157. Editorial Note
On August 10, a group assembled at the White House to hear a briefing on Laos military contingency planning by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer. In addition to the President, George Ball, U. Alexis Johnson, John Steeves, Allen Dulles, General C.P. Cabell, Richard Bissell, Desmond FitzGerald, McGeorge Bundy, General Maxwell Taylor, Brigadier General Paul Fontana, and Robert McNamara attended. (Kennedy Library, President’s Appointment Book)
No record of the briefing session has been found. From subsequent discussion, it seems that Lemnitzer presented three alternative strategies. The first was SEATO Plan 5/61, the longstanding contingency plan for the introduction of SEATO forces into Laos to seize vital areas such as Vientiane, Seno, Luang Prabang, Xieng Khouang, Thakhek, Savannakhet, Pakse, and tentatively Paksane, as well as vital lines of communications. SEATO Plan 5/61 was designed to release Lao Armed Forces for counterinsurgency operations which would be supported by SEATO air support, communications assistance, and special warfare advice depending on the nature of the insurgency. The plan required a request from the Royal Lao Government and unanimous SEATO member concurrence. (Plan 5/61, “A Plan To Assist the Royal Lao Government To Counter Communist Insurgency in Laos” (MS/623/1/61), April 20; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 333, SEATO Registry Microfilm, Reel S–3–61)
A second alternative that was presented to the President was based on a JCS paper entitled “Concept for Multinational Task Force Operations in Southeast Asia,” which was developed by the Joint Staff and sent to CINCPAC for comments. The paper planned for a multilateral task force comprised of non-mainland Southeast Asia Treaty countries (the United States, Pakistan, New Zealand, Australia, United Kingdom, Philippines, and France) which would deploy to Thailand, South Vietnam, and southern Laos, thus allowing the indigenous armies of these three nations to conduct other military operations. The Multilateral Task Force would conduct offensive air, naval, and guerrilla operations [Page 359] from its positions against north Laos, North Vietnam, and southern China. At CINCPAC insistence, this plan would be “within the SEATO context” and would commit as many U.S. forces as contemplated in SEATO Plan 5, although emphasis would be placed on “conspicuous utilization of Asian forces.” (JCS 2339/11, August 2, and JCS telegram 1051 to CINCPAC, August 7; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JMF 9150/3100 (13 May 61))
A third option, which clearly interested the officials at the White House, was a plan, still in the formative stage, that called for clearing out southern Laos with the combined forces of Thailand, South Vietnam, and the Royal Lao Government supported by U.S. forces. If the cleanup was successful, U.S., Thai, and Lao troops would be moved in to occupy Savannakhet, Thakhek, and Vientiane with the object of securing the Mekong Valley. Much of the support for this plan came from the Vietnam Task Force which considered that it would probably be impossible to save South Vietnam without securing southern Laos. (Memorandum from Robert Johnson to Rostow, August 1, with attached paper on the Laos situation, July 20; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 8/1/61–8/10/61)