Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

243. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council and Counselor of the Department of State (Rostow) to President Johnson¹

Washington, December 23, 1965.

Herewith four ideas about Viet Nam, submitted to you at Jack Valenti’s suggestion.

A. A South Vietnamese Political Party

1. Proposal. That we focus our political energies in Saigon—and seek Korean assistance—in building a widely based South Vietnamese political party.

2. Discussion. The critical missing element in the stabilization of politics in South Viet Nam is an effective political party engaging the major groups which constitute now—and will constitute in the future—an effective majority.

We all understand the deep splits in the political and social life of South Viet Nam: Northerners v. Southerners; French trained Catholics v. more indigenous Buddhists; etc. We are doing what we can in Saigon to urge them to come closer together; Ky is considering a representative advisory group; and the most wholesome political fact about South Viet Nam is that the Vietnamese are beginning to talk and worry about what the Communists will do to them if they remain split and peace (or negotiations) breaks out.

Focussing right now on a political party may seem like a gimmick. But our experience in Korea over the last five years indicates that it is something more: it may prove the device for crystallizing minimum national unity.

I am now convinced, for example, that it was the creation of the government party in Korea that converted Park from a well-meaning soldier into an effective politician and, even, a statesman—laying the base for the true Korean “miracle” now under way.

To my certain knowledge, our people were almost as hopeless about Korea in 1961, after the young officers’ coup, as they now are about politics in South Viet Nam. The Koreans were about as fragmented, inexperienced, and helpless in making a political life as the Vietnamese have been.

Moreover, what we have seen happen in other parts of the world suggests that a widely based national political party is fundamental to stable government in a developing country.

The secret of Indian democracy, for example, is not the British-trained civil service: it is the Congress Party, containing representatives of all regions and major social groups. Such parties are the secret of success in Mexico and Tunisia and of the relative stability of Tanzania, Kenya, and Ghana. I believe Castelo Branco is on the right track with his effort to force by law the making of big parties in Brazil.

Why is this so?

Big national parties force the various regional and special interests to come to compromise and to formulate national programs in order to get elected and enjoy the fruits of victory. They also establish a minimum political base and the minimum political discipline to permit an elected President to govern.

The central political weakness in the developing nations is that fragmented political parties and squabbling politicians, representing narrow regional interests, press directly and irresponsibly against the democratically elected presidents. The presidents are so busy balancing off these pressures they find it hard to act. And that is why military coups happen.

What General Soglo said the other day in Dahomey, as he took over, is the epitaph of scores of early experiments in democracy in developing nations:

• “Considering that after two years, the political authorities demonstrated their inability to lead the country to a better future by struggles for influence harmful to the superior interests of Dahomey; …
• “Considering that our country is obviously on the eve of a veritable catastrophe whose only victims will be the humble workers in our towns and rural areas;
• “[We]² therefore decide in the superior interests of the nation and in order to safeguard our prestige on the international scene to take over power temporarily and endeavor to effect national reconciliation on which alone depends the moral and economic recovery of our dear fatherland.”

Can the job be done now in Viet Nam?

I don’t know. But I do know we should focus our efforts around the task. I do know there are glimmerings of a desire among the Vietnamese to pull together. And I do know they are beginning to understand they will either hang together or hang separately.

Moreover, we should enlist the Koreans in the effort. Their experience is the closest parallel to that in South Viet Nam. They, too, began with a mandarin autocrat; then had squabbling civil politicians; then a young officers’ coup.

Finally, the Koreans have, next to us, the biggest direct political as well as military stake in the future independence and stability of South Viet Nam.

3. Action.

a. We should approach General Park and suggest that he write directly to General Ky explaining fraternally the lessons of his experience in building a stable civil government in South Korea over recent years; the role of the government party in that process; and offering to send to General Ky men who will explain in detail how his national political party was organized and how they made the transition in Seoul from military to civil politics.

b. That Ambassador Lodge and his staff, including the Lansdale team, focus their efforts on encouraging the government in Saigon and various non-governmental political persons to move in this direction. Many specific political projects now under consideration or under way in South Viet Nam would begin to take better shape if they were related to the making of a national political party; for example, the proposed Advisory Group, the attempts to formulate national objectives; to design a national economic reconstruction and development plan; to mobilize student leaders; to create a domestic peace corps; etc.

B. The Military and the Future of Politics and Administration in South Viet Nam

1. Proposal. That we begin to consider with a few selected military leaders in South Viet Nam how the military organization now fighting the Viet Cong can, in the future, be used to bridge the gap until the time that a stable, civil politics can fully take hold.

2. Discussion. At the moment the military structure in South Viet Nam holds the country together and represents the biggest single pool of administrative competence. It probably also contains many of the men most capable of assuming political leadership in the postwar phase of the country. Until the kind of party proposed in suggestion A, above, comes into being and generates momentum, the country will have to rely heavily on the army for both administrative skill and political leadership.

This could take many forms:

• —A massive civic action and public works rehabilitation program;
• —The actual transfer of competent officers into civil administrative posts;
• —The kind of literacy and agricultural education programs the Korean army has conducted;
• —The packing away of their uniforms by key officers as they assumed full time political life.

In short, as we look ahead to the future of South Viet Nam, we should be looking at the army as a critically important administrative and political asset; and, as suggested in proposal A, the Korean experience should be made fully available to our friends in South Viet Nam.

3. Action. That we suggest this line of thought to Ambassador Lodge; make available to him full details of the Korean experience on the transitional role of the military in these various civil functions; and encourage the Koreans, under proposal A, to widen their discussions with the South Vietnamese to include this range of issues.

C. The Proper Use of Air Power Against North Viet Nam

Note: I appreciate that you, Secretary Rusk, and Secretary McNamara may well have come to solid conclusions about this subject; but I am moved to set down my own reflections because of continued evidence of widespread confusion at lower levels, reflected, for example, in the recent SNIE 10-12-65, “Probable Communist Reactions to a U.S. Course of Action.”³

1. Proposal. That we systematically bomb the oil refining and storage capacity and the electric power facilities in North Viet Nam.

2. Discussion. Thought in this town is split between those who advocate massive and somewhat generalized air attacks on the Hanoi-Haiphong complex and those who fear that such attacks would dangerously escalate the war, deny Hanoi a stake in its future by destroying what has been built over the last decade, and lead to a last-ditch mentality which would make a negotiated settlement impossible.

As you know, I have long felt that the proper course of action was a systematic but surgical use of air power to take out the oil refining and storage capability and electric power systems in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. This would exact a considerable cost but still leave the cities and factories standing. Given the possibilities of protracting the war by continued infiltration, this has seemed the only practical way to force Hanoi to pay a price sufficient to induce them to negotiate soon, without denying them a future.

It is difficult for those who did not live through the application of systematic, precision bombing against the German air force, German oil facilities, and the Seine-Loire bridges to understand how vastly more effective this kind of bombing is than generalized air attacks. By systematic, I mean the attack on all the major plants in a given target system.

In the Far Eastern war we conducted generalized bombing against Japan, including the burning of cities. In the Korean war we hit everything we could see and a lot we couldn’t see.

No one can tell you for certain—and only an irresponsible man would guarantee to you—that this kind of precise, systematic application of force will tip the balance of thought and policy in Hanoi to the acceptance of the kind of negotiation we envisage. Clearly, we must continue to hold them on the ground in the south and exact there a high price for continued aggression. Clearly, we must maintain minimum political stability in Saigon; for they would be tempted to continue the war, even if hamstrung around Hanoi, if their prospects for early military or political victory in the south were good.

For what it is worth, however, my judgment is this:

• —We have an enormous stake at home and abroad in forcing an early, rather than late, ending to the war in Viet Nam.
• —There is a possibility that this kind of purposeful, systematic, and surgical attack on the Hanoi-Haiphong oil and power installations might so limit the economic and military capacity of North Viet Nam that those who now argue for a negotiated settlement in Hanoi might, at last, prevail.
• —The North Vietnamese civil casualties involved could be quite severely limited if the operations are well planned; and we should be conscious that our present level of sorties in armed reconnaissance and other attacks are imposing some civilian casualties on them and the loss of some of our own finest and best-trained men.
• —This kind of attack is not likely to change radically the degree of Soviet and Chinese Communist involvement in the war.
• —Such attacks will heighten the noise level in the Free World against us, but, if our backs remain stiff, it will also heighten the pressure on Hanoi from the outside to negotiate, including, especially, the pressure from Moscow.

3. Action. That we proceed early in the New Year to go swiftly and purposefully into the systematic attack on oil and electric power, but try to establish—even before the attacks—direct diplomatic contact with Hanoi, as suggested in proposal D.

D. Direct Contact With a Representative of Hanoi

1 Proposal. That we soon quietly establish, at our initiative, direct diplomatic contact with a representative of Hanoi.

2. Comment. In all the other postwar confrontations with Communists, there was no great problem of communication when they decided to cease their aggression. They either knocked it off without talking to us, as in the case of the Greek guerrilla campaign, or they found a way to communicate through diplomatic channels, as in the case of the Berlin blockade of 1948-49, the Korean war, and the Cuban missile crisis.

In these cases of communication, we were then, however, dealing with Russians. And, when the time comes, this is the way it may be again.

But the fact is that Hanoi, not Moscow, is the center of this war; it is in a complex relation to both the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Communists; in the long run it must live with Communist China, even if it decides to negotiate; and, thus, the Sino-Soviet split makes it hard for them to turn wholly to Moscow at this critical moment in their history.

Therefore, direct contact with us may facilitate getting over the hump into negotiations—even if what we discuss is whom to talk to and where.

Hanoi’s position is compounded by the fact that if they knock off the war, without negotiations, they leave the U.S. with all our troops and bases in South Viet Nam and with great freedom of action. For that reason alone, they may be led to get the best deal they can out of a negotiation, including our withdrawal; but negotiations in the midst of a large guerrilla war are exceedingly complex and require quite a bit of talk to get started.

I am led to the view that a direct contact would be useful for another reason. Every war game I have been involved in has been marked by signals that were not accurately read. One side will say something or do something designed to give the other side a message; but the receiving side will not hear or it will misinterpret the message.

Now we and the Russians have been at this game for a generation. And we rarely misread each other’s messages. But this has taken a long time; and our communications are thick—operating at many places and levels.

We must constantly bear in mind that, this time, we are not dealing with a self-confident major power. We are dealing with a small, provincial, isolated power which has had little contact with us, and is caught up between two allies who are bitterly contending with one another.

Finally, our experience with third parties, however well meaning, suggests that they are not necessarily accurate; they leak; and they are too often bucking for a Nobel Peace prize.

Action. That we consider promptly establishing a direct contact with a North Vietnamese representative. I would not pretend to expertise, but Mai Van Bo in Paris would be my first choice, for two reasons: he is quite high in rank; and Paris is a big city, easier for quiet contacts than most of the alternatives. Cairo, Vientiane, and Djakarta are other possibilities. If discovered, we should simply say that if we can talk with the Chinese Communists, we can certainly talk with the North Vietnamese Communists. The contact should be set up, if possible, before the bombing attacks suggested in proposal C. The first message should be an authoritative statement of all our present negotiating proposals. We should remain in contact steadily as the air attack mounts. If there is any indication of willingness to negotiate, we should be willing to explore formulae which would save Hanoi’s face and offer a golden bridge of retreat.

It is wholly possible that they will not be willing to make direct contact with us; but, especially if we plan to increase the heat on Hanoi-Haiphong, it is appropriate to try.

Walt

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 12 VIET S. Secret. According to a December 24 memorandum from Read to Rusk, Rostow felt “some pressure to get his paper to the White House today.” Rusk approved sending it immediately. (Ibid., POL 27-14 VIET)
2. Brackets in the source text.
3. Dated December 10. This SNIE included footnotes indicating dissenting views of most of the chiefs of the intelligence agencies. (Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, Aug-Dec 1965)