Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

156. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the President’s Military Representative (Taylor)⁰

Washington, August 8, 1961.

SUBJECT

• A Split vs. A Unified Laos

As we come closer to the crisis in the Geneva negotiations about Laos it is clear that on our side—and probably on the other side—there will be increasing thought about a split Laos. It is evidently a situation where all the alternatives involve risk; and none of the alternatives is particularly pleasant.

It is possible that the other side will confront us with a situation where a split Laos will be the most we can hope to achieve short of fighting a war to clean the Communist element out of the North.

If we continue on our present course without change, it is even possible that both the alternatives of a unified neutral Laos achieved by negotiation and a split Laos will be denied to us and that we will be faced by the alternatives either of undertaking a substantial military effort in Laos to hold the South or of permitting Laos to slip away wholly to the Communists. In Geneva we seem to be making no progress toward an agreement; on the ground in Laos, though non-Communist forces are by no means lacking in assets, their position in the north is very weak and in the south is gradually eroding away.¹

Thus, we face a choice as to how hard we press at the conference, in possible bilateral talks with the Russians, and conceivably at the UN itself for a unified Laos with a tolerably effective ICC as opposed to resigning ourselves to a split and taking the action necessary to achieve one. Even if we press very hard, it is by no means certain that agreement will be achieved. It may be useful, therefore, to lay out dispassionately the pros and cons of a unified as opposed to a split Laos.

As far as a unified Laos in concerned, the most we can hope for is a unified Laos with a considerable Communist element in the government, which would give relatively free play to the further political development of the Pathet Lao party within Laos and which would exert on the government a strong Communist influence. If there were to be an ICC with adequate powers, including reasonable independence of the Lao government there is some hope that those political elements within Laos which are anxious to maintain the independence of the country would gain strength. But as the weeks go by without agreement this result is becoming increasingly difficult (and perhaps impossible) to achieve; for the Pathet Lao is strengthening its village-level political apparatus in all of the areas that it holds and has apparently gained complete control of the Kong Le neutralist military forces. Souvanna and the neutralists may rally their forces, and if all the non-Communists could make common cause the situation may not be lost. But without an effective, independent international presence, it seems most unlikely under the most favorable assumptions, that a neutralist Lao government could successfully resist pressures from Hanoi. To simplify the problem, therefore, we should compare the most favorable case we can envisage—a neutral government with a tolerably effective ICC with a split Laos.

The case for a neutral unified government is as follows.

1. There will be considerable Lao and international resistance to splitting another country. There will also be great resistance to taking—or supporting—the paramilitary or military moves that probably will be necessary to achieve a split Laos. In short, the weight of opinion in areas not directly involved or responsible will bear on us to accept a political settlement, even if the government and the ICC controls are ambiguous.

2. We would leave open the possibility that a gradual gathering of impulses in Laos for independence might reduce the Communist strength in Laos, notably if the ICC could force the removal of the Vietminh cadres from the army and protect the country from Vietminh penetration. The Meos and other non-Communist military units could meanwhile be a deterrent to drastic Communist action.

3. A unified country would permit the U.S. to disengage from direct involvement in a military-political situation that is extremely awkward and to concentrate in Southeast Asia on Thailand and Viet-Nam.

The argument against a unified neutralist government may be stated as follows.

1. Basically the argument against a neutralist Laos with an ICC is that once the American presence were withdrawn, it might be very difficult, whatever the diplomatic agreement may be, to prevent a subtle or progressive takeover by Communist elements. The continued prolongation of the negotiations in Geneva is likely to result in a further deterioration of the already very weak position of the non-Communists in North and Central Laos and to erode further their position in the South. As a consequence, the non-Communist base from which the non-military struggle in a unified Laos is resumed is likely to be quite weak.

2. We do not know how successful the ICC would be in protecting Lao-Viet-Nam and Lao-Thai borders, but, in view of the inherent difficulties involved, we should not be too optimistic.

The argument for a split is that:

1. As a practical matter, short of U.S. military intervention in Laos, it is the most we can hope to achieve. Even in a supposedly unified neutral Laos, the Communists will control the North.

2. It would provide a political base on which Thai and Vietnamese troops could be introduced into Southern Laos and would provide the possibility of a continued American military presence in the strategic southern part of the country.

3. It would give us time to build a more effective Laos government in the South than we now have.

4. It would put friendly forces along the Laos-Viet-Nam and along a part of the Thai border, south of the seventeenth parallel. Holding southern Laos may be the minimum condition necessary to keeping Thailand and South Viet-Nam non-Communist.

The argument against a split is that:

1. Under present circumstances it would be difficult, and might be impossible, to achieve an effective split without some U.S. military involvement. At a minimum, such involvement would be likely to entail a commitment to send U.S. troops into the South if effective control of that area cannot be achieved by the FAL with the support of the Vietnamese and the Thai.

2. It would virtually guarantee an extension of full-scale Vietminh control down to the southern border of northern Laos.

3. It is uncertain whether infiltration could be effectively checked from northern into southern Laos and thence into Viet-Nam. A split would also leave a long section of the Thai border quite open to infiltration. (For this reason the Thai would probably be unenthusiastic about providing military support to an operation designed only to secure southern Laos.)

4. Political and military viability of a southern Laos government under Phoumi is questionable.

Interim Conclusions

• —It is too soon to decide. We are committed to accept a neutral unified Laos if a tolerable ICC is created. The first job is to see what kind of deal is possible on the Lao government and the ICC.
• —If we get a tolerable settlement our job is to maximize the chance that we get its advantages and minimize the chance that it fails. Contingency planning to this end should be begun, including the following: how all the non-Communists could be brought closer together; how aid could be used to strengthen their hand; what covert operations we would envisage, including role of Meos; how the Viet-Nam and Thai borders could be protected against the weaknesses of the ICC; how more vigorous non-Communist political figures could be sought out and developed, etc.
• —If a split emerges—or turns out to be our best option—we must plan not only military measures to clean out the panhandle, but also political measures to make a southern government more effective in maintaining links of sympathy and support with its people.
• —In any case it is clear that, if we are to hold Southeast Asia, it must be held via Viet-Nam and Thailand. Laos will remain a can of worms.

0. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Taylor NSC, T–624–71. Secret. An unsigned file copy indicates that copies of this paper were also sent to Robert Johnson and U. Alexis Johnson. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Laos: General, 8/1/61–8/10/61) In a memorandum of August 4, Robert Johnson provided comments on a draft of this paper to the effect that the pro-Western and neutralist positions were so weak in Laos that it would be almost impossible to prevent by diplomatic negotiations a Communist take-over. (Ibid.) A note on the memorandum indicates Taylor “noted” it.
1. In a memorandum to Rostow, August 4, Robert Johnson reported the views of a staff analyst responsible for Southeast Asia at the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency. It was that staffer’s personal conclusion that the Pathet Lao had developed a political organization and consolidated their hold on the villages in the countryside to the extent that Souvanna Phouma’s independent political base was seriously undermined. Militarily, the Pathet Lao had the neutralist forces in a squeeze. The result, according to the staffer, was that a de facto partition of Laos would be very difficult. In a memorandum of August 5 to Rostow, Johnson reported that he had talked to Jenkins of FE/SEA who confirmed this view and responded, when asked by Johnson, that Harriman and the other negotiators at Geneva were shutting their eyes to the real situation in Laos. (Both ibid.)