Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

154. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State⁰

Paris, August 7, 1961, 8 p.m.

Secto 30. Verbatim text. Secretary, UK and French Foreign Ministers agreed August 7¹ to following paper on Laos which had been prepared for them by tripartite working group officials:

“Having considered Laos situation with respect security all SEA, the officials have agreed recommend to Ministers that the three governments seek basis which would permit all three support Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister of a neutral Laotian Government of National Unity. It was agreed that, in order to arrive at such a basis prior understandings should be sought with Souvanna and other Laotian leaders on four major matters of concern. These four are:

(A) Composition of a neutral Lao government;

(B) The role of the International Commission;

(C) The Laotian Army and the problem of the Pathet Lao forces;

(D) The French military presence.

It was agreed that the French Government was in the best position to make the initial approach to Souvanna. While discussing all four matters they would emphasize in particular items (A) and (C). In the British follow-up, they equally would review all four placing particular emphasis on (B) and (D). If the result of these approaches were productive the United States would undertake follow-up discussions with Souvanna on all points.

Simultaneously with the initial French approach, the United States will take the initiative to discuss with the Boun Oum-Phoumi group the Western requirements for support of Souvanna, inform them of the overtures being made and seek their agreement to conform with them in their own negotiations with Souvanna.

A—Composition of a Neutral Lao Government.

A first requirement is that Souvanna Phouma would support the monarchy and the constitution.

Regarding the composition of the cabinet itself, none of the key portfolios of Foreign Affairs, Defense, or Interior should be accorded to NLHX members or even to a member of Souvanna’s group who was closely associated with the NLHX. Phoumi should be given a very high civilian post. A large center group should be drawn from those political figures who are not associated with either the NLHX or the present Royal Lao Government. A few NLHX members could be in the Cabinet, provided that they were not given key portfolios and that they were balanced by the inclusion of an equal number from the Boun Oum-Phoumi group.

We would also expect that, utilizing the provisions of the special powers granted to the King by the recent National Assembly action, Souvanna would postpone national elections until suitable provisions for handling the Pathet Lao military establishment have been put into effect, the non-Communist elements have been able to organize their political strength and a satisfactory degree of tranquillity has been restored to the country.

B—International Commission.

(1) We accept the present composition.

(2) The commission must have authority to supervise and control the cease-fire; the withdrawal of foreign military personnel and military equipment and thereafter the entry of such personnel and equipment; and, eventually, the elections.

(3) It must be able to conduct investigation in any region of Laos, at the request of the Laotian Government or of the commission, or of any member of the commission.

Prince Souvanna’s view is that the consent of the Laotian Government is required for any investigation, but he has stated privately that consent would not be withheld. It should be explored with Souvanna Phouma how far he is ready to go in formalizing this understanding in order to provide that such consent by the RLG is never in fact withheld.

(4) The effectiveness of the ICC must not be hampered by veto powers and there should be provision for the ICC to make majority and minority reports.

(5) The ICC must have adequate teams and personnel to do its work.

(6) The ICC should have its own transport and communication equipment, which it would be free to use at its own discretion in carrying out the duties assigned to it.

(7) The security of the ICC must be assured by the RLG.

C—The Laotian Army and the Pathet Lao Forces.

We are agreed that a small army loyal to the central government should be formed and that all other military forces should be disbanded.

It should be explored with Prince Souvanna whether he has practical plans for achieving this aim in a manner likely to minimize Pathet Lao influence. In view of the great importance of this matter, it was agreed that this should also be discussed further among the three governments.

D—The French Presence.

We would expect Prince Souvanna to agree that the French military presence should be maintained under conditions satisfactory to the French. We consider that this responsibility will be of primary importance for the maintenance of Laotian independence.”

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–761. Secret; Priority. Also sent priority to Vientiane and repeated to London, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, Saigon, Ottawa, and Geneva for Fecon. Repeated on August 8 to CINCPAC, New Delhi, Karachi, Rangoon, Canberra, Wellington, and Manila.
1. See Document 153.