Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

155. Memorandum From President Kennedy to His Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) and His Military Representative (Taylor)⁰

Washington, August 7, 1961.

1. Would you prepare a memorandum of the situation at Geneva, the bargaining position taken by both sides on ICC matter and the other basic questions which are now before the conference. Should we ask Harriman to come home?

2. I presume that we are going to receive shortly a military plan for action in the panhandle of Laos and also for military pressure against Northern Vietnam.

3. By what means can we bring to world public opinion the action of North Vietnam in Laos in Southern Vietnam? I agree with you that groundwork has to be laid or otherwise any military action we take against Northern Vietnam will seem like aggression on our part.¹

John Kennedy

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia: General, 8/1/61–8/7/61. No classification marking.

1. A note on the signed memorandum sent to Taylor indicates that Rostow would answer paragraphs 1 and 3 and that paragraph 2 was “answered orally on August 8.” (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Taylor NSC, T–624–71)

   In an apparently related matter, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lemnitzer responded to a request from the President in a written memorandum of August 7 detailing the location, runway dimensions, surfaces, conditions, and the capacity of Wattay (near Vientiane) and Seno (near Savannakhet) airfields. Both airfields were in good condition and could accommodate respectively 36 and 60 sorties of C–130/C–124 aircraft daily in daylight only, but they would not be capable of supporting heavy traffic over a protracted period. (Memorandum from Lemnitzer to the President, August 7, CM–307–61; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Laos: General, 8/1/61–8/10/61)