Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

247. Paper by Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, December 27, 1965.

THE HEART OF THE MATTER IN VIET-NAM

I. The Fact of Aggression

The simple fact is that tens of thousands of trained and armed men, including units of the North Vietnamese regular army, have been sent by Hanoi into South Viet-Nam for the purpose of imposing Hanoi’s will on South Viet-Nam by force. It is this external aggression which is responsible for the presence of U.S. combat forces. Indeed, it was not until the early summer of 1965 that the number of U.S. military personnel in South Viet-Nam reached the number of those which have been infiltrated by Hanoi. If this aggression from the outside were removed, U.S. combat forces would not be needed.

II. The U.S. Commitment

The United States has a clear and direct commitment to the security of South Viet-Nam against external attack. This commitment is based upon bilateral agreements between the United States and South Viet-Nam, upon the SEATO Treaty (whose obligations are both joint and several), upon annual actions by the Congress in providing aid to South Viet-Nam, upon the policy expressed in such Congressional action as the August 1964 resolution, and upon the solemn declarations of three U.S. Presidents. At stake is not just South Vietnam, nor even Southeast Asia; there is also at stake the integrity of a U.S. commitment and the importance of that commitment to the peace right around the globe.

III. Initiatives for Peace

A. We are not aware of any initiative which has been taken by Hanoi during the past five years to seek peace in Southeast Asia. Reports of “peace feelers” have to do with initiatives by third parties. Hanoi has denied that it has ever made any “peace feelers”. We ourselves know of none. During 1965 Hanoi has consistently insisted that its four points must be accepted as the sole basis for peace in Viet-Nam. The third of these four points would require the imposition of the program of the liberation front upon South Viet-Nam, whether the South Vietnamese wanted it or not.

B. The initiatives for peace undertaken by our side, and by many other governments, would be hard to count. They began with President Kennedy’s talk with Premier Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961 and have not ceased. The publicly known initiatives have been multiplied many times by private initiatives not yet disclosed. On the public record, however, are the following instances:

1. Kennedy-Khrushchev talks in June 1961;

2. Geneva Conference on Laos;

3. U.S. reference of Gulf of Tonkin matter to the UN Security Council in August 1964;

4. The Polish proposal to convene the two Co-Chairmen and the three members of the ICC (India, Canada and Poland) to take up the question of Laos;

5. The call of 17 non-aligned nations for negotiations without pre-conditions;

6. Attempts by U Thant to visit Hanoi and Peiping;

7. President Johnson’s call for unconditional discussions;

8. The British Commonwealth Committee on Viet-Nam;

9. Attempted or actual visits by Patrick Gordon Walker, Mr. Davies (MP), and Ghanaian Delegation.

IV. U.S. Contributions to the Basket of Peace

The following statements are on the public record about elements which the U.S. believes can go into peace in Southeast Asia;²

1. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia;

2. We would welcome a conference on Southeast Asia or on any part thereof;

3. We would welcome “negotiations without pre-conditions” as the 17 nations put it;

4. We would welcome unconditional discussions as President Johnson put it;

5. A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference or could be the subject of preliminary discussions;

6. Hanoi’s four points could be discussed along with other points which others might wish to propose;

7. We want no U.S. bases in Southeast Asia;

8. We do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South Viet-Nam after peace is assured;

9. We support free elections in South Viet-Nam to give the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice;

10. The question of reunification of Viet-Nam should be determined by the Vietnamese through their own free decision;

11. The countries of Southeast Asia can be non-aligned or neutral if that be their option;

12. We would much prefer to use our resources for the economic reconstruction of Southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace, North Viet-Nam could participate in a regional effort to which we would be prepared to contribute at least one billion dollars;

13. The President has said “The Viet Cong would not have difficulty being represented and having their views represented if for a moment Hanoi decided she wanted to cease aggression. I don’t think that would be an insurmountable problem.”

14. We have said publicly and privately that we could stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam as a step toward peace although there has not been the slightest hint or suggestion from the other side as to what they would do if the bombing stopped.

In other words, we have put everything into the basket of peace except the surrender of South Viet-Nam.

1. Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Misc. Vietnam, Vol. IV. No classification marking. Cooper, in The Lost Crusade (pp. 293-294), describes and quotes from this paper. He states that it was prepared by Rusk “in considerable haste” for the benefit of Vice President Humphrey, Harriman, and the other high-level emissaries sent to other countries to explain the U.S. position in potential peace negotiations. Also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 740-742.
2. These 14 points appeared in The Washington Post, December 29, 1965.