Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

258. Paper by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)¹

Washington, December 28, 1965.

Record of the Secretary’s Contacts with the Hungarian Charge

1. December 23. The Secretary called in the Charge in order to give him a message inquiring whether the Hungarian Foreign Minister had received any information that would throw light on the question the Secretary had asked Peter at the UN in October. (The Secretary’s question had been, in effect, what would happen on the other side if we were to stop bombing.)

In the course of the conversation, the Secretary spelled out in some detail 12 basic points concerning the US position. He asked that these points be brought to the attention of the Hungarian Foreign Minister and anyone else he chose.

The Charge said that he would report the conversation urgently.²

2. December 24. The Charge called the Secretary to say that he would like to see him urgently. The Charge asked for clarification of our intentions concerning a Christmas truce. The Secretary responded that we had received no indication of the VC attitude on our own 30-hour military ceasefire. He stated emphatically that any ceasefire, of 12 or 30 hours, could not be unilateral. He said that he might know more about our precise military plans during the day. Finally, the Secretary said that we remained interested in knowing what the other side would do if we stopped shooting or bombing.

3. December 25. The Secretary telephoned the Charge during the evening to say that the outcome of the ceasefire within South Viet-Nam depended on the VC attitude and actions. However, he went on to say that he wished the Charge to know that we did not expect to conduct bombing attacks in North Viet-Nam for “a day or two” after Christmas. He said that he would be most interested in any message the Charge might produce on the basis of this information.

4. December 27. The Secretary called the Charge early in the afternoon to ask if he had had any message. The Charge responded in the negative, but later in the afternoon called again to say that he now had instructions. Accordingly, the Secretary received him at 6 p.m.

The Charge conveyed a very precisely phrased message from Peter:

“Can the Secretary’s messages be interpreted to mean that the USG is ready or willing to enter into negotiations on ‘the platform presented by you’ with the NLF?”

The Charge went on to say that the “platform” obviously referred to the 12 points summarized by the Secretary to the Charge on December 23.

The Secretary responded by making five points:

1. He referred to President Johnson’s remarks at his July 28 press conference³ to the effect that the VC would not have difficulty being represented or having their views presented, “if Hanoi decided it wished to cease aggression.”

2. The US problem of peace lies with Hanoi, not the NLF. US forces are in Viet-Nam only because Hanoi has sent tens of thousands of men, including regular forces, into South Viet-Nam. If Hanoi had not done this, US forces would not be there. Thus, our problem is with Hanoi.

3. Our 12 points are a matter of public record. If the NLF is seriously interested in these 12 points, they can tell us or Peter or anyone such as the Geneva Co-Chairmen. We would be interested if Peter has any indication that the NLF is thus interested.

4. There is no technical problem applicable to contact with the NLF. Members of the NLF have family ties and are well known in Saigon. The Charge interjected to ask whether this meant they could talk to the US or to South Viet-Nam in both directions. The Secretary responded by going on to his fifth point below.

5. The USG cannot enter into negotiations with the NLF. The Secretary emphasized this two or three times in the conversation. He pointed out that there were other groups in South Viet-Nam—Buddhists, Catholics, Montagnards, sects, etc., who had their own leaders and would have to be considered. The local VC were part of a population of 14 million. One could not negotiate with them simply because they happened to have rifles.

At this, Charge grunted disagreement, and the Secretary remarked: “I predicted your disagreement,” and the Charge responded: “You predicted correctly.”

Having made these five basic points, the Secretary went on, “in confidence,” to say that at times there seemed to be nuances of difference between the NLF and Hanoi, between Hanoi and Peiping, and of course well known differences between Moscow and Peiping. Under these circumstances, it was very hard to find anyone with whom to make peace. The Secretary said he put this remark in confidence because he did not wish to exaggerate, but that this was the reason for the suggestion that he would be interested in any expression of NLF views on the 12 points.

The Charge complained at this point that they had been given very little time to get any response and had had no time to get out “to the jungle.”

The Secretary then said he did not connect Peter’s message to the bombing. He could not say at that moment when the bombing would be resumed. It could be at any time. However, he wished to underscore that even the cessation of bombing for these three days had shown that it was a point of flexibility on our side, if there was any interest on the other side.

At this point the Charge asked if he might make a personal remark, and asked rhetorically: “Do you think Peter speaks on his own?” (The obvious intended implication was that Peter had been in touch with Hanoi or the NLF, or both.) The Secretary responded that if Peter had reported Hanoi moving in the direction of peace, that would be very important. Peter’s report on the NLF was also interesting, but he repeated that he did not connect Peter’s message with the bombing of the North. The Secretary went on to say that we could stop the bombing but we still wanted to know what Hanoi would then do—not a commitment but at least an indication. He recalled his own participation in the negotiations that terminated the Berlin Blockade and started up in 1951 concerning Korea, and said that there were ways for diplomats to find these things out privately. He went on to say that our 12 points meant exactly what they said and were reliable. If Hanoi thinks we are not in good faith, let them probe us.

The Charge interjected that the present US response appeared to be that we could not negotiate with the NLF. The Secretary said this was indeed the case. The Secretary said however that we mean all we say, for example about not having bases or a military presence in South Viet-Nam and that if Hanoi gets out, we will.

The Charge put on an act of discouragement at this point and asked how we could find a solution. The Secretary responded that if Hanoi was determined to absorb South Viet-Nam by force, there was bound to be further war. The Charge then asked what would happen if free elections led to Communist control of the South. The Secretary said this was a matter for the people of South Viet-Nam. The Charge then backtracked a bit with some remarks about how hard it was to find the will of the people in any circumstances, and admitted under the Secretary’s teasing that he took a standard Communist view of elections.

The conversation then went back to what would happen if the bombing continued to be suspended. The Charge again complained that he had had no time to get “to the jungle.” He thought this was a pity, as this was a very good psychological moment. Now, he regretted to say, he found our response discouraging and was afraid the bombing would resume. Nonetheless he would carefully report the Secretary’s statement that our action should at least be taken as an indication of our flexibility on this point.

The Secretary then noted that the VC had put on at least 20 incidents even during their own ceasefire period, and then 60 more during ours. The Charge responded that he had been surprised there hadn’t been a major attack; the VC didn’t have IBM machines to give orders.

The Charge then referred to the Secretary’s call on Christmas evening. The Secretary said that our informing the Hungarians of our intent was part of our saying that we were interested in peace, but could not pay the price of South Viet-Nam. If you looked at our 12 points, we had been fair and constructive on every other element, but we were simply not about to trade South Viet-Nam for peace. The Charge then reverted to saying that that was all very well, but we still wouldn’t talk with the NLF.

The Secretary then asked, as a point of information, whether there was now an NLF office in Budapest. The Charge responded that one had just been installed.

The Secretary brought the conversation to a close by saying that he did appreciate Peter’s interest.

5. December 28. The Secretary summoned the Charge about noon to give him a simple statement that we were not proposing to resume bombing for at least several more days. The Secretary’s message followed exactly the text used with the Soviets and Poles as well, and is attached.

In response, the Charge gave the Secretary the following message from Peter (subsequently phoned in absolutely correct form to Mr. Bundy). It was as follows:

“I have got your newer message and your pressing questions. Every one of your proposals is under careful study [in place of ‘I am carefully studying all your proposals,’ which the Charge explained orally to Mr. Bundy meant that the proposals were being studied by ‘someone other than Peter.’]⁴

“I will give a complete answer soon.”

Attachment⁵

Washington, December 28, 1965.

1. As you are doubtless aware, there has been no bombing in North Viet Nam since December 24th although some reconnaissance flights have continued. I have been asked to tell you that no decision has been made regarding a resumption of bombing and that this will depend upon developments. We would hope that the present standdown, which is in its fifth day, could extend at least through New Year’s. We cannot make a flat commitment as to timing because of the possibility of some particularly outrageous action or some major new move by the other side. If, on the other hand, the other side should reciprocate by making a serious contribution toward peace, it would obviously have a favorable effect on the possibility of extending the suspension.

2. Because of the interest and concern of your government about this problem, this information is being passed to you for whatever use your government may wish to make of it.

1. Source: Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 412, Nodis/Pinta, Series 1, Vol. 1. Secret.
2. See Document 241.
3. See Document 97.
4. Brackets in the source text.
5. No classification marking.