Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

152. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, August 4, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Southeast Asia

Note: After the last NSC meeting¹ General Taylor and I put our heads together with two objectives. First, to set down our understanding of your attitude towards Southeast Asia. Second, to work out the implications of that attitude for Southeast Asia planning. This is the result. The real planning job is being done at State. You may wish to read this and clarify instructions for planning. I am passing this paper to State. General Taylor concurs in this draft.

Assumptions.

As we understand your position: you would wish to see every avenue of diplomacy exhausted before we accept the necessity for either positioning U.S. forces on the Southeast Asian mainland or fighting there; you would wish to see the possibilities of economic assistance fully exploited to strengthen the Southeast Asian position; you would wish to see indigenous forces used to the maximum if fighting should occur; and that, should we have to fight, we should use air and sea power to the maximum and engage minimum U.S. forces on the Southeast Asian mainland.

This means we are prepared to accept a degree of risk arising from a neutral government in Laos and an ICC which promises to be tolerably effective.

On the other hand, we assume that the U.S. will not accept a government in Laos which is de facto Communist and an ICC which would be merely an instrument of a Lao government. And we assume that, to get an acceptable settlement, the other side must believe we have a contingency plan in mind which would cause them more unhappiness than a government and ICC minimally acceptable to us.

Moreover, we assume that, if the other side resumes substantial overt hostilities, we are committed to resist the take over of southern Laos; that is, we assume the U.S. would not stand idly by if the Pathet Lao moved against Vientiane, etc., but, with its allies, would implement SEATO 5 or some variant thereof.

Proceeding from this general formulation of a concept, a number of possible contingencies become apparent:

1. In order to strengthen our negotiating position in Geneva it is necessary to convince the other side that there is a limit to Communist aggression mounted via Hanoi against Southeast Asia which we will accept without a military response.

2. Our contingency plan must envisage increased application of force to meet each of the following possible situations:

• —A de facto split of Laos; in which we would merely mop up the panhandle with such help as we could get for Phoumi from Sarit and Diem, with the minimum American stiffening and guarantees required to make the locals perform.
• —A resumption of the offensive without a substantial increase in Vietminh interference—in which we would install some form of protection of the Mekong cities as a defensive measure but add to it the panhandle mop-up operation by indigenous Southeast Asian forces. At this point, also, it would be appropriate to initiate interdiction operations against Vietminh-Laos supply lines.
• —A substantial increase in Vietminh interference in Laos or Viet-Nam which we would meet on the scale necessary by increasing pressure directly against North Viet-Nam, leading at a maximum, to attacks from the air—also, possibly, from the sea—in the Haiphong-Hanoi area. This graduated pressure could take the form of air strikes against the land lines of communications and supply centers, and sea interdiction of logistical traffic along the east coast of Viet-Nam. It could also include a naval blockade in the Gulf of Tonkin to isolate the Port of Haiphong. The interdiction operation would be susceptible to flexible control at all times to meet a changing military and political situation.
• —A naval and air plan to deal with ChiCom intervention at various levels, including a definition of the nuclear threshold.

It should be noted that this pattern of contingency planning would lessen the rigidity of our present contingency planning—which leaves us with nothing between reliance on the FAL and SEATO Plan 5. It would give us one position short of SEATO Plan 5; that is, an indigenous mop-up of the panhandle. And it would afford us a whole range of alternatives, aside from merely engaging in a widening battle, absorbing more and more American troops in the Mekong Valley, if the battle should escalate.

Diplomatically this plan is based on our defining with clarity a minimum modest position for Geneva, consistent with your understanding with Mr. Khrushchev at Vienna. Our posture in Geneva might be modest but firm with this kind of contingency backup.

Four non-military actions are, however, urgent if we are to have this kind of posture.

• —We must explore the possibility of collaboration among Diem, Sarit, and Phoumi in the panhandle mop-up component; and we must do so without letting Phoumi believe that this is an excuse for not negotiating in good faith.
• —To provide a political base for the threat to North Viet-Nam, we must urgently begin to surface and spread about the evidence on North Viet-Nam aggression in Laos and South Viet-Nam, starting with the Viet-Nam ICC—then the Geneva conference—then, if necessary, the General Assembly of the UN. Moreover, if the Geneva conference goes into a deadlock and the end of the rainy season approaches, we may wish to consider taking the key issue (the ICC) into the UN. It is possible we would do better there than in Geneva since neutrals are braver about distant problems than those closer to home; and the threat to the peace would be self-evident.
• —We must consider—if we adopt this course—when and how we should reopen negotiations on contingency planning with the British and others who might join in this enterprise; although the best situation may be for the French and British to stand down in SEATO.
• —Both to establish what the diplomatic and military possibilities are and to signal our seriousness to the other side, a military mission should proceed to Southeast Asia not much later than the second half of August.

The foregoing lays out our concept and the situations which it must meet. The discussion that follows explores the controlling factors in somewhat greater detail.

A Creeping Violation of the Ceasefire.

Within the cover of the ceasefire the Pathet Lao have built up their positions in southern Laos, notably around the Tchepone area. If the conference drags on, it is altogether possible that after the rainy season closes (towards the end of September) the Pathet Lao will seek to enlarge the areas they hold in the south; and they may begin to use those areas as a base for enlarged operations against South Viet-Nam. In our view, we should begin now to try to build a basis of collaboration among Phoumi, Sarit, and Diem. The object would be a joint operation to clean up the Pathet Lao pockets in southern Laos, if this kind of a creeping offensive should be launched while the Geneva conference is still in progress and the ceasefire still on. We may wish to consider expanding our MAAG in Laos with special forces types who would be helpful in organizing and stiffening such a mopping up operation.

At this state of development, planning for the clean-up in southern Laos appears to be a pertinent contingency. The problem requires further study as to requirements and objectives to assess its feasibility and suitability before fully accepting it.

The Inadequacy of Plan 5.

Plan 5, as presently constituted, provides only for a SEATO force to hold the cities in the Mekong, thus freeing the FAL to go forth and deal with the Pathet Lao. There is no provision for a mop-up of southern Laos and for protection of the Laos-South Viet-Nam frontier. As a supplement to Plan 5, we should, therefore, vigorously encourage cooperation among Phoumi, Sarit, and Diem on a substantial basis, to mop up and to hold southern Laos if the Pathet Lao should resume an overt offensive. So far as Sarit is concerned, it is evident that he would require some guarantees from us to undertake this responsibility. The degree of the guarantee would have to depend on whether the mop-up took place under an agreed split of Laos, a de facto ceasefire, or a resumption of active hostilities.

A Substantial Increase in Vietminh Forces in Laos.

It is possible that, if the offensive is resumed by the Pathet Lao—and especially if SEATO Plan 5 is put into effect—the Vietminh will enter northern Laos in larger numbers. There may also be some ChiCom volunteers. The best deterrent against such a Vietminh or ChiCom movement would be a positioning of our forces, as the situation gets more tense, which would signal to Hanoi and its friends that the battle—if it is enlarged—will take place not in Laos but in North Viet-Nam. Aside from these deterrent moves, we may wish to plan a whole spectrum of U.S. (or SEATO) actions aimed against North Viet-Nam. These could range from harassing sea or air raids all the way up to the bombing or, even, capture of ground in the Haiphong-Hanoi area. The degree of weight applied would be accommodated to the degree of Vietminh aggression across its frontiers. In envisaging such action, we should be aware that our position would be quite unlike that faced by the French. The French problem was to try to hold on to a whole colonial area or to recapture it. Our operations in North Viet-Nam—should they be undertaken—would be merely a sanction designed to force a negotiation. The French could have held Hanoi and Haiphong until the cows came home if that were their only military objective. On the political side, however, in order to justify a positioning of our forces against Hanoi or the possible range of action envisaged, it is necessary and urgent that we begin to make our case before the world for the illegitimacy of Hanoi’s adventures in Laos and Viet-Nam.

What if the ChiComs Come In?

If, along this way, our actions do not yield a negotiated settlement—the UN will certainly enter the picture—it is possible that the ChiComs will enter the engagement. On the Communist side, we should be aware that neither the Russians nor the Vietminh wish the Chinese Communists to become engaged in Southeast Asia. This is in fact one of our substantial bargaining cards in finding a negotiated settlement. Nevertheless, it would be foolhardy not to be prepared to deal with the possibility of Chinese Communist intervention. What we need is a spectrum of sea and naval action designed to chew up Chinese-North Viet-Nam communications and Chinese Communist air and naval power. Such action would be designed to protect the only position we would envisage that American forces might take on the Southeast Asian mainland; that is, a position in the Haiphong-Hanoi area. However—just as in the case of the Berlin exercise—we must peer all the way down the road to the nuclear threshold.

A Unified versus a Split Laos

As the negotiations on Laos move towards a crisis it is important that we assess cooly the pros and cons of a unified versus a split Laos. The argument can be made either way. I think you will wish to look systematically at the pros and cons soon.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia: General, 8/1/61–8/7/61. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that it was sent to Hyannis Port on August 4 to be included in the President’s weekend reading.
1. See Document 127.