Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

241. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 23, 1965, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Viet-Nam

PARTICIPANTS

• US
• The Secretary
• Christopher A. Squire, OIC Hungarian Affairs, EUR
• Hungarian
• Janos Radvanyi, Charge d’Affaires a.i., Hungarian Legation
• Endre Szluka, Hungarian Legation

Hungarian Charge Radvanyi came to the Department at the Secretary’s request. The Secretary said that he appreciated Radvanyi’s coming to the Department just before the Christmas holidays, and expressed interest in whether Foreign Minister Peter had developed any postscript to his last talk with the Secretary in New York,² at which Charge Radvanyi had been present. He was not inquiring whether Radvanyi had any instructions, although he assumed not. The Secretary had invited Minister Peter to use a little “16th Century Hungarian diplomacy”, and would now be grateful if Radvanyi could ask Minister Peter if there were anything Peter could add to what was said in New York.

The Secretary said that he might make two or three comments as background for asking Charge Radvanyi to come to the Department. American newspapers had referred recently to peace feelers. Hanoi had denied these stories, and he knew of no instance in which Hanoi had taken an initiative in this matter. Others, such as U Thant and the Mayor of Florence, had taken such initiatives. All such initiatives were, however, taken by third parties. He had the impression that Hanoi’s representatives abroad, and in Hanoi itself, were socially very busy; everyone wanted to see them. When third parties go to see such representatives, they come back with initiatives which evidently they believe important. We are not aware of any initiative taken by Hanoi at its own instance.

His second point, the Secretary said, was that many initiatives had been taken by a large number of people towards unconditional discussions. The initiatives known publicly were only a fraction of those taken privately. Thus far no initiative had produced any results. The key question continued to be Point 3 of Hanoi’s 4 points, namely acceptance of the program of the Liberation Front for South Viet-Nam. The third point was what the shooting was all about. Hanoi wanted it, and they could not have it by force.

The Secretary said he would like to review for Minister Peter the things said publicly on our side with respect to peace in Southeast Asia:

1. We have said that the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are a basis for peace in Southeast Asia;

2. We would welcome a conference on Southeast Asia, or on any part of it;

3. We would welcome negotiations without preconditions (using the terms of the 17 nations);

4. We would welcome unconditional discussions (using the President’s term);

5. The question of cessation of hostilities can be taken first and then made the grounds for a conference, or, if anyone preferred, made the subject of preliminary discussions;

6. Hanoi’s 4 points can be discussed at a conference, provided that those points others have in mind are also discussed;

7. We do not wish to maintain any bases in Southeast Asia;

8. We do not wish to retain any military forces in South Viet-Nam;

9. There could be free elections in South Viet-Nam;

10. The question of reunification is to be subject to the free choice of the people of Viet-Nam, and not to be imposed by force;

11. We would much prefer to use our resources, both economic and social, in developing Southeast Asia. North Viet-Nam was free to join in a regional program in which we were prepared to invest $1 billion;

12. We could stop bombing as a step towards peace, as Minister Peter knows we have said. But tell us what would happen if we stopped bombing. Would the bombing in South Viet-Nam stop? Would they come to the conference table? Would the 325th Division go home?

When one put it all together, the Secretary continued, the basket was filled from our side. The only thing not in the basket was South Viet-Nam. The only thing we could add was “Take South Viet-Nam.” That we could not say. Perhaps Hanoi did not believe some of these things we have said. The Secretary recalled he had said he would go to Geneva tomorrow afternoon. The way for Hanoi to find out, added the Secretary, is to find out. We can get there faster than they can. Perhaps they do not believe what we say about bases in Southeast Asia. But they can find out.

Secretary Rusk told Charge Radvanyi that he just wanted Radvanyi to tell Minister Peter that he had thought often of their talk in New York. The Secretary wondered if there was anything else that Minister Peter wished to pass on.

Charge Radvanyi asked the Secretary to clarify what had been reported in the papers about a 30-hour Christmas lull in Viet-Nam. The Secretary said that the 12-hour ceasefire proposed by the Viet-Cong was not very significant to us from the religious point of view since Christmas Eve and Christmas Day were a single unit. We were not particularly attracted to the Viet Cong idea that we take 12 hours to trim our Christmas trees and then watch out for the plastic bombs. So we had said we would treat the period as a whole, for 30 hours.

He owed it to Minister Peter, the Secretary continued, to point out that this was an indication of some flexibility on our part. We did not expect the 30-hour period to be a political initiative, as the period was too short. It was indicative of some flexibility, just a tiny indication. If he were advising Charge Radvanyi how to report the importance of the 30-hour lull, he would not stress its political importance too much. The US had decided, so far as the Viet Cong would allow it, to introduce this lull at Christmas not only in South Viet-Nam but also as far as bombing of the North was concerned. The opportunity might arise again, at the time of the Vietnamese New Year. If the other side were responsive, we might find a way to move towards peace by steps like these.

The Secretary stressed that no commitments could be made at this time with respect to the future, but he did mention the fact that New Year was coming, with its Viet-Nam holiday also, and this fact might offer an occasion to do something like the Christmas ceasefire again. No decision could be made on the future yet, however, as it depended partly on what happened at Christmas.

The Secretary noted that he would also appreciate it if Minister Peter had any comments regarding the Hanoi and Peiping statements of the last two weeks which had been of some interest.³ The Secretary would protect Minister Peter’s discretion. Peiping had chided Moscow, which made it sound as if Peiping knew that the subject of peace moves had been discussed in Hanoi. Broadly speaking, the Secretary continued, what he was asking was that in the light of the very interesting conversation the Secretary had had in New York with Minister Peter, was there anything else that Minister Peter could add privately?

At this point Charge Radvanyi remarked that although the Secretary could count on absolute discretion from the Hungarian side, there had already been press inquiries about the subject of the Charge’s call on the Secretary. It was agreed by the Secretary and by Charge Radvanyi that the press would be informed only that the present meeting was a continuation of the Secretary’s previous discussion with Minister Peter in New York, on general questions and bilateral questions. Charge Radvanyi noted that as to bilateral questions, he believed the present atmosphere was less of an obstacle for bilateral US-Hungarian talks in Budapest then it was in Washington. The Secretary observed that the reverse was true in terms of US-Soviet relations. The Secretary indicated that after the holidays he would be glad to discuss bilateral US-Hungarian affairs at greater length.

Charge Radvanyi said that he would inform Budapest immediately of the discussion, and would convey an answer to the Secretary as fast as he received it. The Secretary said he would await any answer with interest, that he would remain in Washington over the Christmas holidays, and that he could be reached at any hour of the day or night through the White House switchboard.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-VIET. Secret; Exclusive Distribution. Drafted by Squire and approved in S on December 27. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office.
2. See Document 160.
3. Apparent reference to a commentary in Hanoi’s official paper, Nhan Dan, on December 9, broadcast by Hanoi in English; an interview of Ho Chi Minh by British journalist Felix Greene, broadcast by Hanoi on December 8; and a broadcast by Hanoi on December 10, commenting on the deceptive nature of U.S. peace moves. (Texts in FBIS, North Vietnam) On December 20, speaking at a reception in Peking in honor of the fifth anniversary of the founding of the National Liberation Front, Chou En-lai accused the Soviet Union of “sowing discord in an attempt to undermine the Vietnamese people’s unity against U.S. aggression and the unity of the Vietnamese and Chinese people against U.S. imperialism.” (Peter Cheng, A Chronology of the People’s Republic of China (Totowa, NJ, 1972), p. 212)