Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

153. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

US/MC/7

Paris, August 7, 1961, 10:30 a.m.

Ministerial Consultations on Berlin

Paris, August 4–9, 1961

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary of State
  • Ambassador Gavin
  • Ambassador Harriman
  • Mr. Steeves
  • Mr. Sullivan Mr. Usher
• United Kingdom
  • Lord Home
  • Mr. Malcolm MacDonald
  • Mr. Edward Peck
  • Mr. Michael Butler
  • Sir Pierson Dixon
  • Mr. J.W. Russell
• France
  • M. Couve de Murville
  • M. Jacques Roux
  • M. Charles Lucet
  • M. M. Richer
  • Ambassador Falaize
  • M. Baraduc

Couve de Murville opened the meeting with a request for the tripartite report on Laos.¹

Mr. Roux presented the working committee’s recommendations. In his report, Mr. Roux interjected interpretive comment on three points:

Concerning the item in the report, “Composition of a neutral Lao Government,” he said that Phoumi should be given a very high civilian post in the Government but “not necessarily a ministerial post.”

Under Section B of the paper, “The role of the International Commission,” he recalled that Souvanna has two conditions: These were, first, that he wants to have the Lao Government give its consent for investigation; and, second, he doesn’t want fixed teams, but instead wants to have teams in Vientiane which would go out from there to investigate, having first obtained the Lao Government’s approval.

With reference to Section C, “The Laotian Army and the problem of the Pathet Lao forces,” Mr. Roux stressed the point that Souvanna should be helped during our conversations with him to understand this problem clearly. Roux went on to say that, of course, we can’t go very far in this direction at this time. After our first discussions with Souvanna we would need to have further discussions among ourselves on this problem.

Ambassador Harriman commented that the paper sets forth our minimum conditions for supporting Souvanna as Prime Minister of a neutral Lao Government. He said observance of these minimum conditions would minimize the risk of Communist subversion. Referring to Section D of the paper on the French Military presence, Ambassador Harriman stressed the importance of France sending a very high caliber officer to head up the French military mission. He said this would be particularly important in connection with assisting the Lao Government with the problem of reducing and eliminating the separate Pathet Lao military forces.

Ambassador Harriman went on to say that the discussions should begin with Souvanna quickly, because he has gone back to Xieng Khouang where he is presumably under the influence of his Pathet Lao colleagues. The Ambassador said that we ought to try to separate Kong Le from the Pathet Lao.

Mr. MacDonald said that he had nothing to add to Roux’s presentation except to say that he agreed one hundred percent with the working committee recommendations.

The Secretary then said that he would like to congratulate the working committee on its report and Mr. Roux for his exposition. The Secretary said that it is one thing, however, to agree on a paper and quite another matter to carry it out in Laos on terms which will lead to the results we desire. The Secretary stated that he would like it to be quite clear, in speaking for the United States, that unless we can say with integrity that this government of national unity is genuinely neutral, we cannot support it. We will not put our stamp of approval on a fraud. “If the Lao Government is not neutral,” the Secretary told the other Ministers, “you can expect the United States to pull back rapidly from the concept of this paper.”

The Secretary added that the military situation is also of much concern to the United States, and he suggested making the following addition to the second paragraph of Section C (The Laotian Army and the Pathet Lao Forces): “A first priority should be given to the dissolution or removal of Pathet Lao forces south of Xieng Khouang.”

Lord Home said that, on the composition of the government, the first requirement is that it must be supported by the King. He said that, with reference to the Secretary’s statement, if the cabinet were composed as described in the paper and had the approval of the King, and if Souvanna agreed to carry out the provisions in the paper, he, Lord Home, would have thought that situation to be about as much as we could hope to achieve. Lord Home also said he thought the paper’s specifications for the ICC represented the best we could hope for. He said with respect to Souvanna Phouma’s attitude on permissive inspection, we might be exchanging the Polish veto for a possible veto of the Lao Government.

Turning then to the Secretary’s proposed additional sentence, Lord Home said he would like to ask how we visualized the formation of the new Lao army. He thought that the Pathet Lao and RLG forces would not necessarily be disbanded in a manner which would confine any force to any particular area.

Regarding the continuing French presence, Lord Home said that, although of course desirable, we would experience difficulty negotiating this in the Geneva Conference. He asked Couve what he thought was the minimum we might agree on at the Conference. Lord Home said it would be embarrassing to put forth at the Conference something as a minimum requirement and then have to withdraw it in order to get on with the Conference.

Couve replied that discussion of the subject at Geneva had led to the normal situation; namely, that the nature of the French presence would have to depend on the Lao Government itself. Couve said that in principle it seems proper for the Conference not to take a final position on the matter until there is a new Lao Government.

Couve went on to observe that there are two problems, first, the French military mission, and, second, the base at Seno. The mission is much more important because the base is not really a base at all but merely an airfield, which is convenient but not essential. Speaking of the base, he went on to say that this matter, of course, has to be discussed with the Laotians. Regarding the mission, Couve said it was important both politically and militarily. It was a way of maintaining some kind of Western influence and a way to be informed of what is going on in Laos. He agreed with an interjection by Ambassador Harriman that the mission was also important in precluding instructors coming in from the north. Couve also said that he agreed with the Ambassador that the mission be composed of officers and men of high quality.

Couve then went on to say that the key problem in Laos since 1952 has always been the two armies in Laos. Couve said that in his mind the main problem in the future will be whether there will continue to be a zone which in fact is under another authority than the central government in Vientiane. Couve said he didn’t think Souvanna wants to have a big army. The problem is what will be left besides the regular army and where it will be located. With reference to the Secretary’s proposed additional sentence, Couve observed that by saying the PL should not be allowed to remain in the south, we not imply that they should be allowed to consolidate themselves in the north again.

The Secretary said that we undoubtedly could not start with the dissolution of all forces and then begin to create a Lao army. There would be several stages. First, the withdrawal of foreign forces; second, the regroupment of Lao forces; third, the constitution of the Lao army; and fourth, the dissolution of the excess forces. Otherwise, we would get the dissolution of the FAL and no dissolution of the Pathet Lao. Then we would be left high and dry.

Lord Home said he agreed that it would have to take this course. He asked MacDonald whether there had been any discussion of this in the working group. MacDonald said there has not been enough discussion and that was why the working group had said in the paper that the matter should be discussed further among the three Governments. There had been some difference of opinion, but not necessarily conflicting.

Couve again stressed the key importance of this issue and said that it was very important to talk to Souvanna as soon as possible. It is to Souvanna’s interest to have a new army which would be non-Pathet Lao.

MacDonald said there are indications that Kong Le is having serious difficulties with the Pathet Lao. There are other forces in the north which Souvanna thinks are his own, and he may plan to base a new army on Kong Le and these other forces. Couve again observed that the real problem is the dissolution of the Pathet Lao.

Mr. Steeves said he supposed this process would have to be supervised by the ICC. We probably can’t get back to the 1954 process of regrouping the Pathet Lao in Sam Neua and Phong Saly. We will almost have to have a separation of forces and a drawing from them to create a new army. Maybe there could be a kind of neutral zone. The old forces could be gradually disbanded and a new one started. Under this procedure we would have to try to work out some phased withdrawal, with FAL forces drawing back to a kind of safe haven for them and the Pathet Lao withdrawing to the north.

Couve said yes to this, but added that the real problem is not the creation of a new army but the disbanding of the existing one. Lord Home asked whether we shouldn’t discuss this with Souvanna. Roux replied that we already had, but Souvanna doesn’t seem to have a very clear idea on the matter. The three parties are talking about it in the cease-fire negotiations. However, when the three parties form a coalition government it would be very abnormal for them to discuss this problem any more as three separate parties.

The Secretary then said that while he wished to make it clear that he was not talking about partition, the United States does consider it essential to have friendly forces in the south. The principal elements of the present FAL, who are southerners, ought to be in the south, not Pathet Lao. It may be that for a period of time we may have a kind of Laotian “war-lordism.” In that case we want friends in the south. Lord Home said this would lead to the danger of partition and he thought we would want to disband certain elements wherever they are.

Couve said he agreed with the Secretary but we don’t want to give the impression that we would want the Pathet Lao to continue in the north. The Secretary replied that he would rather give that impression than that we want any Pathet Lao in the south. He added further that the formation of a government with Souvanna as Prime Minister is not going to be an easy task.

Regarding the composition of the government, Couve said he supposed Souvanna was going to keep for himself the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense and Interior. Steeves asked, for himself, or for his lieutenants? Lord Home said he would think that Souvanna would appoint trusted ministers to do the work in these ministries. They should not be NLHX nor NLHX fellow-travelers. The Secretary said there should be nobody in Defense or Interior who was PL or near-PL who would have any real authority over security in the south.

Ambassador Harriman said he hoped Souvanna would be helped to understand that he must not allow Viet Cong to use Lao territory to attack Viet-Nam. The Secretary added that this is indeed in Souvanna’s own interest. He should understand that if he allows these people to go through Laos, he will run the danger of armed reaction from the other side, from across the border in South Viet-Nam.

Lord Home observed that one or two things had been left rather ragged in the foregoing discussion. He said he was not quite sure he agreed with the implications of the Secretary’s statement that regrouping of the PL should all take place in the north. He asked whether it could be recorded that this is a matter on which we would have further discussion. He suggested secondly that it also be recorded that in conversations with Souvanna he should be warned against permitting the use of Lao territory for the passage of foreign forces.

The Secretary said he thought the first point was important because it has a bearing on the discussions with Souvanna. Lord Home said it may be just as well to regroup and disarm military forces where they are.

Couve said one question is whether all these people from the FAL who would be regrouped in the south are people of the south. The Secretary said this was a good point and that he was thinking of regrouping in areas of native habitat. He thought the problem would be clearer after the withdrawal of foreign military forces. There are probably a number of Viet Minh in the south, particularly in the area of Tchepone. Couve observed that if armed elements were sent back to the north, this would consolidate the PL army in the north. It would be better to disarm them before they go. Lord Home said perhaps it could be worked out on the basis of sending disarmed people back to their homes.

Couve said that whatever happened regarding the working committee’s paper as it now stands, we would have to decide what to do about this problem of the PL forces. He suggested that the three Governments should ask their ambassadors and military advisors in Vientiane to make a study of this problem and prepare a staff report.

The Secretary asked Lord Home whether it bothered him to remove the Pathet Lao and the Viet Minh from the south. Lord Home said that certainly the Viet Minh should be gotten out. He thought the Lao people ought to stay in their own home areas. The people from the north should be sent back there but not as units. They ought to be disarmed first.

Couve then said that the Secretary’s idea was that perhaps we should concentrate first on solving the situation in the south. Couve suggested that perhaps we could all agree on that. Lord Home said he thought that would be all right.

It was agreed that the three Governments would act on Couve’s suggestion that the ambassadors and military officials attached to their respective embassies in Vientiane should make a study of the problem and report their findings and recommendations.

0. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Usher, edited and approved by Steeves, and approved in Rusk’s office on August 8.
1. For text of the working paper as approved, see Document 154.