Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

165. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)⁰

Washington, August 23, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Laos

Status of the State Department’s Paper

State is currently working on the second draft of the paper¹ they plan to present to the President on Friday morning.² It will be discussed at a meeting of the Task Force at 5:30 this afternoon which Colonel Ewell and I will attend.³ Steeves plans to have a revised version ready for discussion between Alexis Johnson and the Secretary on Thursday morning.⁴ He also hopes to get at least a semi-final draft of the paper to us sometime on Thursday. This will give us an opportunity to look at the paper and prepare comments on it for the benefit of the President.

The Geneva Conference

Washington has been puzzled by the recent demarches by the Russians in Vientiane and Geneva which suggest that they are prepared to reach agreement on an ICC and on the composition of a Lao government.⁵ It occurred to me yesterday that the Russians may believe that the Communist political and military position on the ground in Laos has become so strong that the question of an effective ICC and even the question of the composition of the government have become of increasingly less significance. If the Communist political and military base in Laos is so strong that the Communists could hope to take over by political means (supported by guerrilla-type or other military pressure) without outside support, the effectiveness of the ICC in preventing such outside support could become irrelevant. In one of the Soviet demarches the Russians said that they would be prepared to pull both Viet Minh and Soviet personnel out of Laos even before an agreement on an ICC actually took effect. They have also indicated that the composition of the government didn’t make much difference because any arrangement made now would be an interim arrangement which would be supplanted very soon by a government based upon new elections.

When I talked this morning to Dick Usher, the Deputy Office Director in State who has primary responsibility for the Geneva Conference, I discovered that he has come to much the same conclusions. He was concerned that the Russians may be preparing a negotiating trap for us based upon the fact that we have so far emphasized only the two issues of the composition of the Lao government and the effectiveness of the ICC.

We have been aware of the fact that the reorganization of the Lao armed forces to prevent Pathet Lao control of those forces was also a very important problem. In a general instruction on conference tactics which was sent to Geneva on August 3,⁶ the question of integrating the Pathet Lao forces into a national army was raised. The views of the U.S. delegation were requested with respect to whether this subject should be tabled at the Conference or should be negotiated with the RLG and Souvanna.

On August 7, before any response was received from Geneva, the Foreign Ministers of the UK and France and the Secretary of State reached their general agreement on Laos in Paris on August 7.⁷ That agreement provided that the organization of Lao army and the problem of Pathet Lao forces was one of the subjects on which a satisfactory agreement should be reached with Souvanna and other Laotian leaders as a condition to the acceptance of Souvanna as Prime Minister of a government of national unity. Substantively the agreement between the Foreign Ministers did not go beyond a statement that a small army loyal to the new central government should be formed and that other military forces should be disbanded. It was also agreed that Souvanna’s idea on this subject should be explored and that the matter should be discussed further among the three governments.

A new instruction is being prepared presently in State to reflect the above estimate of Soviet intentions.⁸ The object of this instruction would be to surface at Geneva the question of the organization of Lao military forces as an additional major issue on which we would require agreement before we would be willing to pull out of Laos. This has been a somewhat difficult subject to raise at Geneva because it is much more open to the charge that the Indians and Russians have been making against our proposals with respect to the ICC—that it involves interference in Lao internal affairs.

As a means of protecting ourselves against a political take-over through elections, we will continue to seek Souvanna’s agreement that elections be postponed for some time. (He has been somewhat equivocal on this subject.)

I believe that there is a real danger of the kind that State foresees and that it is most urgent that appropriate instructions go forward. Would you have any interest in seeing the draft telegram before it goes out? Would the President have such an interest?⁹ I ask because it seems to me that, if the Soviet strategy is as estimated above, the issue of the reorganization of the Lao army could become the sticking point for the Geneva Conference. On the other hand, the immediate question can be viewed as one of tactics since, as reflected in the instruction of August 3 and the agreement of the Foreign Ministers on August 7, there is already high-level understanding that the question of the organization of the Lao army is an important one.

I also raised with State the question of whether we were giving sufficient play to the violations to the cease fire by the other side. Usher indicated that during the meetings in Paris earlier this month, Ambassador Harriman and his staff had been wrestling with the question of at what point in the Conference we should make a big play on this subject. Current thinking was that such a play should be made at the time the Conference gets to discussion of the powers and independence of the ICC in about a week. I pointed out that if we are to emphasize the importance of reorganization of the Laotian army to minimize Communist influence, it might be very appropriate to use the case of the cease fire violations as an element of our supporting argument. Usher agreed that this was an interesting idea to which he would give some further thought.

Bob

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 8/10/61–8/31/61. Secret.
1. Draft entitled “Plan of Action for Southeast Asia Covering Thailand, Cambodia, South Vietnam, and Laos,” August 25. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Asia 000.1) The first draft, August 14, is in Department of State, FE/SEA (Laos) Files: Lot 69 D 169, Task Force on Laos, 1961, Jan-Aug.
2. August 25.
3. See Document 167.
4. No record of the Johnson-Rusk meeting on August 24 has been found, except a notation in Rusk’s appointment book that he met with Johnson and Ball at 6:25 p.m. on Southeast Asia. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book)
5. As reported in telegram 283 from Vientiane and Confe 536 from Geneva, August 19 and 21. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–1961 and 751J.00/8–2161)
6. Not found.
7. See Documents 153 and 154.
8. Telegram 202 to Vientiane, sent also to Geneva as Fecon 382 and to Bangkok, Saigon, London, Paris, and Ottawa, August 25. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–1961)
9. Neither the President nor Bundy cleared telegram 202 to Vientiane.