asia.
Humanitarian measures. Whether or not an armistice is arranged in the near future, we should make every effort to proceed with an exchange of prisoners held by the two sides in Viet Nam. This could be undertaken by the ICRC along with its other responsibilities. Exchanges need not be on a one-for-one basis, but could be so calculated as to bring about the repatriation of all prisoners held on each side. In the event of an armistice, an early measure for consideration in the ensuing discussions would be an amnesty for political prisoners and others detained on account of offenses in connection with the war.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret. Prepared at the request of the President who wanted key officers in the Department of State below the Secretary and Under Secretary level to present him with ideas on new diplomatic initiatives in Vietnam. (Memorandum from Read to Rusk, December 24; ibid., POL 27-14 VIET)↩