248. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk1
SUBJECT
- Possible Diplomatic or Peace Initiatives
1. Review of Elements of US Position.
A summary of our basic position, and of Hanoi’s contrasting resistance to any agreement, is a “must” in any case. This could be based on the memorandum you did today for the use of the Vice President,2 and might be supplemented by an up-dated history of the various negotiating efforts that have been made since the circulation of our 15-point list in July.3 Such an up-dating should be ready in a day or two, although I would note that it is less thick and impressive than the record of negotiating efforts through July.
2. Re-Statement of our Position in Four-Point Form.
In your television appearance of last August, you dealt with the essential elements of a settlement in the same order as Hanoi’s four points, but took out the clear objections in Hanoi’s formulation. A more systematic effort in this direction might be used as a framework for an offer to negotiate on the basis of such a four-point statement. This would [Page 708] have the appeal in many world quarters, and among sophisticated domestic critics such as the New York Times, of using Hanoi’s own framework and indicating the general principles which would be acceptable. It could be stated as a possible basis for negotiations, while we reiterated at the same time that we were prepared for negotiations without any conditions or basis whatever, or—as we explicitly said in the Fanfani reply—on the basis of Geneva Accords of 1954. If we provided two or three possible formulations, it would tend to strengthen our position verbally, without any substantive change.
3. Bombing Position.
Assuming that we do not continue the Christmas pause, the next possible occasion for a pause would be the stand-down of all military operations that we have now virtually agreed with the GVN to take place over Tet, January 21-23. With a three-day opening period already agreed, we might well extend this for another ten days and take the prior diplomatic measures that we have all considered useful and indeed essential in the pause scenario discussed in the last six weeks. I would most emphatically not recommend a pause at this or any other time that lasted for less than about two weeks. It must be long enough to be convincing to third countries that a serious opportunity was given for diplomatic activity. Similarly, it must be preceded by careful consultation with the GVN and our key allies, and by messages at the last moment to Hanoi through various possible intermediary channels.
4. Pacing our Bombing in Accordance with Communist Activity in the South.
Many of us have felt for some time that our bombing of the North would be much more effective in the military and psychological sense if it were more irregular in pattern in any case. It may be too difficult to introduce daily variation pegged to the level of VC activity in the preceding day or two, as today’s Washington Post seems to be suggesting. However, we could make a general statement that the level of our bombing in the North would be governed by the pace of Communist activity in the South in the preceding period (not specified). This would have the advantage of a built-in justification for increasing the level of our bombing if Communist activity increases. But it would also have the “peace” significance of opening the way for the other side, by reducing its own activity, to bring about a reduction in our bombing and thus to open the way to what Kennan and others have urged as a progressive de-escalation of hostilities. At the same time, this line of approach is inherently more controllable than an outright pause and leaves the way open to increases that do not raise the problem of outright resumption after a pause.
[Page 709]5. Cambodian Supervision.
We have already started probing with the British the question of their discussing this with the Soviets and the ICC members. We have Sihanouk’s own request for expanded ICC supervision in certain areas, and the issue is one that is wholly consistent with our own past position. Conceivably it might be a matter for UN Security Council discussion, but only if the Soviets fully agreed. I would be much more favorable to a co-chairmen/ICC format, which could produce discussions that might go beyond Cambodia, although this should emphatically not be stated as a purpose at the outset. This strikes me as a useful initiative in any event, although of limited utility at least for a time in meeting any need for a Vietnam peace initiative.
- Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron. Top Secret. Prepared at the President’s request; see footnote 1, Document 244.↩
- Document 247.↩
- The 15-point list, July 26, updated the June 10 list of 13 points by adding references to the June 19 British Commonwealth initiative and the Harold Davies mission to Hanoi of July 9-13. (Johnson Library, Papers of Paul C. Warnke, McNaughton Files, State (Bundy) on Negotiations) The 13-point list is ibid., Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXV.↩