Office of the Historian

268. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam1

Washington, December 29, 1965, 12:46 p.m.

1815. Eyes only for Ambassador and Porter.

1.
You should be aware of following diplomatic actions we have taken in connection with deferring resumption of bombing:
a.
We have informed British, Australians, and New Zealanders very fully here, and Canadians [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].2 Our Ambassadors have also informed ROK, Japan, GRC, RLG, and RTG at highest levels, and we expect to do same for Marcos probably 31st.3 We have urged all these governments to hold our intentions closely, and we have no indication either way as to whether they are informing their Saigon representatives. Any inquiry from these governments in Saigon should be met by saying simply that their governments have been informed. Naturally, if representatives indicate they have received the word, you may elicit comment for whatever use it may be.
b.
We have informed Soviets, Poles, and Hungarians here,4 treating matter as one of information and not pressing them for specific action. We have specifically told them period might be shorter in event of major provocation, but also that we are most interested in any Hanoi response. Our supposition is that one or more may already have been in touch with Hanoi, and Hungarians came back to us even over Christmas period to ask if we would negotiate with NLF. We replied clearly that we would not, for familiar reasons.
c.
Byroade yesterday conveyed note directly to DRV Consul General in Rangoon informing them that resumption might be deferred at least over New Year’s.5 Same format as notification to Soviets, Poles, and Hungarians. Noteworthy that DRV rep received Byroade personally and did not seek to play games as DRV Ambassador in Moscow did last May.6
d.
We have also informed U Thant and Indians in general terms.
e.
Harriman has been dispatched to Warsaw and is talking today to Rapacki.7 We have also indicated to Hungarians that Harriman available to go to Budapest, but have had no response. He may also be sent to Belgrade, to talk with Tito. Purpose of his mission is to show concretely our interest in discussion with Eastern European countries and generally to make strong record of diplomatic activity. There may be speculation Warsaw trip related to contact with Chicoms. We are doing nothing to encourage this here, and it might be specifically useful for us to tell Do privately this is not part of Harriman mission.
f.
Goldberg has been sent to Rome to inform Pope and consult with him.8 This done in light Pope’s general interest and not with expectation he has effective contact with Hanoi.
2.
Above adds up to broad notification and essential diplomatic effort so that we will learn rapidly of any response by Hanoi. Only direct contact with DRV has been by Byroade. We have no reason to believe this will be publicized, but if it should be there is ready parallel to our May efforts through DRV Ambassador Moscow and through British in Hanoi, which are well known to GVN and have been made public subsequently.
3.
You may be assured that if anything substantive should appear as a result of this activity we will be in immediate touch with you.
Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Pinta. Drafted by Bundy and approved by Ball. Repeated to the White House.↩
  2. Further details are in William Bundy’s Pinta Log, December 28-29. (Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 412, Nodis/Pinta, Series 1, Vol. 1)↩
  3. Instructions were sent in telegram 651 to Seoul, also sent to Bangkok, Vientiane, Tokyo, Taipei, and Manila, December 28. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)↩
  4. See Documents 258 and 259. No record of the discussions with the Poles in Washington has been found. In telegram 937 to Warsaw, December 28, Rusk instructed Gronouski to inform Rapacki of the talks. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)↩
  5. See Document 265.↩
  6. See vol. II, Document 299.↩
  7. See Documents 266 and 267.↩
  8. See Document 271.↩