Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

151. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy)⁰

Washington, August 3, 1961.

Dear Bill: In our deliberations thus far reviewing the security problem in the Indo-China peninsula, we have recognized the need for a more comprehensive and appropriate military plan to cover certain contingencies. This seemed apparent in our ad hoc meeting of the Southeast Asia Task Force which you attended on July 27.¹ On the 28th during our meeting with the President,¹ he requested that planning be initiated on a priority basis should we face situations differing, however slightly, from those previously envisaged.

While SEATO Plan 5 is quite flexible and is so regarded by our own military community, it does have limitations and is tied by agreement with our SEATO allies, chiefly the British, to certain assumptions. Some of our allies feel that the forces envisaged would not be able to do the job. There is therefore a need to plan for situations which may be of a different magnitude and character than those used as a basis for SEATO Plan 5, which is restricted essentially to the Mekong Valley and the remaining area within Laos currently held by the RLG. General Taylor’s memorandum to the President of July 26, a copy of which I attach,² briefly points up the inadequacy of SEATO Plan 5 in view of certain other contingencies.

In order to give your planners the political guidance and the framework within which to work, I think it best to describe the various political situations which we believe could develop and then, within that prognostication, to develop contingency military plans for each of the situations. These break down as follows:

• Situation 1—Our first assumption is that, with the close of the rainy season, the Communists may take a look at the political conditions then existing and decide that it is to their advantage to press for a rapid military resolution of the Laos impasse. No progress will have been made in reaching agreement for a government of national union between the three Princes, and the Pathet Lao, urged by their communist backers from the North, may conclude that it would be advantageous for them to carry out a rapid investment of the Mekong Valley. They would conclude that they could with relative ease overrun the RLG’s forces and occupy Luang Prabang, Vientiane, Paksane, Thakhek, Savannakhet and thus bring the campaign to a successful conclusion.

  If this deliberate breach of the cease-fire should take place on the communist initiative and if they should move rapidly in such a campaign, it is rather clear that our response would be in accordance with SEATO Plan 5. This has been reviewed again bilaterally with the UK and clearly falls within that concept. We should realistically recognize that France, although committed under SEATO, would not participate actively with her forces. It would be SEATO minus France. Inasmuch as this situation is the one envisaged under the planning already done in character with Plan 5, I will not pursue this alternative further.

• Situation 2—There is a second set of circumstances which could very easily contain the following ingredients: The talks between the Princes drag on and finally result in failure. Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong together will not accept the condition of a government which does not give them a clear majority. General Phoumi with the King’s backing will not accede to Souvanna’s and Souphanouvong’s demands and continues to maintain the present government under Boun Oum and continues resistance.

  There is a variant to this situation which cannot be ignored. Souphanouvong has already refused to join the talks now taking place in Phnom Penh. This may be an indication that under certain circumstances the Pathet Lao and the hard-core communists would defy both the neutralist Souvanna and the RLG. If Souvanna concludes that there is no possibility of his heading a government under a neutralist facade and is thus faced with the black and white choice of siding either with the communist-backed Pathet Lao or with the King and the RLG, with no hope of discovering a middle ground, he may well withdraw from the scene and return to Paris. This possibility is heightened by his current uncertain health.

  During these political negotiations, the talks in Geneva will have made no meaningful progress. The ICC will not have been empowered to set up any effective program of supervision and the Pathet Lao and the Viet Minh will have carried on with their build-up and preparations for a military campaign to start with the beginning of the dry season. In order not to precipitate action under SEATO, they will not take aggressive overt action of a magnitude that would trigger a SEATO response, but might undertake a campaign of guerrilla warfare and terrorism.

  Under these conditions, we would be faced with a virtual and de facto partition of Laos along the lines of territorial control under “the parties” as it now exists.

  A further variant to this situation could well be a regrouping of the RLG in the southern panhandle with a gradual withdrawal from exposed positions in the North, even abandoning Luang Prabang and Vientiane. If the King could be persuaded to move south, the RLG would still have his person but might even be faced with attempting to hold out in the southern province of Champassak with the political advantage of retaining the present Royal Household denied to them.

• Situation 3—There is yet a third set of assumptions we must make: the three Princes through a series of meetings will come to an agreement to put together a government of national union in which there will be Pathet Lao as well as some of the present members of the RLG cabinet, and in the so-called “center” Souvanna Phouma supporters. Such a coalition, which could even be temporarily headed by the King or more likely by Souvanna would have jurisdiction over the entire country and would have the task of producing a neutralized unaligned Laos.

  At Geneva, agreement would have been reached with respect to the role of the International Control Commission. It is highly unlikely that we would have been able to extract all of the objectives we would like but we would have achieved our minimum objectives. The ICC would be in place.

  This situation and attending assumptions would present some difficulty to us for we would have agreed to withdraw our military personnel on the assumption that the Viet Minh and other outside communist elements would also withdraw. We would be committed to respect the neutrality of Laos and to accept the obligations of non-intervention. With Laos in this condition and while waiting to see whether an effective neutral state could, actually exist, our insurance for the security of Southeast Asia would have to be based on our programs in Thailand and Viet-Nam.

While we must be prepared for any of the above situations or even variations of any one of them, it would seem to me that, gazing in the crystal ball, the most likely one to face us is the one roughly described under situation two. In giving priority to your planning operation, I would therefore suggest that you concentrate on this one first.

The first assumption that we must make under situation two is that under these conditions SEATO as such would most likely not be involved. Many of the members of SEATO such as Australia, the Philippines, New Zealand and Thailand would, of course be expected to cooperate but the plan of action would have to be quite different from any situation which SEATO has heretofore forecast.

In addition to other political, economic and psychological measures we would take to strengthen our position in Viet-Nam, Thailand and even Cambodia, I believe that a military plan for this contingency should provide for a two-pronged and possibly a multi-phased operation. We should plan to counter the DRV and base our offensive against them first from Viet-Nam and also from Laos. I believe we should accept the thesis that we have a better political and military position from which to operate against the DRV in Viet-Nam than in Laos. The operation in Laos would therefore be a holding one or one that would strengthen an operation by the RLG, supported by the Thai and Vietnamese, in the panhandle. American support would be kept to a minimum so far as ground operations were concerned but would involve specialized key personnel with ground forces for stiffening purposes, as well as air, sea and logistic support.

I believe the plan should contemplate carrying the offensive in the final stages to the DRV itself. If feasible it should include the utilization of our sea power from the Gulf of Tonkin.

In any military operation of this magnitude, our plans should of course fully take into account the possibility of Chinese or even Soviet intervention. One of the main efforts should be to devise ways and means of limiting the operation to the DRV if possible while bearing in mind the possibility of massive Chinese involvement.

This is a rather tall order in planning but, in view of the critical situation we face in Southeast Asia, I believe we should pursue it urgently.

Sincerely,

U. Alexis Johnson³

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 379/8–361. Top Secret. Drafted by Steeves on August 1 and cleared by Chapman, Usher, Anderson, Jenkins, and McConaughy.
1. No record of this meeting has been found.
1. Document 148.
2. See Document 147.
3. Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.