160. Memorandum of Conversation1
SECRETARY’S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTIETH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, September-October 1965
SUBJECT
- Viet Nam (Part I of II)2
PARTICIPANTS
- U.S.
- Secretary Rusk
- Emmett B. Ford, Jr.
- Hungary
- Foreign Minister Peter
- Ambassador Janos Radvanyi
Peter asked the Secretary his views on the situation in Viet Nam. He asked if the Secretary could see any way out.
The Secretary said that this would depend on what Hanoi is willing to do with respect to its own actions in South Viet Nam. The United States is in South Viet Nam solely because of the infiltration from North Viet Nam to South Viet Nam of armed men and munitions. If this infiltration would stop, we could go home. But we want to be sure that South Viet Nam can solve its problems without armed pressure from the North.
The Secretary went on to say that he had received the impression that differing and sometimes contradictory attitudes had become apparent in Hanoi of late. We think Moscow would be prepared to take part in a conference if Hanoi would assent. It is Peiping which says no. Hanoi is somewhere between the two but currently leaning toward Peiping.
Peter said that, in his opinion, as long as the United States continues to bomb North Viet Nam, no discussion could take place.3 It is difficult to see what advantage can be gained from the continuance of these air attacks.
The Secretary recalled that large-scale infiltration South of the 17th parallel began in 1959 and 1960; we have waited four years before beginning the bombing of North Viet Nam.
[Page 432]Peter made the point that there had been no advance warning of these bombings and no opportunity for negotiations. The Secretary said that the United States had tried every means before the bombings began—all of this is a matter of record. At any rate, the United States has learned since that holding off does not produce a peaceful settlement. In various ways we have tried to ask the question, “What will happen if we stop the bombing; what will this lead to?”
The Secretary pointed out that we have asked Hanoi what will happen and get no answer. Gromyko says to wait and see. But the bombing and killing goes on every day in South Viet Nam. What is the difference whether explosives are carried by a man on foot or delivered in planes from the air? If we stop the bombing, will the North Viet Namese troops go home? Will the Communists come to the conference table?
Peter expressed his conviction that, if the DRV answered such questions as to their intent while the bombing continues or the threat of bombing is still present, it would be regarded by the world as an indication of their weakness. The DRV does not want to look weak.
The Secretary observed that, by the same logic, the reverse would be true if we stopped bombing before we received any indication of intent from the DRV.
Peter said nobody could seriously believe that the United States would stop the bombings out of weakness.
The Secretary saw a difference in opinion on this point. Peiping is continually preaching that the United States is a “paper tiger”. Chen Yi enjoins the Soviet Union not to take such a gloomy view of war. We take a very gloomy view of war, indeed.
The Secretary was of the opinion that there should be some way to avoid the impression of weakness. We don’t think that there can really be any misjudgment on this score. If “face” or public posture is involved, surely some private arrangement can be made. We are prepared to stop bombing if we can be assured that this is a step toward peace.
Peter said that it certainly would be a step toward peace. It would create the atmosphere which is necessary to bring all the factors for peaceful negotiation into play. In the present situation, however, Hungary is not able to propose negotiations to its friends in North Viet Nam. The Soviets are in the same position.
The Secretary remarked that part of the answer lies in Peiping. What will Hanoi do if Peiping says no?
Peter said that the Hungarians have some direct contacts with Hanoi. He mentioned that a Hungarian delegation is scheduled to arrive in Hanoi today. Peter’s firm conviction was that the DRV is ready to negotiate but that certain conditions must be met. Yet, while North Viet Nam is being bombed or under the threat of bombing, any talks are impossible.
[Page 433]The Secretary pointed out that this works both ways. There is also bombing in South Viet Nam.
Peter said that this situation will continue as long as there is no improvement in the attitude of the United States. The United States should show its goodwill in this matter. The halt in the bombing last summer was not effective because the DRV was still under the threat of renewed attack.
The Secretary observed that Hanoi had not shown any indication of a desire to talk at that time. In fact, they just sent our message back and stuck it under our door. Three days later Gromyko termed our suspension of bombing “an insult”.
We have indicated our willingness to settle this problem not only to the other side, but to our own people. The Secretary said he had repeatedly indicated his willingness to depart “tomorrow” if any one wanted to talk. We have said that we will come to the conference table, we will agree to a cease-fire in the event that a conference is imminent, or that we will come home if the DRV stops its aggression. We have repeatedly said that we want no bases in South Viet Nam and that when the fighting in Viet Nam could be stopped we will join in an economic development project for Southeast Asia.4
If the DRV continues its aggression, the war will continue. It is that simple. How do we deal with that situation? Peter said that a decrease of military action would be a start. There is no other way to decrease military action but to halt the bombing of North Viet Nam. Otherwise escalation will continue with all its dangers.
The Secretary said that escalation is the tragedy. If the war continues to escalate, North Viet Nam will be destroyed. Why do we have to go down that road?
Peter replied that the key to the matter is in United States hands. If bombing is halted, conditions will improve, and negotiations leading to peace will be possible.
The Secretary said that we would get nowhere if such unilateral action meant our acceptance of a program of the “liberation movement”.
Peter reiterated that the conditions necessary to negotiations would arise if the United States stopped its bombing. It would be impossible to get any guarantee from the DRV until after the cessation of bombing.
The Secretary remarked that we cannot move very long on a unilateral basis.
Peter said that before the United States started its air attacks there had been no real proposal for negotiations on the situation in South Viet [Page 434] Nam. The air attacks began without notification thus, if the United States stops its bombing, it is not purely a unilateral concession, but a new start to try to find a solution.
The Secretary asked how long Peter felt it would take for the other side to enter negotiations after the proposed halting of air attacks.
Peter replied certainly a few weeks, provided the attacks were stopped without the threat of renewal. The United States would not lose anything by it and the rest of the world would surely gain.
The Secretary remarked that there are traditional ways and means of coming to an understanding on such matters as this. In the past history of such disputes, there have been means of making clear the possibilities for peaceful settlement which existed.
Peter remarked that, while the bombings continue, any prior indication on the part of the DRV that it is willing to negotiate would be a sign of weakness. They would think that the United States had gotten what it wanted, namely negotiations, through military action.
The Secretary said that it is, indeed, very difficult to get the idea of reciprocity across this ideological gulf. If Hanoi thought it could succeed in achieving its objectives in this way, would the DRV come to the conference table?
Peter said that it may be a long way to the conference table.
The Secretary feared that Hanoi takes an exaggerated view of the force of international opinion. We have consulted with most governments on the problem of North Viet Nam and we know what they think. Hanoi may well believe that, if we stop, the force of world opinion may prevent us from resuming the air attacks. Thus the DRV believes they will have an advantage if we stop.
Peter said that this would not be a unilateral advantage. The United States would gain much more in the way of international support if the air attacks were stopped.
The Secretary said he supposed there was always universal support for the idea of a peaceful settlement, except in Hanoi and Peiping. Some countries, however, feel themselves unable to express their support until Hanoi assents to negotiations.
The Secretary then recalled the manner in which Peiping had torpedoed the conference on Laos and Cambodia. He said that we understand the difficulties currently present in the Socialist world. But it does seem to us that Hanoi has the key.
The Secretary said that, if Hanoi comes to the conference table with the United States and the Soviet Union, Peiping would hesitate to interfere, at least with force. Therefore, Hanoi holds the key. It simply doesn’t appear that Hanoi is ready to make any effort toward a peaceful solution. If they wish to do so, there are ways and means of letting us know.
[Page 435]Peter said that as long as the present situation continues, there can be no change in the attitude of Hanoi. The bombing must cease.
The Secretary asked what, besides the bombing, would cease. There must be some reciprocal action on the part of the DRV.
Peter was certain that reciprocal action would come, perhaps on the ground as well. It is impossible to get both sides to move at once.
The Secretary asked why, at a very private level and in the most sophisticated manner, is it necessary for one party to move in advance of the other. This is not the traditional way to negotiate.
Peter didn’t agree. The Secretary then reminded him that, as an example, we had contacts with the Soviet Union while Berlin was still under blockade.
Peter termed such contacts as of a special nature and well-established.
The Secretary then explained that the United States has no national ambitions in Southeast Asia. South Viet Nam can be non-aligned, if it is left alone. We want no military bases in Viet Nam. But we do feel strongly about a small nation being overrun by force. Thus, there is an enormous gap between our attitude and that of Peiping.
Peter said that, if the United States has no ambitions in that area, the points of agreement between the two sides are much closer than they seem. The main thing now is to stop the bombing. For Hungary, as a Socialist country, it is impossible to talk to friends in the DRV about negotiations while the bombing goes on. Peter went on to point out that the air attacks are different from the ground fighting in South Viet Nam.
The Secretary said he found it difficult to accept a distinction between the bombing and the fighting in South Viet Nam. Peter repeated his certainty that the key is in the hands of the United States.
The Secretary remarked that, in conflict, surely the key is in the hands of both sides.
Peter said that the United States is the major power in this case.
The Secretary said that other elements entered into the picture. When campaigning for re-election, President Johnson had told the American people that we did not wish a larger war in Viet Nam. After the President had won the election, Hanoi evidently misunderstood the meaning of the President’s victory. They thought that they could expand the war without danger of response from the United States.
Peter said that, if the United States were to stop the bombing, it could still maintain “all the present possibilities” if Hanoi acted in bad faith. He then asked the Secretary whether he had anything favorable to say on this whole matter.
The Secretary remarked that he had been very interested in hearing Peter’s views. He couldn’t say more than he had already said. The whole [Page 436] matter needs further exploration. The greatest difficulty is the absence of any reciprocal intent on the part of the DRV.
Peter told the Secretary that reciprocity would come.
The Secretary said he did not want to mislead Peter. We have thought very hard about this problem and we want peace very much. It is too late in history for war; no one understands this better than we. Most of the great powers understand the dangers of war, with the signal exception of Peiping. This creates problems in the Socialist world as well as in the West.
Suppose that we stop the bombing and the Chinese calculate that they can intervene in safety?
Peter thought that this was an extremely unlikely possibility.
The Secretary felt that, nevertheless, we would have heavy responsibility if such should be the result.
Peter said that there could not be any danger in stopping. It would change the whole atmosphere.
The Secretary recalled one of the deepest disappointments the United States has ever experienced—the failure of President Kennedy’s fresh approach on Laos. The DRV never did reduce its forces in Laos more than a few thousand men and continued to use Laos as a base to infiltrate South Viet Nam. Everyone was ready for a peaceful settlement but it didn’t work.
Peter remarked that if one binds one’s hands as a result of bad experiences one will never get out of a bad situation.
In return, the Secretary quoted an old saying of American horse traders: “If someone cheats me once it is his fault; if he cheats me twice it is my fault.”
Peter said that the United States would have many good friends supporting it if there was a cessation of bombing. This would include the Soviet Union.
The Secretary said that, since both he and Peter were Calvinists, we will continue to give the entire matter “our prayerful Presbyterian consideration.” He wanted to make it clear that he had not made any promise or commitment to Peter. He expressed his appreciation for the opportunity for talking with Peter.5
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Emmett B. Ford, Jr., of the Office of German Affairs on October 8 and approved in S on October 13. The meeting was held at USUN.↩
- Part II is unrelated to Vietnam.↩
- Secto 39 from USUN, repeated to Saigon as telegram 50, October 7, summarized this conversation. The cable also noted that after the discussion, Peter was interviewed by the press at some length and he repeated his belief that a cessation of the bombing was an indispensable first step to creating an atmosphere necessary for negotiations. (Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 412,Nodis/Pinta, Series 1, Vol. 1)↩
- The next paragraph began with the sentence: “We are not rabbits to be frightened by a snake.” It was apparently erased in the Secretary’s office, but remains legible on the source text.↩
- This last paragraph was typed on a different typewriter and was probably added in the Secretary’s office when the memorandum was approved.↩