159. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton)1
Dear John:
This is in reply to your letter of September 28.2 I am not in a position to comment further at this moment on the question of locks and dams, but I would like to respond immediately to your last paragraph referring to the language in paragraph 2 of the State dissent to SNIE 10-11-65.3
I have not attempted to go through all of the public statements and press conferences, but it certainly would be my impression that—even though there might not have been specific statements on the question—the various responses indicated generally that we would continue, as far as we could then see, the policy we have been pursuing, which of course does not include attacks on Hanoi and Haiphong. I am confident that our statements have been interpreted in this sense by diplomatic observers and sophisticated newspapermen, and that if Hanoi has any eyes and ears at all the overwhelming reading that has been reported to it is that we were not planning to hit H-H at any early time. I say this despite the fact that the general line of response in all our public statements has been not to exclude such action.
As to private indications, I think you know that we have repeatedly been asked point-blank by the British, Japanese, and others whether we intended to extend our bombing to H-H. We have always replied with some care that we had no such current plan, although the time might come when it would be necessary as a part of the over-all pattern of pressure on the DRV. I do not know whether these diplomatic conversations get back to Hanoi, but I would suspect strongly that some of them do.
More broadly, the question of hitting H-H has repeatedly come up in background conversations and briefings with Congressional groups and newspapermen. We have taken the same line as with the diplomats, but on occasion, notably with Congressmen, I myself—and I am sure others—have necessarily argued the pros and cons in such a way as to indicate that we certainly did not exclude this but had doubts, as of the time of the statements, that it was likely to bring the DRV to accept a solution. Again, I think the net of all these discussions must have been an [Page 430] impression that we would weigh hitting H-H as a very major step and that we were not inclined to do it except for grave reasons or unless there were a clear basis to believe it could significantly help in effecting a favorable resolution of the problem. I cannot help but believe that discussions with these groups necessarily percolate into the bloodstream of Washington, and reach Communist ears which in turn pass them to Hanoi.
On one specific point, I would like to flag that we have seen one TDCS, brought to our attention by Andy Goodpaster, in which a CAS representative was quoted as telling his Soviet contact that we had no plan to hit the SAM sites because Soviet personnel were present. This was not an authorized statement, and we have flagged it to CIA.
On the basis of all this, I do not suppose any of us can say what the DRV leaders really think we intend. The massive air defense effort in Hanoi strongly suggests the assumption that we will eventually hit H-H. But I do think that the statement in the paragraph in question—that there have been many “official indications, public and private,” to the contrary, at least for the present—does represent the fact. It may be that the sentence is a shade overstated, in light of our consistent refusal to exclude such action at some time, but I think the inevitable thrust of all our statements has been in the direction indicated.
In any case, whether the sentence could have been improved or not, those of use who saw the INR dissent—and this included Ambassador Thompson, Alex Johnson, Len Unger, and myself—would still agree with its essential point, namely that the Communists (and non-Communists) would feel that the program discussed in the Estimate would in fact represent a very major change in our level of action.
I am writing this to meet your deadline of October 1, and without having dug up the relevant memoranda of conversations and briefing notes in any detail. But I am confident that I have summed up fairly what has been said. I do want to conclude by assuring you and General Wheeler that we have no intention of changing the line we have taken consistently, basically that we are not excluding this or any other action. Obviously, we must not say anything that could impair our freedom of action or the President’s freedom of choice on future actions.
Sincerely,
- Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron. Top Secret. McNaughton passed a copy of this letter to the JCS on October 6. (Washington National Records Center,RG 330, OSD/ADMIN Files: FRC 70 A 1265, Vietnam 381)↩
- Not found.↩
- Document 148.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩